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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON SS-25
ELIMINATIONS, MAY 30, 2005
REF: A. OIR SS-25 ELIMINATIONS AT VOTKINSK C OR E
FACILITY APRIL 20-26 2005
Â¶B. STATE 84840 (ANC/STR 05-393/142)
Â¶C. 04 STATE 267697 (JCIC-DIP-04-026)
Â¶D. MOSCOW 2997
Â¶E. 04 STATE 140091 (JCIC-DIP-04-009)
Â¶F. 04 GENEVA 2986 (JCIC-XXVI-042)
Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
Â¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-011.
Â¶2. (U) Meeting Date: May 30, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Â¶3. (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on May 30, 2005, to discuss the problems encountered
during the April 20-26, 2005, SS-25 ICBM elimination
inspection at the Votkinsk Conversion or Elimination (C or E)
Facility. The Russians expressed dissatisfaction with the
way the U.S. conducted the SS-25 elimination inspection.
They said the additional information requested by the United
States was not required by the Treaty. The U.S. side
explained that the United States could not confirm the
elimination because all of the missile elements were not
presented. The Russians explained that the guidance and
control module was an integral module, and not part of the
self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) or front section.
Â¶4. (S) On preliminary cuts of nozzles, the U.S. side said
such cuts should not affect the shape, dimensions, or
distinguishing features of an element subject to elimination.
The Russians said the nozzles had undergone experiments, and
that, in the future, the use of open source photographs
during inspections would not be permitted.
Â¶5. (S) When asked why ambiguity photographs were not taken
as requested by the U.S. team, the Russians said the
inspection team was not able to articulate the essence of the
ambiguity. Also, Russia raised a new problem related to
confirming the type of missile after removal of the
propellant through burning of the first-stage solid rocket
motor. The resultant destruction of part of the end dome of
the motor case would be likely to change the dimensions and
appearance of the stages, thus affecting the ability of
inspectors to confirm the type of ICBM being eliminated.
RUSSIA DISSATISFIED WITH U.S. INSPECTORS
Â¶6. (S) At a Working Group Meeting at the Russian Mission on
May 30, 2005, Fedorchenko stated that Russia saw the first
SS-25 elimination inspection at Votkinsk as an historic event
which Russia had hoped would provide valuable experience to
inspectors and escorts to draw from in future SS-25
elimination inspections. However, Russia was dissatisfied
with the U.S. inspection team due to their unexpected
comments in the Official Inspection Report (OIR) (REF A).
Russia was also displeased with the "absolutely unclear" U.S.
NRRC Notification (REF B), which stated that the United
States considers that the status of the four SS-25 ICBMs
remains open. The U.S. inspection team had confirmed the
missile type and the missile elements that were presented for
elimination, so Russia did not understand why the United
States could not confirm the eliminations. The Russian
Delegation stated it was prepared to listen to U.S. concerns
and to reach full and complete understanding on this issue.
APPLICABILITY OF BERSHET' EXPERIENCE
Â¶7. (S) Buttrick stated that, based on previously exchanged
communications about the applicability of the Bershet' SS-24
elimination experience, the United States had expected that
Russian escorts would work more cooperatively with U.S.
inspectors to confirm the elimination of the four SS-25 ICBMs
in April 2005. This was especially important because U.S.
inspectors had no previous experience with SS-25 ICBM
eliminations. The U.S. demarche of December 14, 2004 (REF C)
had stated, for example, that the dimensions of the SS-24
ICBM first-stage without nozzles attached and photographs of
the elements of a disassembled SS-24 missile were essential
for the U.S. inspection team to be able to confirm the
elimination of SS-24 ICBMs at Bershet'.
Â¶8. (S) Fedorchenko stated that Russia consistently
maintained that the eliminations of SS-24s in Ukraine had
nothing to do with the eliminations of SS-25s and SS-24s in
Russia. Ukraine had chosen its own way, and Russia was being
guided only by the Conversion or Elimination (C or E)
Protocol. This understanding had been confirmed by numerous
JCIC documents. The provision of additional information was
not required by the Treaty, a position Russia had made clear
in its March 17, 2005 non-paper (REF D). Fedorchenko
asserted that U.S. inspectors had confirmed both the type of
missile through measurements of the first-stage and launch
canister, and such confirmation had included confirmation of
the elements subject to elimination.
Â¶9. (S) Buttrick stated that U.S. inspectors could not
confirm the elimination of these missiles because the
procedures required by Paragraph 4 of Section I of the C or E
Protocol were not completed. Specifically, for all four
missiles, Russia did not present the entire SCDM for
elimination; Russia also presented three objects declared to
be SS-25 first, second, and third stage nozzles that
inspectors were unable to identify as nozzles from SS-25
PART OF SCDM NOT PRESENTED FOR ELIMINATION
Â¶10. (S) Buttrick detailed U.S. concerns further, stating
that the inspected Party presented for elimination only one
of two sections that together comprise the SCDM. The aft
section containing the maneuvering rockets was presented for
elimination, but the forward section containing guidance and
control equipment was not presented. Buttrick indicated the
section he was describing using a technical exhibition
photograph. Buttrick also stated that Subparagraph 2(b) of
Section I of the C or E Protocol permitted removal of
"electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's
guidance and control system from the missile" prior to an
elimination inspection, but this provision did not state that
the inspected Party may remove the section of the missile
airframe containing such devices.
Â¶11. (S) Fedorchenko responded that Russia used its Treaty
right to remove electronic components of the guidance and
control system. All of the equipment was assembled into a
unified component, which was the cylindrical element pointed
out by Buttrick. This element had never been considered a
part of the SCDM by Russia. He also stated, on his own
behalf, that these elements were at the April 2005 inspection
and ready to be submitted to U.S. inspectors to assist in
confirmation of missile type, but that this proved to be
unnecessary. Russia had been surprised to find this element
later mentioned in the OIR.
Â¶12. (S) Fedorchenko stated that, in the December 14, 2004
U.S. demarche (REF C), the United States had enumerated the
13 elements it wanted to see at the inspection for each
particular missile, and that this component was not included
in that list by the United States; Russia had, therefore,
assumed that the United States had agreed to the Russian
Treaty right to remove this section.
Â¶13. (S) Buttrick asked why it was not possible to remove the
individual electronic devices so the airframe could be
presented for elimination. If this device was not part of
the SCDM, it was still part of the front section and should
therefore be eliminated.
Â¶14. (S) Fedorchenko said that the shell of this system was
an integrating component for all parts of the system and
could therefore not reasonably be disassembled. The system
was needed by Russia for other purposes, and it would be
useless in disassembled form. Because of different cables
and joints, it was unreasonable to try to disassemble it. He
also stated that there were many vague points and loopholes
in the Treaty, and Russia considered that this was an element
it could remove.
Â¶15. (S) Foley noted that his understanding was that, during
the initial technical exhibition for the SS-25 ICBM, Russian
escorts did not inform U.S. inspectors that Russia did not
consider this element to be part of the SCDM. The U.S.
communication to Russia in December 2004 was meant to solicit
more information from Russia to prevent this type of surprise.
Â¶16. (S) Buttrick laid out U.S. concerns regarding the
preliminary cuts made to first, second and third stage
nozzles prior to the April 2005 elimination inspection. In a
June 2004 demarche, and at a Heads of Delegation Meeting
during the last JCIC session (REFS E and F), the United
States stated that it would not object to the use of
preliminary cuts for mobile missiles and their launchers as
long as the cuts did not affect the shape, dimensions, or
distinguishing features of an element subject to elimination.
The United States continued to believe that, in order to
allow inspectors to visually confirm all elements, the
inspected Party should present those portions of the nozzle
removed by pre-cuts for viewing with the nozzle.
Â¶17. (S) Fedorchenko stated that it was obvious that the
items presented during the April 2005 elimination inspection
were nozzles. Further, during the pre-inspection brief,
Russia had stated that all nozzles had undergone experiments
and each and every nozzle's situation had been clarified. It
was unclear why such a small doubt had caused such a strict
comment in the OIR. The nozzles had been cut into pieces and
would obviously never be used again. He asserted that the
sides were left in a situation in which all elements on all
four missiles had been confirmed, their elimination had been
confirmed, and the missile types had been confirmed, but the
elimination of the missiles was not confirmed. Was the
United States still convinced these four missiles were still
attributed to the Votkinsk C or E facility?
Â¶18. (S) Buttrick reiterated that the United States continued
to view the status of these ICBMs as open.
Â¶19. (S) Fedorchenko asked the United States to consider the
Peacekeeper situation, in which the United States claims that
the elimination of the first stage is enough to remove the
missile from attribution. For the SS-25, Russia eliminates
much more and it is not called an elimination.
Â¶20. (S) Buttrick stated the Peacekeeper eliminations were
inappropriate to discuss in this context because this group
was addressing SS-25 eliminations.
Â¶21. (S) Buttrick stated that U.S. inspectors had been unable
to identify three objects declared by the Russian escorts to
be SS-25 first, second and third stage nozzles. The
inspectors were prepared to use open-source photographs of
the nozzles in identifying the nozzles, but Russian escorts
did not cooperate in verifying their accuracy. Would Russia
now confirm their accuracy? Buttrick further noted his
assumption that escorts will not object to the use of these
photographs in the future.
Â¶22. (S) Regarding the U.S. inspectors' inability to identify
the nozzles, Fedorchenko brought up Russian concerns
regarding the elimination of the reentry vehicle platforms of
the Minuteman III ICBMs that had been downloaded, and stated
that the Russian answer now would be similar to the U.S.
answer then: the element in question was mentioned nowhere
in the Treaty except in the first section of the C or E
Protocol. There is no picture of an SS-25 nozzle, or listing
of its dimensions, in the Treaty. The submitting of
photographs of nozzles is not a Treaty requirement.
Â¶23. (S) Fedorchenko also expressed indignation that U.S.
inspectors had tried to use materials not officially
submitted by Russia, calling a U.S. team member's proposal to
make the open-source photographs of SS-25 nozzles official a
"provocation." Unofficial pictures were not to be used
during START inspections. Any decision to add photographs to
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had to take place at
Â¶24. (S) Buttrick pointed out that the SS-25 ICBM is in a
canister for its entire life cycle from the time it departs
Votkinsk. The technical exhibition was the only time the
United States had seen it out of its canister. How were
inspectors who had never seen these missile elements before
supposed to identify them? In particular, how would
inspectors tell that the nozzles presented were for the SS-25
and not another ICBM? The United States was seeking to find
a solution that would allow inspectors to complete their
Treaty task. If this problem was not resolved, it could
create future problems; it was to Russia's benefit to seek a
solution that would potentially reduce the duration of
Â¶25. (S) Buttrick stated that extensive dialogue on ambiguity
photographs had taken place at prior meetings. He related
that, when U.S. inspectors had difficulty identifying the
SS-25 nozzles and their Russian escorts did nothing to help,
they requested an ambiguity photograph of that item. He
asked why Russian escorts denied the inspecting Party's
request, made in accordance with Paragraphs 18 and 27 of
Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, a provision of the
Treaty developed for this reason.
Â¶26. (S) Fedorchenko stated that the U.S. inspector
requesting the ambiguity photograph was unable to
satisfactorily articulate the essence of the ambiguity that
would require the taking of a photograph; the request was
therefore correctly denied. Ambiguity photographs would have
been useless for resolving the matter because there are no
MOU photographs of the nozzles with which to compare them.
He also asked where the Treaty says that inspectors must
confirm a type of nozzle. Finally, he asked whether the U.S.
side considered that Russia was trying to present nozzles
from another missile.
NEW PROBLEM: FIRST STAGE BURNS
TO COMPLICATE TYPE CONFIRMATION
Â¶27. (S) Fedorchenko stated at the end of the meeting that
fuel removal from first stages through burning will cause the
stage's appearance and dimensions to change. The aft end
dome would be damaged enough to potentially affect an
inspectors' ability to confirm type through a first-stage
rocket motor case measurement. He illustrated this with what
he called personal and unofficial photographs. The burned
first-stage displayed in the April 2005 inspection was a best
case scenario, in that its length was only reduced to 7
meters, 19 centimeters. Russia believed that some burned
missiles would be shortened to under 7 meters, 18
centimeters, which would take them outside the three percent
Treaty measurement tolerance. He suggested that Russia
propose several options to resolve this issue, but wanted
U.S. reaction to its March 17 non-paper first.
Â¶28. (S) All Parties agreed to discuss these issues further
at this session, in the interest of facilitating future
inspections and avoiding any possible delays in the
eliminations schedule. Fedorchenko added that resolving
these issues prior to the close of the first part of this
session was important because there may be eliminations
during the intersession.
Â¶29. (U) Documents exchanged: None.
Â¶30. (U) Participants:
Mr. French (Int)
Lt Col Novikov
Mr. Uspenskiy (Int)
Â¶31. (U) Look sends.