Viewing cable 05GENEVA1403

05GENEVA14032005-06-08 04:15:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 001403 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
     ¶B. GENEVA 1342 (JCIC-XXVII-010) 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-016. 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 2, 2005 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
¶3.  (S) A second Working Group meeting with all Parties 
present was held at the Russian Mission on June 2, 2005, to 
discuss RSM-56 warhead attribution and throw-weight 
accountability, and SS-25 elimination inspections.  The U.S. 
Delegation informed the Russian Delegation that it had 
reviewed Russia's briefing, presented during the NRRC 
Consultations held in March 2005, on plans for the RSM-56 and 
still had questions regarding Russia's plans for launcher 
conversion, flight-testing, warhead attribution, and 
throw-weight accountability.  The U.S. Delegation requested 
that Russia forward information to the United States on its 
plans as soon as it became available to help facilitate 
agreement in the JCIC on the procedures to be used to 
establish throw-weight accountability.  The Russian 
Delegation stated that the deployed SLBM launchers on a 
Typhoon submarine are in the process of being converted, in 
accordance with Treaty provisions, and would become 
accountable as RSM-56 launchers as soon as the converted 
submarine left the conversion facility in Severodvinsk. 
However, determination of RSM-56 warhead attribution and 
throw-weight accountability was not feasible until after some 
flight-testing.  This situation represented the first time a 
Party  declared a new strategic offensive arm under the 
Treaty.  The Russian Delegation confirmed that Russia planned 
to forego the prototype phase and would flight-test the 
RSM-56 SLBM from the newly-converted RSM-56 launchers on a 
Typhoon submarine. 
¶4.  (S) On the issue of SS-25 ICBM elimination, the Russian 
Delegation stated that it would not present the section of 
the missile that the United States describes as the forward 
section of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) and 
which Russia describes as the guidance and control section 
for elimination.  Russia also stated that it would object to 
U.S. inspectors' use of open-source photographs during the 
elimination inspection to confirm the identity of nozzles 
presented for elimination.  The United States responded that 
its inspectors would continue to use these photographs 
because they assisted inspectors in determining the types of 
nozzles that were being eliminated.  Russia also stated that 
it would not object if U.S. inspectors continued to make 
comments in the inspection report that they could not confirm 
nozzle types if they stopped making comments in the 
inspection report that they could not confirm the elimination 
of the entire missile. 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Delegation made a proposal to assist U.S. 
inspectors in confirming the type of ICBM undergoing 
elimination if the length of the first-stage rocket motor 
case was shortened during propellant removal by low pressure 
burning.  Russia offered to make a statement that would list 
the length of the cylindrical portion of the first stage, 
exclusive of the fore and aft end domes.  This measurement, 
6.54 meters, could be obtained after the propellant had been 
removed, since it may not be possible to obtain the end-dome 
to end-dome measurement. 
¶6.  (S) Buttrick asked Russia to confirm that it would not 
present its brief from the March 2005 NRRC Consultations (REF 
A) here at the JCIC.  Fedorchenko responded that Russia had 
no instructions to provide this briefing, nor did it have the 
necessary software and equipment available.  Buttrick stated 
that the U.S. Delegation was able to obtain a copy of this 
briefing from Washington and had a couple of questions.  The 
first question for Russia was whether RSM-56 flight-testing 
would be conducted from the deployed SLBM launchers on the 
submarine currently undergoing conversion to support the 
RSM-56 SLBM.  The second question was whether Russia was 
bypassing the prototype validation phase with the RSM-56. 
¶7.  (S) Fedorchenko responded to the first question by 
confirming that flight-tests will be conducted from the 
Typhoon submarine currently undergoing launcher conversion to 
RSM-56, and that the notification for the SLBM launcher 
conversion had been submitted in January 2005, by NRRC 
notification STR-05-21/011.  He said that the third paragraph 
of this notification states that 20 launchers were being 
converted from RSM-52 to RSM-56.  Fedorchenko further stated 
that, in April 2005, Russia had provided advance notification 
that the Typhoon submarine would be entering the Severodvinsk 
SLBM Launcher Conversion Facility (Ref:  RNC/STR 05-91/53) 
and that on May 5, 2005, launcher conversion had commenced 
(Ref:  RNC/STR 05-126/56).  Fedorchenko stated that 
conversion will be completed at Severodvinsk before testing 
¶8.  (S) Buttrick asked when RSM-56 warhead attribution would 
be declared.  Fedorchenko said that RSM-56 warhead 
attribution was planned to be accomplished after flight-tests 
were complete, in accordance with Article III.  Buttrick 
asked when the conversion of the 20 Typhoon launchers to 
support the RSM-56 would be completed.  He explained that 
Treaty Article III, Paragraph 7(c), defines when the 
launchers on an existing submarine undergoing conversion are 
considered to be converted.  Fedorchenko confirmed this 
requirement.  Buttrick asked whether Russia was going to 
declare RSM-56 warhead attribution before the first 
flight-test, and what missile type the launchers would be 
attributed with when the flight-test commenced.  Fedorchenko 
replied that as soon as the converted submarine leaves the 
conversion facility and begins sea trials, it will be 
attributed with 20 RSM-56 launchers. 
¶9.  (S) Fedorchenko explained that the aggregate number of 
warheads for this submarine would be annotated with an 
asterisk in the MOU.  Russia would not indicate either RSM-56 
throw-weight accountability or warhead attribution until 
after flight-testing had taken place.  He said that the 
Nerpich'ye submarine base will be attributed with 20 RSM-56 
launchers and 20 fewer SS-N-20 launchers.  The first RSM-56 
that is produced will be reported as a deployed missile.  He 
also indicated that the aggregate warhead number in the MOU 
would be decreased by 200 when the 20 existing SS-N-20 
launchers completed conversion to RSM-56, since each SS-N-20 
SLBM is attributed with ten warheads.  Buttrick asked how 
many warheads the United States should consider for each of 
the launchers of the converted SSBN equipped with the RSM-56 
SLBMs when the submarine first comes out of the conversion 
facility.  Fedorchenko responded that the United States could 
pick any number; it would be not less than one and not more 
than ten. 
¶10.  (S) Buttrick explained that he understood the difficulty 
in determining throw-weight and warhead attribution prior to 
flight-tests and that he understood that Russia was not ready 
to declare warhead attribution for this new missile.  He 
reminded Fedorchenko that, at the last meeting, the Russian 
Delegation said that the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement would 
apply to throw-weight accountability for RSM-56.  He 
requested that Russia inform the United States as soon as 
possible if fewer than eight flight-tests for the RSM-56 
would be conducted so that the Parties could begin the 
process for establishing the throw-weight accountability for 
the RSM-56.  This discussion had to take place in the JCIC 
pursuant to the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement.  Any delay in 
this process could create Treaty problems associated with the 
deployment of the RSM-56 SLBM. 
¶11.  (S) Fedorchenko thanked Buttrick for understanding 
Russia's situation and noted that he concurred with 
Kottymyer's statement in the previous meeting (REF B) 
regarding Treaty drafters not foreseeing this situation. 
First, we had to make provisions for SLBMs in launch 
canisters.  The next problem is that not having a prototype 
phase impacts warhead and throw-weight accountability.  He 
said Russia would provide the United States with flight-test 
telemetry recordings and interpretative materials 65 days 
after flight-tests.  This data would also include the usual 
warhead dispensing and separation information, and the 
maximum number of warheads would be accounted for.  He said 
throw-weight accountability would have to be discussed in the 
JCIC after flight-testing had begun because it did not make 
sense to discuss it prior to flight-testing. 
¶12.  (S) Shevtsov said that this was another case of a 
situation that was not envisioned when the Treaty was 
created.  He used Vandenberg as an example, but Fedorchenko 
promptly refuted this, stating there was no connection and 
this was not a good analogy.  Fedorchenko stated that the 
RSM-56 represented the first strategic offensive arm of a new 
type created under the Treaty and that the Treaty Parties had 
no experience or template to follow.  He stated further that 
Russia was trying to be legally pure, had informed the 
Parties in advance of the development of the RSM-56, and had 
put the RSM-56 issue on the JCIC agenda.  He said that Russia 
performed a demonstration of the missile in September 2004, 
and was waiting for the JCIC agreement on corresponding 
documents before Russia begins testing. 
¶13.  (S) Buttrick began by reiterating U.S. concerns raised 
at the first meeting.  He said the Parties had discussed 
three areas of concern.  First, in terms of the missing 
forward portion of the SCDM that was not presented as part of 
the SS-25 elimination, Russia had stated that it did not 
consider this portion of the missile either part of the SCDM 
or part of the front section of the SS-25.  Buttrick asked 
Fedorchenko what Russia considered this portion of the 
missile to be.  Fedorchenko responded that it was an 
independent part of the missile that contained the guidance 
and control devices.  Just because it was connected to the 
SCDM does not mean that it was part of it; he referred to the 
Treaty Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol, Section 
I, Subparagraph 2(b).  Buttrick responded by reading the 
Treaty definition of SCDM as "a device that separates from 
the final stage of a missile together with the front section 
and that independently targets and releases the reentry 
vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids."  Buttrick, 
using open-source photographs of the SS-25 missile as a 
visual aid, said that, in accordance with this definition, 
the whole section of the missile forward of the SCDM 
containing the maneuvering rockets separates from the final 
stage of the missile and provides guidance and control to 
target.  Section I, Subparagraph 4(c) of the C or E Protocol 
requires the destruction of the SCDM and front section of the 
missile; it was clearly the intent of the Treaty drafters to 
eliminate the whole section of the SS-25 ICBM forward of the 
SCDM.  Buttrick said Fedorchenko had told the U.S. Delegation 
in the previous meeting that Paragraph 2 of the C or E 
Protocol allows Russia to remove the guidance and control 
systems from the missile.  Buttrick stated that this 
provision does not state that the entire section of the 
missile may be removed prior to elimination.  Buttrick said 
that Dr. Look wanted an explanation from Russia as to why it 
believes the section of the missile containing the guidance 
system does not need to be eliminated.  Fedorchenko indicated 
that Russia had the right to remove guidance and control 
systems.  Buttrick asked Fedorchenko if the devices inside 
could not be removed without damage and Fedorchenko 
acknowledged that this was so.  Buttrick asked why Russia was 
concerned about damaging these components since the SS-25 was 
being eliminated. 
¶14.  (S) Buttrick stated he understood that Russia would not 
be providing the section of the missile containing the 
guidance and control system for destruction and said that he 
would take this information back to Washington. 
¶15.  (S) Regarding the SS-25 nozzle identification issue, 
Buttrick reminded Fedorchenko of the SS-24 eliminations and 
asked him whether he agreed that there were no concerns with 
these eliminations.  Fedorchenko responded that the topic of 
SS-24 eliminations was not on the agenda, but there were 
concerns with U.S. inspectors using photographs provided by 
Ukraine during the first SS-24 inspection in Russia.  Russia 
had chosen not to raise them at the time and now considered 
the issue closed because U.S. inspectors have not used the 
photographs on subsequent inspections. 
¶16.  (S) Buttrick asked Fedorchenko whether Russia would 
object if U.S. inspectors brought photographs from an 
open-source book copyrighted in Russia to identify SS-25 
nozzles and, if so, on what grounds.  Fedorchenko responded 
that inspectors were required to use official photographs 
during inspections.  Buttrick said that U.S. inspectors 
planned on continuing to use photographs to help them 
identify SS-25 nozzles during elimination inspections, and 
that it would be helpful if Russia could confirm they are 
accurate.  Fedorchenko replied that unofficial photographs 
can be used for preparation, but not for inspections. 
Buttrick said that U.S. inspectors could not identify the 
nozzles, Russia had not provided any reference photographs, 
and the nozzles presented during the inspection were 
separated from the missiles.  It was, therefore, impossible 
to confirm that the nozzles corresponding to the SS-25 
missile being eliminated had in fact been eliminated. 
¶17.  (S) Fedorchenko stated that he had a significant 
proposal regarding the SS-25 nozzle.  He suggested that 
Russia would not object to U.S. inspectors continuing to make 
a comment in the inspection report, that the inspectors could 
not confirm the type of nozzles for the first, second, and 
third stages of the SS-25 ICBM, if they would no longer make 
comments that they could not confirm the elimination of the 
missile.  He noted that the Treaty did not require that 
photographs of the nozzles be provided, and said he 
understood the inspector's difficulty.  He said trust was 
required and he hoped the United States believed that Russia 
was providing SS-25 nozzles for elimination.  Furthermore, 
Fedorchenko stated that he failed to comprehend how the 
United States could not consider these missiles to be 
eliminated.  He said that none of the four missiles exist any 
longer and that this was a fact.  Buttrick stated that he did 
not think this would satisfy the requirements of the C or E 
Protocol, but said he would forward this information to 
Washington for consideration. 
