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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
SS-25/SS-27 AND MINUTEMAN III REENTRY VEHICLE ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS, JUNE 1, 2005
REF: 04 GENEVA 856 (JCIC-XXVI-005)
Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
Â¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-015.
Â¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 1, 2005
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Â¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on June 1, 2005, to discuss SS-25, SS-27, and
Minuteman (MM) III reentry vehicle on-site inspection (RVOSI)
issues. The U.S. Delegation confirmed that the Russian
Federation had rejected the latest U.S. proposal to use INF
radiation detection equipment (RDE) to resolve its SS-25
RVOSI concerns. The Russian Delegation reminded the U.S.
Delegation that the Russian offer of a one-time demonstration
and future use of the Karusel RDE were still on the table.
When questioned, the Russian Delegation confirmed that there
were no new elements to their offers.
Â¶4. (S) The U.S. Delegation emphasized that the SS-27 RVOSI
issue continued to gain importance to the United States,
given the Russian open source material stating that the SS-27
ICBM could be deployed with more than one warhead. It was
noted that the United States previously had provided a whole
list of solutions, none of which had been responded to in
detail by Russia. The Russian Delegation explained that it
could not understand how the United States could have an
issue with their soft cover.
Â¶5. (S) On MM III RVOSI, the Russian Delegation explained
that inspectors did not have an unobstructed view of the
front section when conducting MM III RVOSIs. The Russians
suggested that the United States pull the front section
completely into the payload transport (PT) van or move the
front section to a special allocated site for viewing. The
U.S. side responded that the presentation of the front
section was fully compliant with the Treaty and, in fact, the
United States even had instituted additional procedures not
required by the Treaty to try and resolve the Russian
Federation's concerns. The Russian Delegation said that the
additional procedures were not helpful.
SS-25 RVOSI: LET ME ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS
Â¶6. (S) Look opened the meeting by reminding the Parties that
the issue of SS-25 RVOSIs has been an agenda item for quite
some time, and a solution eluded the Parties even though
multiple proposals had been tabled by both sides. The latest
U.S. proposal was to include the use of INF Treaty RDE and
procedures. Look asked whether he had heard correctly that
during an earlier working group meeting the Russians had
stated that the INF RDE equipment was not accurate enough and
the process was too complicated. Boryak confirmed that this
was the case.
Â¶7. (S) Look asked where the Parties should go from here.
The United States, he said, has run out of ideas but
continues to have concerns regarding U.S. inspectors'
inability to confirm that the SS-25 was not deployed with
more warheads than it was attributed with. Boryak reminded
Look that Russia's proposal for an SS-25 demonstration was
still on the table. Look asked whether the proposal had any
new elements. Boryak responded that the SS-25 was attributed
and deployed with one reentry vehicle (RV). It had also
never been flight-tested with more than one RV. The results
of the demonstration, first proposed by the Russians in 1999,
would confirm that the SS-25 was not deployed with more than
one RV. Boryak understood that the United States wanted
procedures that could be demonstrated during every SS-25
RVOSI, but he said the procedures were too difficult from a
complexity and security perspective to be conducted during
each SS-25 RVOSI, particularly with the road-mobile versions.
Boryak also reminded Look that, in March 2004, the Russian
Federation had tabled a new proposal (REFTEL) that involved
the use of new RDE called Karusel which was demonstrated to
the United States in April 2004. Use of such equipment would
allow inspectors a non-intrusive way to confirm that the
SS-25 was not deployed with more than one RV. Boryak
believed that the use of the INF RDE would be a step back,
therefore, the March 1999 offer remained on the table
Â¶8. (S) Look observed that neither side was willing to accept
the other side's proposal. Since the procedures proposed for
the demonstration had already been seen by the United States
during an earlier RVOSI, Look asked what the United States
would learn from the one-time demonstration that was new.
Boryak said the United States would be able to tell that one
cone-shaped object was beneath the cover. Look asked whether
the proposal included any new or changed procedures that
would be used during subsequent RVOSIs. Boryak conferred
with Fedorchenko, after which Fedorchenko replied that the
demonstration, taken with all the other information the
United States received regarding SS-25 RV deployment (i.e.,
telemetry, open source material, elimination of the RV
platform during SS-25 elimination inspections) should be
sufficient to satisfy U.S. concerns. The demonstration would
involve choosing a deployed missile at random and included
unprecedented procedures (i.e., pushing in on the cover).
Such procedures required special methods and personnel which
could not be duplicated for every RVOSI.
Â¶9. (S) Look asked whether the Russian Federation expected
the United States to state that the demonstration would
satisfy U.S. concerns prior to the demonstration being
conducted. Boryak appeared to say it would, but then
confused the response by drawing a parallel with the Trident
II demonstration, which did not require that agreement be
reached on the procedures as a prerequisite to Russia
attending the Trident II demonstration.
Â¶10. (S) Look summarized his understanding of the Russian
position as follows: The proposal was the same; the demo
would show what the United States had already seen during an
inspection several years ago; there would be no new
procedures used during the demonstration; there would be no
additional procedures used during subsequent RVOSIs that
would result from the demonstration; the procedures could not
be done during each RVOSI; and Russia wanted the United
States to agree in advance that the demonstration would
resolve its concerns prior to observing the demonstration.
Boryak confirmed that Look's summary was a correct
understanding of Russia's position. Boryak repeated
Fedorchenko's arguments as to why the United States should be
satisfied with the demonstration, but added that the Russian
Federation is open to other solutions. Look stated the
Parties would need to return to the issue. Shevtsov stated
that he thought Fedorchenko's argument was convincing. He
could not understand why the demonstration, plus the use of
the new Karusel RDE, would not satisfy U.S. concerns.
Grinevich concurred with Shevtsov's assessment.
SS-27 RVOSIs: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Â¶11. (S) Look noted that the issue of SS-27 RVOSIs was even
more important to the United States than the SS-25 RVOSI
issue. It was very important to resolve this issue because
the United States continued to see open sources which
described the SS-27 as having multiple warhead capability.
Look quoted the Designer-General of Russia's SS-27s, Yuriy
Solomonov, from the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology,
as stating recently that: "The standardized Solid-fuel
three-stage Topol-M missile can be fitted with a single or
multiple warheads." Look noted that the United States had
proposed a whole list of solutions, citing the limiting of
the diameter of the base of the cover as an example.
However, the proposals had never been discussed fully, which
showed that Russia had no interest in them. The United
States was willing to work on any new proposals to resolve
the issue, but it had no knowledge of why the shrouding was
so large. Therefore, the United States had no other
solutions to offer. Look asked Boryak where the Parties
should go from here.
Â¶12. (S) Boryak replied that the SS-27 had only been
flight-tested with one RV. He stated that Russia was now
using a soft cone cover which allowed inspectors to confirm
that there was no more than one RV on the missile. However,
U.S. inspectors noted in the official inspection reports
(OIR) the use of a large oversized, non-conformal cover which
would not allow them to confirm there was only one RV
underneath. Boryak stated that the Russian Federation, to
date, had not received an answer to their question regarding
why the cover must be conformal. In the Russian Federation's
opinion, the inspectors' conclusions were ungrounded and
biased. Look observed that the Parties were at a stalemate,
but that additional discussions on the issue were required.
MM III RVOSI
Â¶13. (S) Boryak listed the long-standing issues the Russians
had with the way the United States presented the MM III front
section during RVOSIs. Since Russian inspectors could not
obtain an unobstructed view of the front section, Boryak
asked that the United States either pull the front section
entirely up into the PT van or conduct the viewing at a
special allocated site like Russia. Look responded that he
was puzzled why this issue was placed on the agenda. Early
after entry into force of the Treaty, the Russians complained
about how the United States presented its front section for
an RVOSI. In response, the United States instituted
additional procedures, believing they would resolve Russia's
concerns. The additional procedures were not required by the
Treaty, but they allowed Russian inspectors to view below the
floor of the PT van and see the rest of the front section.
Additionally, Look noted that he had attended a mock RVOSI at
Minot AFB. In his opinion, the additional procedures
provided an unobstructed view of the front section. The
bottom line was that the RVOSI procedures used by the United
States were fully compliant with the Treaty and there was no
question that the additional procedures provided a full view
of the front section.
TWO SOCKS ON, ONE SOCK OFF
Â¶14. (S) Boryak responded that he thought the Russian
inspectors must have a different view from Dr. Look's.
Ryzhkov noted that he had participated in a MM III RVOSI. He
added that when he looked over to observe the three soft
covers, the wind blew, and one of the covers moved and
revealed that there was nothing underneath. Ryzhkov could
not understand why the United States continued to present the
MM III front section as they did. He questioned whether the
United States would have a problem if the Russian Federation
removed only half of their SS-18 front section so U.S.
inspectors could only see the top five warheads. He thought
the United States would have concerns. It was up to the
United States to demonstrate that the MM III did not have
more than three warheads deployed on it. To date, the United
States had not done that. Look asked whether the additional
procedures provided during the MM III RVOSI helped at all.
Ryzhkov stated that the Russian inspectors needed to see the
whole front section. The Russian Federation had no issues in
the way the United States presented the Peacekeeper (PK)
front stage because they saw the whole front section. Since
the additional procedures did not provide a full view, he
believed that the additional procedures were not helpful.
Â¶15. (S) Look repeated that the MM III RVOSI procedures were
compliant with the Treaty; however, he had no doubt that
Russia would return to the issue. Commenting on an earlier
statement he had made, Boryak recognized that the United
States had attempted to raise the front section completely
into the PT van but it would not fit. The attempt was a
positive sign from the U.S. side but it still needed to do
more. Shevtsov commented that the sides were at a dead end.
He understood Russia's concerns, but also understood that to
change the way in which the United States presented the MM
III front section would be difficult and would require
changes to the technical procedures. He offered that the
United States might do a one-time demonstration like the U.S.
Navy did with Trident II. The Parties agreed to return to
Â¶16. (U) Documents exchanged: None.
Â¶17. (U) Participants:
Col (Sel) Emig
Mr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Anisimov (Int)
Â¶18. (U) Look sends.