Viewing cable 05GENEVA2685
Title: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA26852005-11-03 10:57:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 002685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
RSM-56 ATTRIBUTION AND SS-25 ELIMINATION, NOVEMBER 1, 2005 
 
REF: GENEVA 2682 (JCIC-XXVII-034) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-037. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 1, 2005 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
Russian Mission on November 1, 2005, to discuss warhead and 
throw-weight attribution for the RSM-56 SLBM, as well as U.S. 
concerns with Russia's SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures. 
The U.S. Delegation stated that Russia had been obligated to 
notify warhead attribution prior to deploying and 
flight-testing the RSM-56, and requested that Russia provide 
the attributed number of warheads or indicate when and how 
attribution would be determined.  Russia was urged to begin 
discussions now in the JCIC to determine the procedures for 
establishing the accountable throw-weight under the 
Thirty-Second Agreed Statement.  Russia also was requested to 
provide a maximum calculated throw-weight as soon as 
possible.  The Russian Delegation said it would respond in 
due time. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. Delegation summarized the recent formal U.S. 
review and legal analysis of Russia's SS-25 ICBM elimination 
procedures.  The United States had concluded that the 
guidance and control section, which Russia did not eliminate, 
was part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM). 
The United States does not consider the 11 SS-25 ICBMs 
presented for elimination during inspections conducted in 
April and August of 2005 to have been eliminated because the 
entire SCDM was not eliminated.  Russia was urged to bring 
its SS-25 elimination procedures into compliance with the 
Treaty by eliminating the airframe for the forward section of 
the SCDM or by developing alternative Treaty-compliant 
procedures.  The Russian Delegation said it hoped to be able 
to provide a written response through diplomatic channels. 
 
------------------------ 
RSM-56 SLBM THROW-WEIGHT 
AND WARHEAD ATTRIBUTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (S) Taylor began the meeting and stated that the United 
States believes that Russia should be prepared to provide 
additional information about the RSM-56 SLBM now that it has 
been deployed and flight-tested from a submarine.  Although 
the Parties worked hard to bring the RSM-56 canisterized SLBM 
under the Treaty, Russia has, in effect, removed it from the 
Treaty's provisions by deploying and flight-testing it 
without making the Treaty-required declarations for the 
number of warheads attributed and throw-weight. 
 
¶6.  (S) As the RSM-56 is a deployed missile, Taylor said 
Russia has an obligation not to deploy or flight-test it with 
more RVs than the attributed number of warheads.  The United 
States has the corresponding right to verify compliance with 
this obligation.  Without warhead attribution, these 
important obligations and verification rights had been 
rendered meaningless.  As Russia had an obligation to notify 
warhead attribution prior to deployment or flight-testing, 
the United States requested that Russia identify the number 
of warheads attributed to the RSM-56 or inform the U.S. how 
and when warhead attribution will be determined. 
¶7.  (S) Taylor reminded the Russians that the Parties must 
also agree on procedures for establishing the throw-weight 
accountability of the RSM-56 according to the Thirty-Second 
Agreed Statement.  Now that the missile has been 
flight-tested, the United States believes it is possible to 
do so.  Those discussions should begin now in the JCIC, with 
the goal of reaching agreement as soon as practicable. 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor observed that Russia was required to provide a 
notification concerning throw-weight not later than five 
days after the RSM-56 became subject to Treaty limitations. 
There are no exceptions for missiles that skip the prototype 
phase.  The United States believes that Russia should have 
been able to provide a "maximum calculated throw-weight" 
without conducting a flight-test.  The U.S. Delegation 
requested that Russia provide this data as soon as possible. 
 
¶9.  (S) Boryak reiterated that the RSM-56 was being developed 
in a manner that had not been envisioned by the Treaty 
drafters.  He said Russia is committed to bringing the RSM-56 
development efforts under the Treaty, and that the previous 
JCIC deliberations on this topic had anticipated all of the 
issues that the United States just raised.  The Russian 
Delegation will study all of the U.S. questions carefully and 
respond in due time. 
 
---------------------- 
U.S. RESPONSE ON SS-25 
ELIMINATION PROCEDURES 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor responded to the Russian Delegation's earlier 
remarks concerning problems with SS-25 ICBM elimination 
inspections (REFTEL) by summarizing the recent formal U.S. 
review and legal analysis of the issue. 
 
¶11.  (S) In response to the Russian Delegation's assertion 
that Russia had never considered the guidance and control 
section to be part of the SCDM, Taylor explained why the 
United States believes it is part of the SCDM.  Applying the 
Treaty definitions of "SCDM" and "front section" to the 
SS-25, the United States concluded that the SCDM extends from 
the top of the third stage interstage skirt to the beginning 
of the front section.  The forward portion of the SCDM 
separates from the final stage with the front section and, by 
controlling the maneuvering rockets and providing guidance, 
contributes to independently targeting a reentry vehicle. 
During the START negotiations, the Soviet Delegation stated 
that the SCDM included the instrument compartment as well as 
the fuel and oxidizer compartment.  The Soviet Union 
exhibited both portions of the SCDM during the SS-25 
technical characteristics exhibition, as can be seen in an 
exhibition photograph. 
 
