Viewing cable 05GENEVA1361

05GENEVA13612005-06-03 09:01:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 001361 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
        FACILITY APRIL 20-26 2005 
     ¶B. STATE 84840 (ANC/STR 05-393/142) 
     ¶C. 04 STATE 267697 (JCIC-DIP-04-026) 
     ¶D. MOSCOW 2997 
     ¶E. 04 STATE 140091 (JCIC-DIP-04-009) 
     ¶F. 04 GENEVA 2986 (JCIC-XXVI-042) 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-011. 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  May 30, 2005 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
¶3.  (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on May 30, 2005, to discuss the problems encountered 
during the April 20-26, 2005, SS-25 ICBM elimination 
inspection at the Votkinsk Conversion or Elimination (C or E) 
Facility.  The Russians expressed dissatisfaction with the 
way the U.S. conducted the SS-25 elimination inspection. 
They said the additional information requested by the United 
States was not required by the Treaty.  The U.S. side 
explained that the United States could not confirm the 
elimination because all of the missile elements were not 
presented.  The Russians explained that the guidance and 
control module was an integral module, and not part of the 
self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) or front section. 
¶4.  (S) On preliminary cuts of nozzles, the U.S. side said 
such cuts should not affect the shape, dimensions, or 
distinguishing features of an element subject to elimination. 
 The Russians said the nozzles had undergone experiments, and 
that, in the future, the use of open source photographs 
during inspections would not be permitted. 
¶5.  (S) When asked why ambiguity photographs were not taken 
as requested by the U.S. team, the Russians said the 
inspection team was not able to articulate the essence of the 
ambiguity.  Also, Russia raised a new problem related to 
confirming the type of missile after removal of the 
propellant through burning of the first-stage solid rocket 
motor.  The resultant destruction of part of the end dome of 
the motor case would be likely to change the dimensions and 
appearance of the stages, thus affecting the ability of 
inspectors to confirm the type of ICBM being eliminated. 
¶6.  (S) At a Working Group Meeting at the Russian Mission on 
May 30, 2005, Fedorchenko stated that Russia saw the first 
SS-25 elimination inspection at Votkinsk as an historic event 
which Russia had hoped would provide valuable experience to 
inspectors and escorts to draw from in future SS-25 
elimination inspections.  However, Russia was dissatisfied 
with the U.S. inspection team due to their unexpected 
comments in the Official Inspection Report (OIR) (REF A). 
Russia was also displeased with the "absolutely unclear" U.S. 
NRRC Notification (REF B), which stated that the United 
States considers that the status of the four SS-25 ICBMs 
remains open.  The U.S. inspection team had confirmed the 
missile type and the missile elements that were presented for 
elimination, so Russia did not understand why the United 
States could not confirm the eliminations.  The Russian 
Delegation stated it was prepared to listen to U.S. concerns 
and to reach full and complete understanding on this issue. 
¶7.  (S) Buttrick stated that, based on previously exchanged 
communications about the applicability of the Bershet' SS-24 
elimination experience, the United States had expected that 
Russian escorts would work more cooperatively with U.S. 
inspectors to confirm the elimination of the four SS-25 ICBMs 
in April 2005.  This was especially important because U.S. 
inspectors had no previous experience with SS-25 ICBM 
eliminations.  The U.S. demarche of December 14, 2004 (REF C) 
had stated, for example, that the dimensions of the SS-24 
ICBM first-stage without nozzles attached and photographs of 
the elements of a disassembled SS-24 missile were essential 
for the U.S. inspection team to be able to confirm the 
elimination of SS-24 ICBMs at Bershet'. 
¶8.  (S) Fedorchenko stated that Russia consistently 
maintained that the eliminations of SS-24s in Ukraine had 
nothing to do with the eliminations of SS-25s and SS-24s in 
Russia.  Ukraine had chosen its own way, and Russia was being 
guided only by the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) 
Protocol.  This understanding had been confirmed by numerous 
JCIC documents.  The provision of additional information was 
not required by the Treaty, a position Russia had made clear 
in its March 17, 2005 non-paper (REF D).  Fedorchenko 
asserted that U.S. inspectors had confirmed both the type of 
missile through measurements of the first-stage and launch 
canister, and such confirmation had included confirmation of 
the elements subject to elimination. 
¶9.  (S) Buttrick stated that U.S. inspectors could not 
confirm the elimination of these missiles because the 
procedures required by Paragraph 4 of Section I of the C or E 
Protocol were not completed.  Specifically, for all four 
missiles, Russia did not present the entire SCDM for 
elimination; Russia also presented three objects declared to 
be SS-25 first, second, and third stage nozzles that 
inspectors were unable to identify as nozzles from SS-25 
¶10.  (S) Buttrick detailed U.S. concerns further, stating 
that the inspected Party presented for elimination only one 
of two sections that together comprise the SCDM.  The aft 
section containing the maneuvering rockets was presented for 
elimination, but the forward section containing guidance and 
control equipment was not presented.  Buttrick indicated the 
section he was describing using a technical exhibition 
photograph.  Buttrick also stated that Subparagraph 2(b) of 
Section I of the C or E Protocol permitted removal of 
"electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's 
guidance and control system from the missile" prior to an 
elimination inspection, but this provision did not state that 
the inspected Party may remove the section of the missile 
airframe containing such devices. 
¶11.  (S) Fedorchenko responded that Russia used its Treaty 
right to remove electronic components of the guidance and 
control system.  All of the equipment was assembled into a 
unified component, which was the cylindrical element pointed 
out by Buttrick.  This element had never been considered a 
part of the SCDM by Russia.  He also stated, on his own 
behalf, that these elements were at the April 2005 inspection 
and ready to be submitted to U.S. inspectors to assist in 
confirmation of missile type, but that this proved to be 
unnecessary.  Russia had been surprised to find this element 
later mentioned in the OIR. 
¶12.  (S) Fedorchenko stated that, in the December 14, 2004 
U.S. demarche (REF C), the United States had enumerated the 
13 elements it wanted to see at the inspection for each 
particular missile, and that this component was not included 
in that list by the United States; Russia had, therefore, 
assumed that the United States had agreed to the Russian 
Treaty right to remove this section. 
¶13.  (S) Buttrick asked why it was not possible to remove the 
individual electronic devices so the airframe could be 
presented for elimination.  If this device was not part of 
the SCDM, it was still part of the front section and should 
therefore be eliminated. 
¶14.  (S) Fedorchenko said that the shell of this system was 
an integrating component for all parts of the system and 
could therefore not reasonably be disassembled.  The system 
was needed by Russia for other purposes, and it would be 
useless in disassembled form.  Because of different cables 
and joints, it was unreasonable to try to disassemble it.  He 
also stated that there were many vague points and loopholes 
in the Treaty, and Russia considered that this was an element 
it could remove. 
¶15.  (S) Foley noted that his understanding was that, during 
the initial technical exhibition for the SS-25 ICBM, Russian 
escorts did not inform U.S. inspectors that Russia did not 
consider this element to be part of the SCDM.  The U.S. 
communication to Russia in December 2004 was meant to solicit 
more information from Russia to prevent this type of surprise. 
¶16.  (S) Buttrick laid out U.S. concerns regarding the 
preliminary cuts made to first, second and third stage 
nozzles prior to the April 2005 elimination inspection.  In a 
June 2004 demarche, and at a Heads of Delegation Meeting 
during the last JCIC session (REFS E and F), the United 
States stated that it would not object to the use of 
preliminary cuts for mobile missiles and their launchers as 
long as the cuts did not affect the shape, dimensions, or 
distinguishing features of an element subject to elimination. 
 The United States continued to believe that, in order to 
allow inspectors to visually confirm all elements, the 
inspected Party should present those portions of the nozzle 
removed by pre-cuts for viewing with the nozzle. 
¶17.  (S) Fedorchenko stated that it was obvious that the 
items presented during the April 2005 elimination inspection 
were nozzles.  Further, during the pre-inspection brief, 
Russia had stated that all nozzles had undergone experiments 
and each and every nozzle's situation had been clarified.  It 
was unclear why such a small doubt had caused such a strict 
comment in the OIR.  The nozzles had been cut into pieces and 
would obviously never be used again.  He asserted that the 
sides were left in a situation in which all elements on all 
four missiles had been confirmed, their elimination had been 
confirmed, and the missile types had been confirmed, but the 
elimination of the missiles was not confirmed.  Was the 
United States still convinced these four missiles were still 
attributed to the Votkinsk C or E facility? 
¶18.  (S) Buttrick reiterated that the United States continued 
to view the status of these ICBMs as open. 
¶19.  (S) Fedorchenko asked the United States to consider the 
Peacekeeper situation, in which the United States claims that 
the elimination of the first stage is enough to remove the 
missile from attribution.  For the SS-25, Russia eliminates 
much more and it is not called an elimination. 
¶20.  (S) Buttrick stated the Peacekeeper eliminations were 
inappropriate to discuss in this context because this group 
was addressing SS-25 eliminations. 
¶21.  (S) Buttrick stated that U.S. inspectors had been unable 
to identify three objects declared by the Russian escorts to 
be SS-25 first, second and third stage nozzles.  The 
inspectors were prepared to use open-source photographs of 
the nozzles in identifying the nozzles, but Russian escorts 
did not cooperate in verifying their accuracy.  Would Russia 
now confirm their accuracy?  Buttrick further noted his 
assumption that escorts will not object to the use of these 
photographs in the future. 
¶22.  (S) Regarding the U.S. inspectors' inability to identify 
the nozzles, Fedorchenko brought up Russian concerns 
regarding the elimination of the reentry vehicle platforms of 
the Minuteman III ICBMs that had been downloaded, and stated 
that the Russian answer now would be similar to the U.S. 
answer then:  the element in question was mentioned nowhere 
in the Treaty except in the first section of the C or E 
Protocol.  There is no picture of an SS-25 nozzle, or listing 
of its dimensions, in the Treaty.  The submitting of 
photographs of nozzles is not a Treaty requirement. 
¶23.  (S) Fedorchenko also expressed indignation that U.S. 
inspectors had tried to use materials not officially 
submitted by Russia, calling a U.S. team member's proposal to 
make the open-source photographs of SS-25 nozzles official a 
"provocation."  Unofficial pictures were not to be used 
during START inspections.  Any decision to add photographs to 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had to take place at 
¶24.  (S) Buttrick pointed out that the SS-25 ICBM is in a 
canister for its entire life cycle from the time it departs 
Votkinsk.  The technical exhibition was the only time the 
United States had seen it out of its canister.  How were 
inspectors who had never seen these missile elements before 
supposed to identify them?  In particular, how would 
inspectors tell that the nozzles presented were for the SS-25 
and not another ICBM?  The United States was seeking to find 
a solution that would allow inspectors to complete their 
Treaty task.  If this problem was not resolved, it could 
create future problems; it was to Russia's benefit to seek a 
solution that would potentially reduce the duration of 
¶25.  (S) Buttrick stated that extensive dialogue on ambiguity 
photographs had taken place at prior meetings.  He related 
that, when U.S. inspectors had difficulty identifying the 
SS-25 nozzles and their Russian escorts did nothing to help, 
they requested an ambiguity photograph of that item.  He 
asked why Russian escorts denied the inspecting Party's 
request, made in accordance with Paragraphs 18 and 27 of 
Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, a provision of the 
Treaty developed for this reason. 
¶26.  (S) Fedorchenko stated that the U.S. inspector 
requesting the ambiguity photograph was unable to 
satisfactorily articulate the essence of the ambiguity that 
would require the taking of a photograph; the request was 
therefore correctly denied.  Ambiguity photographs would have 
been useless for resolving the matter because there are no 
MOU photographs of the nozzles with which to compare them. 
He also asked where the Treaty says that inspectors must 
confirm a type of nozzle.  Finally, he asked whether the U.S. 
side considered that Russia was trying to present nozzles 
from another missile. 
¶27.  (S) Fedorchenko stated at the end of the meeting that 
fuel removal from first stages through burning will cause the 
stage's appearance and dimensions to change.  The aft end 
dome would be damaged enough to potentially affect an 
inspectors' ability to confirm type through a first-stage 
rocket motor case measurement.  He illustrated this with what 
he called personal and unofficial photographs.  The burned 
first-stage displayed in the April 2005 inspection was a best 
case scenario, in that its length was only reduced to 7 
meters, 19 centimeters.  Russia believed that some burned 
missiles would be shortened to under 7 meters, 18 
centimeters, which would take them outside the three percent 
Treaty measurement tolerance.  He suggested that Russia 
propose several options to resolve this issue, but wanted 
U.S. reaction to its March 17 non-paper first. 
¶28.  (S) All Parties agreed to discuss these issues further 
at this session, in the interest of facilitating future 
inspections and avoiding any possible delays in the 
eliminations schedule.  Fedorchenko added that resolving 
these issues prior to the close of the first part of this 
session was important because there may be eliminations 
during the intersession. 
¶29.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
¶30.  (U) Participants: 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Foley 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Jones 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Maj Mitchner 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Page 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Tiersky 
Mr. French (Int) 
Mr. Grinevich 
Mr. Baysuanov 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Bolotov 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Mr. Kashirin 
Ms. Kotkova 
Col Maksimenko 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Shabalin 
Mr. Yegerov 
Mr. Uspenskiy (Int) 
Mr. Taran 
¶31.  (U) Look sends.