Viewing cable 05GENEVA1419
Title: JCIC-XXVII: (U) FINAL MEETING OF PART ONE OF

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA14192005-06-08 10:43:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 001419 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) FINAL MEETING OF PART ONE OF 
JCIC-XXVII, JUNE 7, 2005 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 1404 (JCIC-XXVII-021) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 1415 (JCIC-XXVII-024) 
     ¶C. GENEVA 1417 (JCIC-XXVII-025) 
     ¶D. GENEVA 1418 (JCIC-XXVII-026) 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-023. 
 
¶2.  (U) The Parties met, with all delegation members of each 
Party present, at the U.S. Mission on June 7, 2005 for the 
final meeting of this part of the session.  At the meeting, 
all Parties expressed their satisfaction for the work of the 
session.  It had been a very fruitful session, given that a 
total of seven documents had been initialed or signed (REFS 
A, B, C and D). 
 
¶3.  (U) Look said the U.S. Delegation wanted to compliment 
the work of the Russian lawyer.  Having a lawyer on the other 
side of the table made our collective work better.  He added 
that he wanted to reinforce the need for our delegations to 
continue our work during the intersessional period. 
 
¶4.  (S) Specifically, Look proposed that the Parties focus 
efforts on three items during the intersession.  First, we 
need to continue the effort on SS-25 eliminations.  Second, 
the Parties need to codify that arrangement that had been 
discussed for resolving the Trident II RVOSI issue.  The 
United States was providing a paper today, in the form of a 
coordinated plenary statement (para 5 below), that could 
record the resolution of this issue.  We need to have the 
other Parties' response to this proposal.  On a similar note, 
the Russian Delegation had provided an informal proposal to 
resolve the Tridents in Containers issue.  The United States 
would study the proposal and respond during the intersession. 
 The third area of focus was for Russia to provide timely 
information on the RSM-56.  As this program develops, the 
Parties need to anticipate problems so they can be taken care 
of before they become actual issues between the Parties. 
 
¶5.  (S) Begin text (U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary 
Statement on Trident II RVOSI): 
 
                                                 JCIC-XXVII 
                                         U.S.-PROPOSED TEXT 
                                               Jun 07, 2005 
 
   UNCLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE 
  OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION 
              COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY 
                OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION, 
                        JUNE 07, 2005 
 
                COORDINATED PLENARY STATEMENT 
     ON THE INSPECTION OF TRIDENT II SLBMS DURING REENTRY 
                     VEHICLE INSPECTIONS 
 
     To resolve concerns regarding confirmation that the 
Trident II SLBM is not deployed with more reentry vehicles 
than its attributed number of warheads, the United States 
conducted a Trident II RVOSI demonstration at the Strategic 
Weapons Facility, Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia on February 
7-9, 2005, and will augment existing Trident II RVOSI 
procedures by utilizing the measuring device demonstrated at 
Kings Bay to confirm that the Trident II RVOSI cover is 
attached to the front end of the missile while in the SLBM 
launcher in the same manner as was observed during the 
demonstration. 
 
     The procedures for using the measuring device during 
future Trident II RVOSIs are as follows: 
 
-- After all of the inspectors have completed their fifteen 
minutes of viewing of the installed Trident II RVOSI cover, 
the Escort Team Chief will request that the Inspection Team 
Chief and one additional member of his team return to the 
temporary structure specially intended for preparing the 
front section for viewing the SLBM launcher, where the 
inspectors will be given the opportunity to examine the 
Trident RVOSI measuring device. 
 
-- The two inspectors will then observe as facility personnel 
take two official measurements in the same manner as 
performed at the demonstration.  The Inspection Team Chief 
will record these measurements in the Official Inspection 
Report. 
 
-- The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A SLBM 
configuration, as presented by the United States at the 
demonstration, is 23 centimeters plus/minus 3 centimeters. 
The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type B SLBM 
configuration, as presented by the United States at the 
demonstration, is 24 centimeters plus/minus 3 centimeters. 
 
     Provided measurements obtained using the measuring 
device are within the prescribed tolerances, the Parties 
understand that past Trident II RVOSI concerns are resolved 
and inspectors will not record in Official Inspection Reports 
their previous statements relating to the inspecting Party's 
inability to obtain an unobstructed view of the Trident II 
front section and corresponding inability to ascertain that 
the inspected Trident II SLBM contains no more reentry 
vehicles than its attributed number of warheads. 
 
End text. 
 
¶6.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley