Viewing cable 05GENEVA2690

05GENEVA26902005-11-04 06:15:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 GENEVA 002690 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2015 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-035. 
¶2.  (S) Meeting Date:  November 1, 2005 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
Russian Mission on November 1, 2005, to discuss a new Russian 
proposal to resolve the SS-25 RVOSI issue.  The Parties also 
discussed support equipment at SS-25 mobile ICBM bases, and 
new vehicles at SS-25 mobile ICBM bases. 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation presented a briefing on a new 
proposal to allow U.S. inspectors to observe how the 
barrel-shaped reentry vehicle cover is mounted on the reentry 
vehicle.  Measurements would be made of both the external 
diameters of the upper and lower rings, which support the 
barrel-shaped oversized cover currently being used during 
SS-25 RVOSI inspections, and measurements would be made of 
the internal diameter of the lower support ring.  The 
demonstration would be conducted by no more than ten U.S. 
observers and would be in a two-stage process, the first 
stage would follow a normal RVOSI inspection procedure 
followed by a demonstration of Russian-proposed measurements 
to be taken. 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Federation withdrew its proposal, to 
declare and mark with a unique symbol support vehicles 
located at SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases, citing the fact that 
U.S. inspectors still did not agree that all support vehicles 
were being properly declared and marked in accordance with 
the arrangement that had been discussed at the last session. 
¶6.  (S) The Russian Federation informed the United States 
that it will begin deploying converted eliminated SS-25 
road-mobile launchers as "road security" vehicles at SS-25 
road-mobile ICBM bases.  The intent of these vehicles is to 
match the weight of actual road-mobile launchers so that the 
Russians can assess the safety of the roads over which 
road-mobile ICBMs move at their operational bases. 
¶7.  (S) Boryak began the meeting by stating that the Russian 
Federation had taken steps to resolve the SS-25 RVOSI issue 
and the result was a new Russian proposal.  He described the 
proposal as a creative product from his side and apologized 
that many of the terms and definitions used in the briefing 
to be presented did not necessarily reflect those used in the 
Treaty and were only tentative.  He turned to Osetrov to 
present the briefing on the Russian-proposed demonstration of 
the covers used during SS-25 RVOSI.  Osetrov began by 
recounting some of the history on this issue, including the 
fact that the United States believed the size and shape of 
the cover used during SS-25 RVOSI procedures did not allow 
inspectors to ascertain that there were no more reentry 
vehicles on the SS-25 than the number of warheads attributed 
to it.  He displayed a slide that depicted a diagram of the 
barrel-shaped oversized cover currently used during RVOSI 
procedures.  He explained that the cover consisted of an 
outer soft portion made of some type of fabric which covered 
two rings that were used to attach the cover to the reentry 
vehicle.  He then recounted the original Russian proposal, to 
push in on one side of the soft cover, and showed a diagram 
of that process and recounted the Russian additional proposal 
to use a new type of radiation detection equipment (RDE) to 
resolve this issue, both of which were rejected by the United 
¶8.  (S) Osetrov stated that the Russian Federation proposed 
to conduct a demonstration during which U.S. observers would 
see how the cover used during SS-25 RVOSI procedures was 
attached to the reentry vehicle as well as to conduct some 
additional measurements that are not currently conducted 
during inspections.  He explained that the demonstration 
would be an independent event from an inspection and would 
not count against the U.S. quota for inspections.  No more 
than ten observers currently present on the START list of 
inspectors would be allowed to attend the demonstration and 
all costs for meals and accommodations, both at the point of 
entry and at the SS-25 missile base selected for the conduct 
of the demonstration, would be borne by the Russian 
Federation.  The date and point of entry for arrival of the 
observation team would be delivered through Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center (NRRC) channels 30 days in advance of the 
team's arrival.  The United States would send a NRRC Format 
144 to the Russian Federation not less than 72 hours in 
advance of the team's arrival listing team member names, 
passport numbers, and arrival times and airline.  He 
emphasized that the overall schedule for the proposed 
demonstration would be determined by the Russian Federation. 
¶9.  (S) Osetrov explained that the SS-25 road-mobile ICBM to 
be used for the demonstration would be selected and inspected 
by U.S. observers, in accordance with normal RVOSI procedures 
during stage one of the process.  Once the missile was 
selected it would be moved to the demonstration site under 
the direct observation of the U.S. team.  (Begin comment: 
Typically, during normal RVOSI procedures, the mobile 
launcher is taken from the res tricted area to a building 
within the base maintenance facility.  End comment.)  The 
observers would be allowed to examine the individual cover 
components, including the soft outer fabric piece, and the 
two mounting rings for an unlimited amount of time.  The U.S. 
team would then be allowed to measure the length of the cover 
prior to placement on the reentry vehicle and then the U.S. 
team would be removed from the demonstration site, except for 
two members, who would be placed behind the launcher so that 
they could not see the actual placement of the cover on the 
reentry vehicle, but still ensure that no additional cover 
elements were being added or removed or that no reentry 
vehicles were being removed as is typically done during SS-25 
RVOSI procedures.  Once the cover was placed over the reentry 
vehicle, the entire U.S. team would be allowed to observe the 
covered front section for the standard 15 minutes during 
which time Russian escorts would point out the placement of 
the mounting rings used under the soft portion of the cover. 
¶10.  (S) Osetrov explained that, upon completion of the 
15-minute viewing, the U.S. team would be asked to step away 
from the immediate area of the front section, while still 
remaining in the building, during which time the outer soft 
cover would be removed and a conformal sock-like cover would 
be placed over the upper mounting ring (closest to the top of 
the reentry vehicle) and over the reentry vehicle leaving the 
lower ring (closest to the bottom of the reentry vehicle) 
exposed.  The U.S. observers would be allowed to approach the 
front section and observe the relationship between the 
mounting rings and the sock-like cover.  The U.S. observers 
would then be removed from the immediate vicinity of the 
front section once again while the mounting rings were being 
removed and placed upon the ground.  The U.S. team would then 
be allowed to measure the external diameter of both the upper 
and lower rings and the internal diameter of the lower ring 
as well as to observe the spokes that are contained within 
both rings.  (Begin comment:  Both the upper and lower rings 
consist of two concentric metal circles attached by spokes in 
similar fashion to a wagon wheel.  The center metal circle 
for the upper ring is intended to be attached to the top of 
the reentry vehicle, hence it will have a much smaller 
diameter than the center metal circle within the lower ring 
which attaches to the bottom of the reentry vehicle. 
Further, the spokes within the upper ring would have longer 
spokes than those of the lower ring.  End comment.)  The 
measurements would be recorded in an official demonstration 
report and used during subsequent inspections.  Osetrov 
concluded by stating that the earlier Russian proposal to 
push in on the cover at a single point was removed from the 
table, but the proposal to use RDE to resolve this issue was 
still of value and deserved further study. 
¶11.  (S) Taylor thanked the Russian Delegation for the new 
Russian initiative to help resolve this long-standing issue. 
He asked whether the United States would be allowed to select 
the SS-25 ICBM base for conduct of the demonstration. 
Fedorchenko replied that the base would be selected by the 
Russian Federation and the selected base would be the one 
that would best be able to lower its alert level, based upon 
which dates were selected for the demonstration.  Taylor 
asked which specific measurements would be taken and when 
would they be taken.  Osetrov stated that a measurement of 
the length of the cover, prior to it being placed on the 
reentry vehicle, as well as measurements of the external 
diameter of both the upper and lower mounting rings and the 
internal diameter of the lower ring, after they had been 
removed from the reentry vehicle, would be taken.  Also, the 
U.S. team would be able to visually confirm the length of the 
spokes for both mounting rings. 
12  (S) Mullins asked whether the diameter of the lower ring 
was constant, to which Osetrov replied that the ring 
diameters are all consistent within the covers being used for 
RVOSI procedures.  Taylor asked how the recorded measurements 
would be used during future inspections.  Osetrov explained 
that U.S. inspectors would be able to conduct similar 
measurements during subsequent inspections.  Mullins asked 
whether the rings would be shrouded during the measurements, 
to which Osetrov responded that the rings would not be 
shrouded.  Kuehne asked whether there would be any 
opportunity to measure the distance between the two rings 
during phase II of the demonstration while they were on the 
missile.  Fedorchenko explained that U.S. inspectors were 
currently allowed to measure that distance during each 
inspection prior to the cover being placed on the missile. 
(Begin comment:  Russian escorts place the two mounting rings 
inside the soft casing of the cover, stretch it out and allow 
a measurement while the cover is on the ground.  End 
comment.)   Singer asked whether the U.S. observers would be 
able to see clearly where the lower ring attached to the 
reentry vehicle, as well as during subsequent inspections. 
Fedorchenko explained that this was already done during each 
inspection.  Taylor made the observation that, during the 
presentation, it had been explained that a soft sock-like 
cover would be placed over the upper mounting ring and the 
reentry vehicle leaving the lower ring exposed.  Speaking 
personally, Taylor noted that this type of cover was similar 
to those used during Minuteman RVOSI inspections and would be 
excellent covers for the Russian Federation to use to resolve 
this issue.  There was no response from the other Parties. 
Boryak closed the discussion on this issue by stating that 
the Russian Federation considered this to be a very serious 
proposal and understood that additional discussion of the 
specific procedures would be required. 
¶13.  (S) Begin text (Russian proposal): 
(Begin Comment:  Pages 3, 5, 7 and 14 contain depictions 
which cannot be included in this text.  Adobe files were made 
of pages 3, 5 and 14 and e-mailed to Washington (STATE/VCI). 
Page 7 is a depiction of the Russian proposal using RDE, 
which the United States has rejected.  End Comment.) 
                                   Official Translation 
Title Page:  Additional Demonstration of the Cover Used 
during Reentry Vehicle Inspections of SS-25 ICBMs under the 
START Treaty 
Page 2 
--   During inspections conducted at ICBM bases for 
road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, U.S. inspection teams are not 
confirming that the front sections of SS-25 ICBMs contain no 
more than one RV. 
--   In the view of the inspecting Party, the shape and 
dimensions of the cover used by the inspected Party do not 
allow the inspectors to achieve the objectives of the 
Page 3 
Schematic for Covering an RV (Diagram) 
--   Soft cover with two rigid elements for attaching the 
cover (rings) 
--   Launch canister 
--   Front (upper) ring 
--   Rear (lower) ring 
Page 4 
The Russian Proposal for Pressing in on the RV Cover 
--   In July 1999 the Russian side tabled a proposal that 
makes it possible to resolve the issue of inspecting SS-25 
front sections.  The essence of the Russian proposal is to 
press in on the cover on the RV during one SS-25 RVOSI, as a 
result of which the conical shape of the inspected RV would 
be unequivocally identified and the fact that there is only 
one cone-shaped item under the cover would be confirmed. 
--   The United States of America did not agree to 
participate in the proposed activity. 
Page 5 
Pressing in on the Covered RV (Diagram) 
--   The cloth casing of the cover touches the RV body. 
Conclusion:  there is one cone-shaped item under the cover. 
Page 6 
Russian Proposal on Using a New Type of RDE 
--   In March 2004, at JCIC-XXVI, at its own initiative the 
Russian side raised for discussion by the Treaty Parties a 
proposal on a new method of instrument verification, which 
could be used during RVOSI.  The proposed method was based on 
the use of a new type of radiation detection equipment 
provisionally named the "Karusel'." 
--   For the purpose of additional consideration of the 
technical and treaty-legal aspects of the proposals on using 
the new type of RDE, technical consultations were organized 
in Moscow in May 2004, in which experts from the U.S., 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan participated. 
--   In October 2004, during Part II of JCIC-XXVI, the U.S. 
side rejected the Russian proposals to reach specific 
agreements on using new equipment. 
Page 7 
Russian Proposal on Using Karusel'-type RDE 
(See diagram) 
Conclusion:  there is one nuclear item inside the monitored 
Page 8 
New Russian Proposals 
--   Continuing, in a spirit of good will, to search for ways 
to resolve the issue regarding the equipage of SS-25 front 
sections, the Russian side proposes 
     an unprecedented step - conducting a demonstration 
during which the inspecting Party will see how the cover used 
by the Russian side is attached to the SS-25 RV.  The visual 
information, plus the additional measurements that will be 
made during the demonstration, will make it possible to 
resolve the U.S. side's questions. 
Page 9 
Overall Arrangements for Holding the Demonstration 
--   The demonstration will be organized and conducted as a 
stand-alone event (outside the START quota). 
--   The group of observers should consist of no more than 10 
representatives from the U.S., who are included in the 
current list of START inspectors. 
--   The Russian side will bear the costs of organizing and 
holding the demonstration itself, including the provision of 
lodging and food at the point of entry and at the facility. 
Page 10 
Overall Arrangements for Holding the Demonstration (continued) 
--   The timeframe for holding the demonstration will be 
proposed by the Russian side. 
--   The point of entry and timeframe for holding the 
demonstration will be communicated to the U.S. side through 
NRRC channels well in advance, but not later than 30 days 
before the estimated time of arrival of the group of 
observers at the point of entry. 
--   No less than 72 hours prior to the arrival of the group 
of observers at the point of entry, the U.S. side will 
provide, through NRRC channels (format 144 notification), 
information analogous to that specified in the format 116 
notification provided in accordance with subparagraphs 5 (a), 
(b) and (d) of Section III of the Inspection Protocol. 
Page 11 
Overall Arrangements for Holding the Demonstration (continued) 
--   The schedule for transporting the group of observers to 
the facility and the schedule for conducting the event will 
be determined by the Russian side. 
--   The specific launcher for the demonstration/RVOSI will 
be selected by the U.S. side. 
--   The event will take place in two phases:  during the 
first phase inspection procedures analogous to those 
performed during RVOSIs will be carried out; during the 
second phase additional demonstration procedures will be 
carried out. 
Page 12 
First Phase - Inspection 
--   After the launcher has been selected, the event will 
follow the same procedures and methods used in organizing a 
regular RVOSI: 
     -- the group of observers will be taken to the selected 
     -- the launcher will be prepared for operation and, with 
the group of observers watching, will be moved to the site of 
the inspection/demonstration; 
     -- the group of observers will be given an opportunity, 
with no time limit, to examine the cover components:  the two 
rigid elements for attaching the cover (rings) and the cloth 
cover itself; 
     -- the observers may measure the length of the assembled 
structure of the cover before it is placed on the front 
     -- the launcher with ICBM will be prepared for 
inspection; two observers stationed behind the road-mobile 
launcher will observe the process of preparing the front 
section for inspection; 
     -- the front section, covered in the usual manner, will 
be presented for viewing for 15 minutes, during which time 
the  ring placements will be shown to the group of observers. 
Page 13 
Second Phase - Demonstration 
--   Additional demonstration activities will be carried out 
upon completion of the procedures for inspecting the front 
section of the selected road-mobile launcher with ICBM; these 
activities will include the following: 
     -- after the 15-minute viewing period the group of 
observers will move out of the inspection zone, without 
leaving the building where the inspected launcher is located; 
     -- the inspection support crew will remove the cloth 
casing of the standard cover, leaving its rings on the 
inspected RV; 
     -- the observers will be invited into the inspection 
zone and will view the RV with the rigid elements for 
attaching the cover (rings) in place; the RV and the upper 
attachment ring will be covered by a stocking-type cover; 
     -- the group will leave the inspection zone, the 
inspection support crew will remove the rings of the cover 
and, with the observers watching, will move them to the place 
where the observers will be given the right to measure the 
diameters of the outer supporting rings of these elements of 
the cover and the inside diameter of the lower attachment 
ring, and also to ascertain visually that the spokes of the 
upper attachment ring are longer than the spokes of the lower 
attachment ring. 
Page 14 
View of the Front Section during the Demonstration Phase 
--   Stocking-type cover concealing the surface of the RV and 
the front ring 
--   Launch canister 
--   Front (upper) ring under the cover 
--   Rear (lower) ring 
Page 15 
Outlook for the Future 
--   If there is appropriate legal codification in the JCIC 
of the measurements recorded in the demonstration report, 
they will be used in the future during SS-25 RVOSIs as 
auxiliary data that assist in achieving the objectives of the 
--   The Russian side's previous proposals for pressing in on 
the cover are taken off the negotiating table. 
--   We continue to regard the proposals on using 
Karusel'-type RDE as relevant. 
End text. 
¶14.  (S) Fedorchenko read a prepared statement concerning the 
results of the most recent data update inspections at Teykovo 
and Barnaul SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases as well as the 
Plesetsk Test Range.  He stated that U.S. inspection teams 
ignored Russian escort efforts to resolve this issue and in 
each case documented comments in their inspection reports 
that they could not confirm that some of the vehicles 
assigned to those facilities were not SS-25 support vehicles. 
 This was done despite the placement of unique symbols on 
those vehicles declared to be support vehicles by the Russian 
Federation.  He noted that the Russian proposal to place 
unique symbols on declared support vehicles as well as to 
provide official photographs of those marked vehicles was not 
objected to by the United States during JCIC-XXVI.  He 
observed that the procedures used during these recent 
inspections did not work and, as a result, the Russian 
Federation was withdrawing its proposal. 
¶15.  (S) Taylor noted that the United States welcomed the 
Russian Federation's proposal to declare and mark all SS-25 
support vehicles with unique symbols and said the United 
States was evaluating the results of those recent 
inspections.  He explained that it was understood that those 
markings would be more permanent, as opposed to the temporary 
paper markings that were observed during the inspections.  He 
made it clear that the United States was pleased to see that 
nine support vehicles were declared at both of the SS-25 ICBM 
bases and two at the test range, but that the presence of 
paper markings, as well as the presence of additional, 
similar support vehicles that were not declared or marked, 
did not give the United States confidence.  As a result, U.S. 
inspectors had questions.  He stated that the Russian 
decision to withdraw its proposal was troubling and asked the 
Russian Federation to reconsider its position.  Fedorchenko 
held up three inspection reports and noted that nowhere in 
those reports did U.S. inspectors complain about the type of 
markings they observed and they were able to confirm that all 
of the vehicles declared were support vehicles.  He explained 
that Russia's disappointment was that U.S. inspectors did not 
agree that other vehicles present on the site were not 
support vehicles, despite escort assurances that only the 
marked vehicles were capable of performing launch functions 
while the other similar vehicles were not.  He also noted 
that the Russian Delegation had proposed that this procedure 
was only temporary and if accepted it would become permanent. 
¶16.  (S) Boryak stated that the Russian Federation paid close 
attention to the protection of its nuclear weapons.  With 
this in mind, a new measure was being implemented which 
entailed the placement of specialized vehicles at SS-25 
road-mobile ICBM bases which would be used to monitor the 
condition of roads over which SS-25 ICBMs would be moved. 
This was an effort to increase nuclear safety and security. 
These new vehicles were former SS-25 road-mobile launchers 
that have undergone elimination procedures at the Piban'shur 
SS-25 launcher elimination facility.  Concrete blocks 
supported by a specialized frame have been affixed where the 
launch canister usually is located to simulate the weight of 
an actual missile in its canister.  Additionally, these 
vehicles would not be declared as support vehicles since they 
do not directly support missile launch and would begin 
arriving at missile bases in Spring 2006.  Kuehne asked how 
these concrete blocks would be configured, to which 
Fedorchenko responded that he was not aware of the specifics, 
just that the vehicles were intended to match the weight of 
actual SS-25 mobile launchers.  National technical means may 
have trouble telling them from the real thing, but inspectors 
would have no problem. 
¶17.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
- Russia: 
    -- Briefing on a Demonstration of the Covers Used During 
SS-25 RVOSI; and 
    -- Draft JDT for a Joint Statement on First Stages of 
SS-25 ICBMs Burned Without Nozzles Attached, dated November 
1, 2002. 
¶18.  (U) Participants: 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Deihl 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Maj Mitchner 
Col Rumohr 
Mr. Singer 
Col Smith 
Mr. Smith 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
Mr. Grinevich 
Mr. Baisuanov 
Mr. Boryak 
Col Yegorov 
Maj Gen Artyukhin 
Mr. Kashirin 
Mr. Kotkova 
Amb Masterkov 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Osetrov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Fokin (Int) 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Dotsenko 
Mr. Fedotov 
Col Taran 
¶19.  (U) Taylor sends.