¶12.  (S) In response to Russia's claim that it has a Treaty 
right to retain the guidance and control sections, Taylor 
stated the U.S. view that the Conversion or Elimination 
Protocol requires the entire SCDM to be eliminated for mobile 
ICBMs.  Russia was allowed to remove guidance and control 
devices from the SCDM prior to its elimination, but the 
entire airframe of the SCDM, including the portion containing 
the guidance and control system, must be eliminated.  During 
the START negotiations, the Soviet Delegation stated that the 
airframe would be presented for elimination after the 
electronics elements were removed.  Prior to the April 2005 
elimination inspection at Votkinsk, Russia had not indicated 
a different view. 
¶13.  (S) Taylor stated that the United States does not 
consider the 11 SS-25 ICBMs presented for elimination in 
April and August of 2005 to have been eliminated because the 
entire SCDM was not eliminated.  He urged Russia to bring its 
SS-25 elimination procedures into compliance with Section I 
of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol during future 
inspections by eliminating the airframe for the forward 
section of the SCDM, or that Russia develop alternative 
Treaty-compliant procedures. 
 
¶14.  (S) Boryak replied that the Russian Delegation would 
carefully study the U.S. remarks and requested a written 
copy.  He hoped Russia would be able to provide a written 
response through diplomatic channels.  The U.S. Delegation 
provided the points on SS-25 the following day. 
 
¶15.  (S) Begin text (U.S. Points on SS-25 Elimination): 
 
                                      JCIC-XXVII 
                                      U.S. Non-paper 
                                      November 1, 2005 
 
                 SS-25 ELIMINATION PROCEDURES 
 
-  During the SS-25 elimination inspections conducted in 
April and August 2005, the United States raised concerns 
regarding Russia's failure to comply with the requirements of 
subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol by not presenting the entire 
self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) for elimination. 
 
-  Specifically, only the rear portion of the missile SCDMs 
were presented for elimination.  The entire forward portion 
of each of the SCDMs had been removed prior to the arrival of 
the inspectors. 
 
-  During the first part of JCIC-XXVII, the Russian 
Delegation stated that, since the electronic components of 
the guidance and control system were assembled into a 
"unified component," this section in its entirety could be 
removed from the SCDM, in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) 
of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, prior 
to the elimination inspection. 
 
-  The Russian Delegation further stated that the excluded 
element "had never been considered a part of the SCDM by 
Russia." 
 
-  Subsequent to these discussions, the United States 
completed a formal review of this issue, including an 
in-depth legal analysis. 
 
-  A summary of that review is provided below. 
 
-  First, applying the Treaty definitions of "SCDM" and 
"front section" to the SS-25 ICBM we concluded that the SS-25 
SCDM extends from the top of the third stage interstage skirt 
to the beginning of the front section. 
 
-  Our review also noted that the forward portion of the SCDM 
separates from the final stage of an SS-25 ICBM with the 
front section, and, by controlling the maneuvering rockets 
and providing guidance, contributes to independently 
targeting a reentry vehicle. 
 
-  In reviewing the negotiating record, we noted that during 
START negotiations, the Soviet Delegation stated that the 
SCDM was understood by the Soviet side to include the 
instrument compartment as well as the fuel and oxidizer 
compartment. 
 
-  In addition, the Soviet Union exhibited both portions of 
the SCDM during the technical characteristics exhibition for 
the SS-25 ICBM, as seen in the photograph taken during the 
exhibition at Balabanovo in October 1991. 
 
-  Therefore, the United States believes that the forward 
portion of the airframe of the SCDM is clearly part of the 
SCDM. 
 
-  With respect to the SCDM's elimination, subparagraph 4(c) 
of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol 
requires the entire SCDM for mobile ICBMs be eliminated, 
except for "electronic and electromechanical devices of the 
missile's guidance and control system," which may be removed 
from the missile. 
 
-  In our review of the negotiating record for subparagraph 
2(b) of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, 
we noted that the Soviet Delegation stated that the airframe 
would be presented for elimination after the electronics 
guidance elements were removed. 
 
-  Prior to the April inspection at Votkinsk, there had never 
been any indication from the Russian Federation that the SCDM 
was anything other than what Soviet negotiators had described 
during the negotiations. 
 
-  Accordingly, the United States believes that the SS-25 
ICBM elimination procedures which Russia used at Votkinsk in 
April and August 2005 do not comply with the requirements of 
paragraph 4(c) of Section I of the C or E Protocol, and the 
United States does not consider the 11 SS-25 ICBMs presented 
for elimination during these inspections to have been 
eliminated under START. 
 
-  We agree that Russia may remove guidance and control 
devices from the SCDM of SS-25 ICBMs prior to its 
elimination.  However, the airframe of the SCDM, which 
includes the airframe containing the guidance and control 
section, must be eliminated in order for these ICBMs, and all 
SS-25 ICBMs presented during future elimination inspections, 
to be considered eliminated. 
 
-  The United States urges Russia to bring its SS-25 ICBM 
elimination procedures into compliance with Section I of the 
Conversion or Elimination Protocol during future inspections 
by eliminating the airframe for the forward section of the 
SCDM, or that Russia develop alternative Treaty-compliant 
procedures. 
 
-  The United States is prepared to work with Russia to 
resolve the issue of SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures, 
including eliminating the airframes for the missing forward 
sections of the SCDMs of the first 11 SS-25 ICBMs that were 
presented for elimination at Votkinsk. 
 
-  The U.S. Delegation is prepared to consider any proposals 
or additional information that Russia wishes to provide 
regarding its SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures. 
 
End text. 
 
¶16.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- U.S. Non-paper on Points on SS-25 Elimination 
Procedures, dated November 1, 2005. 
 
¶17.  (U) Participants: 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Deihl 
Mr. Dunn 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Maj Mitchner 
Col Rumohr 
Mr. Singer 
Dr. Zimmerman 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baisuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Boryak 
Col Yegorov 
Gen Maj Artyukhin 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Istratov 
Amb. Masterkov 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Lt Col Novikov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Ms. Vodopolova 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
 
¶18.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley