Viewing cable 04MUSCAT2130
Title: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/07/2004

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
04MUSCAT21302004-12-07 13:01:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Muscat
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 002130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC, 
DS/OPO/FPD, DS/IP/SPC/MSG, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/07/2004 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 259800 
 
     ¶B. MUSCAT 2125 
 
Classified By: DCM William R. Stewart. 
Reason: 1.4(c)(g). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU)  Summary: The Ambassador convened the Emergency 
Action Committee December 7 to review updated reporting on 
yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General 
Jeddah.  After a careful review of the facts surrounding the 
attack, the EAC discussed existing countermeasures and 
avenues for further mitigating the threat of a similar 
attack.  EAC members noted no new threat reporting specific 
to Oman, and concurred that there have been no substantive 
changes in previously reported assessments of the local 
security and threat environments (reftel B).  The EAC will 
continue to meet and report regularly.  End Summary. 
 
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Review 
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¶2.  (C)  The Ambassador convened the Emergency Action 
Committee ("EAC") December 7 to review updated reporting on 
yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General 
Jeddah.  The meeting opened with a discussion of the known 
facts, including the contents of reftel A.  The EAC further 
discussed existing countermeasures, such as operating 
procedures for the Chancery vehicle entrance's double set of 
anti-ram vehicle gates and Delta barriers, and their control 
via both Post One and a 15-minute FEBR local guard booth.  To 
mitigate the threat to security, motorpool, facilities, and 
other staff performing functions in or adjacent to the 
motorpool, which lies between the aforementioned sets of 
gates/barriers, the EAC agreed on the necessity of creating 
an alternate safehaven in the carpenter shop (accessible via 
the motorpool).  The alternate safehaven would provide cover 
for staff who, based on the circumstances, might be caught in 
the motorpool between the two sets of barriers an be unable 
to escape attack through the Chancery hard-line.  The EAC 
further agreed on the necessity of scheduling an Embassy-wide 
combined intruder/safehaven drill. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  As previously reported (reftel B), immediately 
following the attack against Consulate General Jeddah, RSO 
requested ramped-up Royal Oman Police (ROP) coverage at both 
the Chancery and in residential neighborhoods; RMAS did the 
same via their Omani government counterparts.  Marine 
Security Guard, Surveillance Detection Unit, and local guard 
personnel were also briefed accordingly. 
 
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MSGQ 
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¶4.  (C)  Specifically addressing the Marine Security Guard 
Quarters (MSGQ), a low-visibility, nondescript -- but not 
unknown -- residence located in a residential neighborhood 
approximately four miles from the Chancery, the EAC 
recommended and agreed to immediately increase guard coverage 
from one to two guards.  The augmentation will enhance access 
control of the MSGQ, by allowing one guard to monitor the 
street and approaching pedestrian/vehicle traffic, while the 
other manually operates the pedestrian and/or vehicle gates. 
RSO will coordinate this EAC decision with DS/OPO/FPD.  NOTE: 
Currently, the MSGQ maintains only one 24/7 guard position. 
This guard must single-handedly control access, screen 
visitors and vehicles, and monitor CCTV monitors.  The guard 
is therefore unable to rove, take hygiene breaks, or respond 
to emergencies or other security-related requests for 
assistance without leaving his post.  In addition, the guard 
relies heavily on the Surveillance Detection Unit to respond 
to calls for assistance, as there is no daytime roving 
patrol.  END NOTE. 
 
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Conclusion 
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¶5.  (S/NF)  After carefully consideration, and noting no new 
threat reporting specific to Oman, the EAC concluded that 
there has been no substantive change in the local security 
environment, and that the Embassy's FPCON and already 
heightened security posture remains appropriate.  The EAC 
remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the 
regional and local security situation, and is prepared to 
take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either 
occur.  AMB, DCM, RSO, ARSO, RMAS, P/E, PAO, CONS, MGT, MSG, 
DAO, OMC (USDR), and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the 
meeting. 
BALTIMORE