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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) TAYLOR-BORYAK DINNER, OCTOBER 30,
REF: 03 GENEVA 2757 (JCIC-XXV-055)
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
Â¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-032.
Â¶2. Meeting Date: October 30, 2005
Time: 7:00 - 8:15 P.M.
Place: Restaurant Le Creux-de-Genthod
Mr. Taylor Mr. Boryak
Â¶3. (S) U.S. JCIC Representative Taylor hosted a dinner for
Russian JCIC Representative Boryak on October 30, 2005, prior
to the opening of Part II of JCIC-XXVII, scheduled to begin
October 31, 2005.
Â¶4. (S) Taylor emphasized that he intended to continue the
good work began by Dr. George Look in focusing the work on
those issues where the Parties could move forward. Much
groundwork had been laid in Part I and two long-standing
issues -- Trident RVOSI and Tridents in Containers -- were
very close to resolution. In addition, the Parties had been
able to exchange draft JCIC Joint Statements on Confirming
First Stages of SS-25s that had been damaged (burned without
nozzles) during the intersession and this issue was ready to
be completed. Taylor provided a draft agenda for the week
which focused on the work during the first three days.
Boryak said that Russia would have something to present on
both Trident issues and the confirmation measurement for
damaged SS-25 first stages. Boryak asked whether the United
States would have any response to Russian proposals on Castor
Â¶120. Taylor emphasized that the United States had nothing to
add and that our time could be better spent on the issues the
Parties were in agreement on. Boryak agreed that the Parties
should focus our efforts, but said Russia had its views, as
did the United States, on certain issues and he was not
certain he could turn back the desire of his delegation to
raise these issues.
PREVIOUS WORK PATTERN TO CONTINUE
Â¶5. (S) Boryak opened the conversation by welcoming Taylor to
the work of the JCIC, noting that he recalled working
together on the SVC and, more recently, on the BIC. Boryak
said he was pleased with the constructive approach that Dr.
Look had taken concerning the issues and hoped this would
continue. Taylor assured him that he intended to continue
the good work that Look had begun in revitalizing the JCIC.
In this regard, Taylor was proposing that the Parties take up
the Trident RVOSI and containers issue along with the SS-25
first stage measurement (damaged first stages) during the
first HOD in order that these issues could quickly be
referred to the Conforming Group.
Â¶6. (S) Boryak stated that Russia would have something to
present on Trident RVOSI and a response to our paper on
Tridents in containers. The Trident RVOSI statement was very
close to resolution and Boryak was hopeful this long-standing
issue would be resolved. With regard to the Tridents in
containers issue, he said he was very pleased that the United
States had accepted Russia's proposal and that this issue was
close to resolution also.
OLD ISSUES DIE SLOWLY
Â¶7. (S) Boryak next raised Castor 120 and Peacekeeper (PK)
and asked whether the United States would have anything new
to say on either of these issues. Taylor said that the
United States had not changed its position and any discussion
of these issues would likely cover the same ground as before.
Boryak acknowledged that on several issues Russia had its
position and that these were unlikely to be resolved.
Â¶8. (S) Taylor asked Boryak whether Russia would accept the
U.S. offer to visit the Vandenberg silo. Boryak would not
commit to a yes or no answer, rather saying that Russia would
say what it had to say about U.S. actions at Vandenberg.
Going more into detail, Boryak questioned Taylor on how the
United States could defend its actions by saying the launcher
was now part of a space launch facility when it did not use
ICBMs or SLBMs to launch objects into space. This was not in
accordance with how an SLF was defined in the Treaty. Taylor
explained that the Treaty did not prohibit such activity.
The launchers were still accountable under the Treaty as ICBM
Â¶9. (S) Boryak raised the issue of the Bulava flight test,
saying that there was still much work that needed to be done,
however, Russia was not in a position to provide any
information on throw-weight or attribution. This would be a
topic for future meetings. Taylor said that the fact that we
had worked hard to bring this missile under the Treaty now
seemed to be turned on its head since we had a deployed
missile without any attribution.
Â¶10. (S) Taylor turned the conversation to the two Trident
issues, saying that he was hopeful these long-standing issues
could be resolved this session. Boryak agreed that the
Parties were very close on both. Russia would be providing
papers on both issues. In addition, Russia was hopeful the
agreement on SS-25 measurement of damaged first stages could
be completed soon also. Taylor said that, with the
completion of the confirmation of the measurement, we were
prepared to conclude the Joint Statement.
Â¶11. (S) Boryak concluded the conversation by asking whether
any special message was intended to be conveyed by the recent
publication of the U.S. Report on Arms Control Compliance.
There had been much discussion in Moscow over the U.S.
decision to include the details of our negotiations and
Boryak questioned whether Taylor felt this violated the
confidentiality of the START Treaty.
Â¶12. (S) Taylor explained that the issues reflected in the
recent Compliance Report were not unfamiliar to Russia, as
DAS Karin Look had made a special trip to Geneva to consult
with the Russian Delegation on these issues in August 2003
(REFTEL). As for a special message, the United States was
fulfilling its obligation to the Congress to report as fully
as possible on compliance issues including those pertaining
to Russia's implementation of START.
Â¶13. (S) Boryak wondered why the United States said it was
compliant with all aspects of the Treaty, but that it had a
problem with Russian implementation. He asserted that Taylor
was fully aware Russia had concerns about the U.S.
implementation of START. Boryak said he did not want to have
an extended debate but this was an interesting question to
think about. Nonetheless, Boryak closed by saying he was
hopeful for success this session.
Â¶14. (U) Taylor sends.