Viewing cable 04MUSCAT2246
Title: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/22/2004

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
04MUSCAT22462004-12-22 12:08:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Muscat
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 002246 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC, 
CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KSAC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/22/2004 
 
REF: A. TD-314/70393-04 
     ¶B. JEDDAH 2937 
     ¶C. MUSCAT 2200 
     ¶D. MUSCAT 2130 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. 
Reason: 1.4(c). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU)  The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core 
Emergency Action Committee December 22 to review the 
Embassy's security posture prior to the local holiday 
weekend.  Members of the EAC noted no substantive changes in 
the local security environment since the last meeting. 
Accordingly, the EAC agreed that the Embassy's already 
heightened security posture and FPCON remain appropriate. 
End Summary. 
 
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Security Environment 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On December 22, the Ambassador chaired a meeting 
of the core Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the 
Embassy's security posture prior to the local holiday 
weekend.  The meeting opened with a discussion of the local 
security situation, which the EAC continued to characterize 
as stable.  Members concurred that there have been no 
substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the 
security and threat environments. 
 
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Unsubstantiated Threat Information 
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¶3.  (S/NF)  RMAS briefed the EAC on an unsubstantiated threat 
to the American manager of Hunt Oil Company in Oman (reftel 
A).  In short, information alleges that, as of early October 
2004, the U.S. oil company received an anonymous letter (in 
the U.S.) requesting the withdrawal of their American Manager 
in Oman, who was in danger (NFI).  RMAS advised that they 
(RMAS) are in the process of attempting to verify the 
existence and/or content of the alleged threat letter at the 
headquarters level.  RMAS added that it remains unclear what, 
if anything, transpired with respect to the alleged threat. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  P/E noted that since early October 2004, his 
office has maintained routine contact with Hunt Oil's General 
Manager ("GM") in conjunction with Muscat American Business 
Council activity.  During this time, however, the GM did 
not/not express concern or awareness of any threats on him or 
Hunt Oil operations in Oman.  RSO and CONS, who also maintain 
limited contact with Hunt Oil's GM, affirmed the same.  It 
was also noted that the GM is an active affiliate member of 
the Muscat Employee Association's recreation facility, a 
venue that offers social contact with Embassy staff and 
families, as well as others from the private-sector American 
citizen community.  The fact that the GM does not appear to 
have discussed the alleged threat may call into question the 
threat's veracity, or supports the idea that he was not made 
aware of the threat, should it actually exist.  NOTE: Prior 
to the EAC meeting, the Economic/Commercial Officer attempted 
to contact Hunt Oil's GM on an unrelated matter; he was told 
that the GM was currently in the U.S. on holiday (NFI).  END 
NOTE. 
 
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Events, Holiday Services, and Vigilance 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The EAC again conducted a review of the private 
and official events scheduled for the remainder of the 
holiday season.  DAO highlighted the upcoming visit of the 
U.S.S. Barry (DDG 52), a non-saluting Destroyer, to Port 
Sultan Qaboos in Muscat from December 23-28.  As with all 
U.S. military ship visits to Oman, security is being closely 
coordinated with the Royal Oman Police ("ROP") Coast Guard. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  RSO confirmed that a list of religious holiday 
services expected to have a significant American attendance 
was forwarded to ROP Operations.  RSO also took the 
opportunity to reiterate that members of the EAC must 
continue reinforcing to both their staffs and family members 
the need for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal 
security, including the need to maintain a low profile and to 
remain unpredictable.  Likewise, RSO re-emphasized the 
importance of immediately reporting suspicious activity or 
security-related incidents, especially those involving 
suspected surveillance, to Post One. 
 
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Lessons Learned from Jeddah 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  RSO distributed copies of, and led a discussion on 
reftel B, regarding lessons learned from the December 6 
terrorist attack on U.S. Consulate General Jeddah.  In 
addition to actions already taken in response to previous 
reporting of the attack, e.g., incorporation of an additional 
safehaven/area in the motorpool (reftel D), the EAC will use 
Jeddah's lessons learned to assist with their ongoing review 
of avenues to enhance and sustain the Embassy's security 
posture. 
 
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EAC Conclusion 
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¶8.  (S/NF)  The EAC concluded that there have been no 
substantive changes in the local security environment since 
the last meeting held on December 18 (reftel C), and that the 
Embassy's FPCON and already heightened security posture 
remain appropriate.  Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely 
aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local 
security and threat environments, and is prepared to take the 
necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur. 
AMB, A/DCM, RSO (Duty Officer), RMAS, P/E, CONS, A/MGT, DAO, 
OMC (USDR), and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting. 
BALTIMORE