Viewing cable 04BRUSSELS4438
Title: U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS ON CRISES, FAILING STATES

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
04BRUSSELS44382004-10-15 10:20:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brussels
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS ON CRISES, FAILING STATES 
 
REF: A. LONDON 7312 
 
     ¶B. BRUSSELS 4107 
     ¶C. BRUSSELS 3497 
     ¶D. BRUSSELS 0014 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) On October 5 Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), met with EU 
officials and laid the ground work for closer cooperation 
with the EU in dealing with crises and failing states. 
Agreeing that U.S. and EU priorities fit well in this area, 
EU contacts expressed a desire to work together but cautioned 
that the EU faced institutional and resource constraints. 
Commission interlocutors pointed to a recently proposed 
streamlining of EC foreign assistance, which, if approved for 
2007, would include a "stability instrument" of 500-600 
million Euros to tackle crises in third countries.  EU 
Council officials summarized EU crisis-management operations 
and aspirations, and said a civilian/military planning cell 
-- which might be a good partner for S/CRS -- would be set up 
by end of year.  EU Council Director for Policy and Planning 
Christoph Heusgen suggested that S/CRS work together with his 
office to develop a U.S.-EU dialogue on &early warning8 
assessments of countries at risk.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S., EU ON SIMILAR TRACKS BUT EU HAMPERED 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) EU Council Secretariat Director-General Robert Cooper 
(see ref C) said U.S. plans were "highly relevant to what the 
EU wants to do but now does rather badly;" if the 
constitutional treaty is ratified, he said, an EU Foreign 
Minister and EU Diplomatic Service could help bring together 
"significant political, military and foreign-aid clout" )- 
coordination that the EU currently lacks.  Cooper said that, 
at present, the Council Secretariat was working on crisis 
management, with a military staff of about 150 and a police 
unit of about a dozen police officers, but without an 
institutional framework that encompassed both the political 
authority of the member states and the Commission's funds. 
Until these elements existed under a single framework, the EU 
would continue to "learn crisis management by doing," but 
would not be able to develop an S/CRS equivalent. 
 
¶3. (C) Other interlocutors commented on the EU institutional 
framework as well.  Marc van Bellinghen, Deputy Director of 
the European Commission Office of Conflict Prevention and 
Crisis Management (Directorate-General for External 
Relations), specified the constraints the EU Council 
Secretariat was subject to when trying to act in a crisis 
 
SIPDIS 
situation:  Council action requires unanimous agreement of 
the 25 member states, thus delaying the EU response to crisis 
situations; also, the Council Secretariat has virtually no 
budget (CFSP budget is 50 million Euro/year) and very little 
manpower for taking action outside of Brussels.  Council 
interlocutors, on the other hand, outlined for us the 
constraints under which the Commission must work:  while the 
Commission has money for crisis management, it does not have 
the political backing; whereas Council crisis-management 
operations are usually carried out by people seconded from 
the member states under the political control of the 
member-state officials on the EU Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), the Commission often outsources its 
on-the-ground work to experts without an official connection 
to -- and without the political backing of -- member-state 
governments. 
 
COMMISSION MAY INAUGURATE "STABILITY INSTRUMENT" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (C) Van Bellinghen acknowledged the Commission's need to 
"adapt its foreign-aid instruments" so that the EC could 
"respond to crises in real time."  He said that that was a 
principal purpose of the proposed streamlining of the EC 
foreign-aid system that the Commission had proposed in a 
White Paper published on September 29 ("On the Instruments 
for External Assistance under the Future Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013").  The proposal includes a "stability 
instrument" of about 500-600 million euros per year to tackle 
crises and instability in third countries.  Commission Deputy 
Director-General for External Relations Michael Leigh 
affirmed that such a stability mechanism would give the EC 
more resources and greater flexibility in dealing with crises 
quickly.  For the present, until Council and Commission 
authorities would be brought together under the new 
constitution in 2007, Leigh noted that RELEX focuses more on 
medium-term issues, while crises are more likely to be 
managed by the Council.  He said he expected the Commission 
proposal to get the necessary approval of the European 
Parliament and member states, and to be up and running by 
¶2007.  Leigh added, though, that the amount of money that 
would actually be made available for a stability mechanism 
could not yet be predicted.  (NOTE: Van Bellinghen named the 
500-600m euro figure, but that does not appear in the 
Commission White Paper.  END NOTE.) 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT MOVING UP EU AGENDA 
------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Michael Matthiessen, EU Council Secretariat Director 
of Civilian Crisis Management, said S/CRS activities and 
plans were strikingly similar to that of his Directorate.  He 
said EU priorities for crisis management were expanding 
capabilities for missions in four priority areas: police, 
rule-of-law assistance, civil administration and civil 
protection.  He noted that the EU had succeeded in meeting 
its headline goal targets for building rapid reaction 
capacities in the four priority areas.  Given expanded EU 
membership, the Council was revising targets upward regarding 
the available on-call pool for the four civilian headline 
goal elements and two new areas: monitoring capacity and 
staff for EUSRs. 
 