¶18.  (S) Buttrick asked whether Russia planned to continue to 
present pre-cut SS-25 nozzles that had large segments of the 
nozzles removed, as had been done during the first 
elimination inspection.  He reminded Russia that the 
understanding between Russia and the United States was that 
pre-cuts could be made as long as the cuts did not affect the 
shape, dimensions, or distinguishing features of the element 
that was being eliminated.  Fedorchenko replied that, as 
Russia readied more SS-25 ICBMs for elimination, there would 
be fewer occurrences of this situation.  However, there were 
several nozzles that had been subjected to pre-cuts and may 
have segments missing, but he was not sure how many. 
¶19.  (S) Buttrick said that dimensional changes of SS-25 
first-stage rocket motors after propellant was removed by 
low-pressure burning could cause difficulty for inspectors in 
confirming missile type for the elimination following 
burn-out of the motor.  He expressed interest in 
Fedorchenko's proposal on this issue.  Fedorchenko tabled a 
draft statement and before and after burn photographs to help 
explain the proposal.  He indicated that the proposal 
consisted of measuring the length of the cylindrical portion 
of the first-stage rocket motor.  It should be possible to 
obtain a consistent measurement of 5.64 meters because 
Russian experts expected only the end domes to be eroded as 
the result of low-pressure burning.  To illustrate the 
problem, he provided photographs showing an SS-25 first-stage 
motor before it had been burned out and a photograph after 
burn-out had occurred.  He added that U.S inspectors also 
could use these photographs to assist them in confirming the 
type of ICBM undergoing elimination.  Buttrick stated that he 
would take this information back to Washington.  Buttrick 
concluded by asking how soon inspectors will encounter these 
motors; and Fedorchenko responded "soon." 
¶20.  (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed statement on the 
elimination of SS-25 ICBMs of July 31, 1991): 
                                        Official Translation 
                                        June 2, 2005 
             Statement by the Representative of the 
                    Russian Federation to the 
       Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the 
    Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
        the United States of America on the Reduction and 
             Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
                        of July 31, 1991 
                On the Elimination of SS-25 ICBMs 
     In connection with the beginning of SS-25 ICBM 
elimination, the Russian side reaffirms that such elimination 
will be carried out in strict accord with the Treaty 
provisions governing conversion or elimination of the items 
covered by the Treaty. 
     These provisions provide for the right of the inspected 
Party to remove the fuel from the missile stages before a 
confirmatory inspection. 
     The Russian Federation removes the fuel from the stages 
of SS-25 ICBMs by slow-burning them without the nozzle.  The 
slow burn can result in burning out the end domes of these 
stages.  This makes it impossible to use the length of the 
first stage, specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on 
the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, to 
confirm the type of ICBM.  In view of this, the Russian side 
proposes that in such cases the length of the cylindrical 
portion of the first stage casing, which is equal to 6.54 
meters and which does not change as a result of the slow 
burn, be used to confirm the type of an SS-25 ICBM located at 
a conversion or elimination facility.  The relevant 
photographs are attached. 
End text. 
¶21.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
- Russia: 
    -- Russian-proposed Statement by the Representative of 
the Russian Federation to the JCIC on the Elimination of 
SS-25 ICBMs, dated June 2, 2005; 
    -- Picture of SS-25 First-Stage Motor Before Burn-out; and 
    -- Picture of SS-25 First-Stage Motor After Burn-out 
(Pictures e-mailed to State/AC/SNI). 
¶22.  (U) Participants: 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Dunn 
Col(sel) Emig 
Mr. Foley 
Mr. Herrick 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Sessions 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. French (Int) 
Mr. Grinevich 
Mr. Baysuanov 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Col Razumov 
Mr. Bolotov 
Col Maksimenko 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Shabalin 
Col Yegorov 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
¶23.  (U) Look sends.