Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE2290
Title: SEPT 13-14 GAERC: DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH OFFICIALS

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
04THEHAGUE22902004-09-10 09:56:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL NL EUN
SUBJECT: SEPT 13-14 GAERC:  DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH OFFICIALS 
 
REF: A. STATE 193154 
     ¶B. BISHARAT/SCHOFER E-MAIL 
     ¶C. 9/8/04 
 
Classified By: Polcouns A. Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  Emboffs discussed Sept 13-14 GAERC agenda 
and reftel subjects with MFA Political Affairs Department 
Director Jaap Werner on September 8 and with MFA European 
Correspondent Joep Wijnands on September 9.  The Dutch 
clearly signaled that EU member states on the IAEA board will 
not support referral of the Iran issue to the UNSC.  The 
Dutch are committed to finding EU funds for the UN Protection 
Force in Iraq despite technical and legal obstacles involving 
the Commission.  Other EU support activities for Iraq (police 
training etc) are still in the process of being defined.  The 
Dutch anticipated no serious EU disagreements on Sudan/Darfur 
or Bosnia.  The upcoming GAERC will also discuss Belarus 
(elections), African Great Lakes (probable support for 
proposed reinforced UN role), and ASEM (formal endorsement of 
Gymnich decision on Burmese participation).  End summary. 
 
Sudan/Darfur 
------------ 
 
¶2. (C) The EU agrees with the US about the need to maintain 
international pressure on the Sudanese government to fulfill 
its commitments.  The GAERC will have sanctions "explicitly 
on the table," which in practical terms means that the 
ministers want to look at the options and have the ground 
prepared to implement sanctions "immediately" if appropriate. 
 The EU wants to "reinforce" the African Union observer 
mission in Darfur and support financially or logistically. 
But the EU wants to respect AU and UN "ownership" of action 
in Darfur and will await AU requests and/or UN decision 
before acting.  Werner added, however, that the EU will not 
be passive in awaiting an invitation but will be in contact 
with AU on needs. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶3. (C) The GAERC will want to express concern about 
developments in Iran not only with regard to the nuclear 
issue but also human rights.  However, the EU position will 
not support a referral by the September IAEA Board of 
Governors to the Security Council.  Werner said that member 
states -- including the UK, Germany, and France -- believed 
it was too early and too risky to refer the issue to the 
Security Council, particularly since the expected IAEA 
report, taken alone, did not appear to justify such a step. 
Werner suggested that the time until the November BOG meeting 
should be used to intensify pressure on Iran to cooperate, 
and to convince Russia and China not to block possible action 
at the Security Council.  Moving the issue to the Security 
Council too soon, he said, would allow Iran to "get off the 
hook" by ending its cooperation with the IAEA.  Without a 
"plan B," the international community would "lose its grip" 
on the process and end up exerting even less pressure on 
Iran.  Wijnands separately expressed it as a member state 
belief that referral in September "could make things worse" 
but if by November there has been no movement from Iran, then 
referral "would become a concrete option."  Emboffs stressed 
that the costs of failing to hold Iran to account were 
mounting and argued that the international community sent the 
wrong signal to Iran by not referring the issue to the 
Security Council. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶4. (C) The Dutch officials said that the EU is leaning toward 
providing significant financial support to the UN Protection 
Force in Iraq, although they cautioned that the details 
(including total figures) remained to be worked out.  The 
hitch that developed at the Gymnich over whether the funds 
could come from the Commission or not was primarily a 
technical issue, they said.  Werner noted that the Dutch have 
asked their own legal people to counter the Commission 
argument that Commission funds cannot be used for "military 
operations" -- so far, however, the Dutch legal advisors were 
leaning toward accepting the Commission argument.  Speaking a 
day later, Wijnands seemed more definite, saying it appeared 
that member states would have to come up with the money, 
though some may still want to argue at the GAERC that the 
protection force would not be a military operation.  Werner 
said the twenty million for election support is "locked in" 
for that and could not be shifted to protection force 
support.  Both stressed that the Dutch, as EU president, 
would continue to push member states to come up with the 
necessary funds individually if Commission funds were not 
available. 
 
¶5. (C) Werner and Wijnands both said that they had "heard" 
that states earlier identified as providing the 1,800 
soldiers for the protection force might now be reluctant to 
do so.  The level of EU support for the force, they 
suggested, might depend to some degree on whether the force 
was viewed as a truly international, independent force or a 
subset of the MNF.  Drawing from refs, poloffs stressed that 
a number of states have offered to provide troops if the 
costs were met by a third party, such as the EU. 
 
¶6. (C) The GAERC will move ahead with endorsing the 
conclusions of the EU's exploratory mission (already 
informally endorsed at the Gymnich) calling for EU support 
for police training, civil administration, rule of law, and 
elections.  The Commission is to come up with specific 
proposals in these areas, but these will probably not be 
ready for Council review until the October GAERC.  Werner and 
Wijnand predicted that any election observers would most 
likely be made available by member states rather than the 
Commission given the Commission's concerns regarding 
security, although Werner noted that this could change if the 
security situation improved.  Werner reiterated that FM Bot 
had invited Iraqi PM Allawi to address the November 5 
European Council meeting, and said that the Dutch also hoped 
to receive Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawer in The Hague during 
his current European tour.  (Note:  If al-Yawer does not come 
to The Hague, then FM Bot would try to meet him in Brussels 
when both are there next week.  End Note.) 
 
Other GAERC issues: Belarus, African Great Lakes, and ASEM 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶7. (C) According to Wijnands, ministers will use the occasion 
of the GAERC to remind Belarus that the October 17 
parliamentary elections should be "free and fair", as should 
the planned referendum on a constitution amendment that would 
permit Lukachenko to continue as president.  On the Great 
Lakes, the ministers will discuss the situation and the UN 
Secretary General's proposals for reinforcing the MONUC in 
 
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the Congo.  At the Gymnich the ministers basically concluded 
that the EU should be ready to contribute more, either money 
or manpower, because the situation threatens stability not 
only in the Congo, but in the region.  On ASEM, the GAERC is 
expected to endorse formally the "package" that was approved 
at the Gymnich that will permit the ASEM to proceed with 
Burmese participation at the minister level.  (Note:  On 
ASEM, Werner noted that the French -- who had not been 
present at the Gymnich discussion -- had posed some 
"technical" concerns regarding the package, but he did not 
expect these to prevent the GAERC from endorsing the 
compromise.  End Note.) 
 
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