¶6.  (C) Matthiesen stressed that the Council was responsible 
for not only strategic level planning, but also for the 
operational conduct of EU crisis-response missions.  He 
described the EU's three current civilian crisis-management 
missions:  the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, the 
PROXIMA police mission in FYROM, and the ESDP rule-of-law 
mission in Georgia.  Matthiessen added that EU was 
considering or planning several future missions:  (1) a 
police mission in Kinshasa to train DRC police; (2) the 
sending of police planners to Addis Ababa to help the African 
Union in Darfur; (3) an as-yet undefined civilian crisis 
management mission in Iraq (Matthiessen will go on a 
fact-finding trip to Iraq in October to assess needs for 
civilian crisis management in time for the November 5 visit 
of Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to Brussels); (4) a possible 
police-assistance mission to the Palestinian Territories; and 
(5) a possible replacement of UNMIK police with EU police in 
Kosovo.  (NOTE: deliberations on 3-5 above are in the 
beginning stages.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶7. (C) Most interlocutors pointed out that crisis management 
and dealing with failed and failing states is central to the 
European Security Strategy (ESS), which is the strategic 
foundation of the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP).  An important component of the ESS is "effective 
multilateralism with the UN at its core" (refs B, D). 
Against that background, our EU contacts said the EU would 
enthusiastically welcome an S/CRS approach, as described by 
Pascual, that included close cooperation with the UN.  EU 
Council Secretariat Policy Unit Director Christoph Heusgen 
proposed that a first step on enhancing U.S.-EU coordination 
on crisis issues could be to begin a regular dialogue on 
&early warning8 assessments, given that the U.S. and the EU 
had undertaken similar, regular exercises to identify 
countries at-risk.  He also referred us to the EU-UN Joint 
Declaration on Crisis Management.  Jim Cloos, Council 
Secretariat Director for UN Affairs, Human Rights and 
 
SIPDIS 
Transatlantic Relations, is in charge of implementation of 
the agreement.  In response to Ambassador Pascual,s appeal 
for EU support to encourage concrete efforts by the UN to 
improve coordination among UN agencies involved in 
post-conflict operations, Heusgen said Cloos should be 
brought into the loop in developing thoughts on how EU-UNcooperation might be 
relevant to the S/CRS approach. 
 
CIV/MIL PLANNING CELL: USEFUL S/CRS PARTNER 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Both Cooper and Matthiessen suggested that the 
Council's incipient Civilian/Military Planning Cell (CMPC) 
could be a natural partner for S/CRS.  According to our 
interlocutors, the CMPC should be set up by the end of this 
year, with about 60 staff preparing action plans for crisis 
management -- including both military and civilian components 
as needed -- based on an EU watch list of potential crisis 
countries.  Cooper said he foresaw the CMPC as first 
developing the capability to manage a crisis monitoring 
operation; later, he hoped, it could manage Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs; finally, 
even further in the future, Cooper envisaged the CMPC 
managing post-conflict reconstruction programs.  Ambassador 
Pascual noted that the EU was aware of the U.S. position on 
EU planning capability.  He welcomed, however, the cell,s 
stated role to act as a coordinator of EU civilian 
stabilization and reconstruction activities. 
 
COMMENT: SEEDS PLANTED, CONTINUE CONSULTS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Since the December 2003 approval of the ESS and the 
related advent of the concept of effective multilateralism, 
crisis management and dealing with failing states have been 
moving toward the center of EU foreign and security policy 
thinking.  Thus, this visit to introduce S/CRS struck a 
chord.  EU capabilities and resources in these areas are not 
commensurate with the EU's economic clout or the political 
weight of the member states, but the EU is working hard to 
make progress -- the proposed Commission "stability 
instrument" and the planned Council civ/mil planning cell are 
two examples of this.  Continued consultation with the EU on 
these issues could help us not only to reach our objectives 
for S/CRS, but also encourage a pragmatic and positive 
approach to "effective multilateralism," as opposed to the 
ideological multilateralism of many in the EU with its 
intense suspicion of American "hegemony."  END COMMENT. 
 
¶10. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Pascual. 
 
MCKINLEY