Viewing cable 05GENEVA2738
Title: JCIC-XXVII: UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S.

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA27382005-11-09 09:44:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 UNCLASSIFIED US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO/N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S. 
CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 
 
REF: GENEVA 2735 (JCIC-XXVII-049) 
 
¶1.  This is JCIC-XXVII-047. 
 
¶2.  At paragraph 3 is the text of the Unclassified Attachment 
to the U.S. closing plenary statement -- Coordinated Plenary 
Statement on Reentry Vehicle Inspections of Trident II SLBMs 
-- that was made at the closing plenary meeting of the 
Twenty-seventh Session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the Russian Mission 
on November 9, 2005.  Translations of statements made by the 
other Parties will be sent Septel. 
 
¶3.  Begin text: 
 
                   UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT 
                    U.S. CLOSING PLENARY 
                         JCIC-XXVII 
 
                      November 9, 2005 
 
       Coordinated Plenary Statement on Reentry Vehicle 
               Inspections of Trident II SLBMs 
 
     The United States of America reaffirms that the front 
sections of Trident II SLBMs belonging to the United States 
of America are equipped with no more than eight reentry 
vehicles and that the United States of America will not equip 
them with more than eight reentry vehicles during the term of 
the START Treaty. 
 
     The United States of America notes that in order to 
resolve concerns regarding confirmation that the Trident II 
SLBM is not deployed with more reentry vehicles than its 
attributed number of warheads, the United States of America 
conducted a demonstration in connection with reentry vehicle 
inspections of Trident II missiles at the submarine base, 
Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia, on 
February 7-9, 2005 (hereinafter - the demonstration). 
 
     The United States of America will supplement existing 
procedures for conducting Trident II reentry vehicle 
inspections with procedures for using the measuring device 
demonstrated.  These procedures are designed to confirm that 
the cover used during Trident II reentry vehicle inspections 
is installed on the front section of the missile contained in 
the SLBM launcher in the same manner as was observed during 
the demonstration: 
 
     ¶1.  After all of the inspectors complete their 15 
minutes of viewing of the installed cover used during Trident 
II reentry vehicle inspections, the Inspection Team Leader, 
at the request of the Escort Team Leader, designates from 
among the inspection team members two measurement groups 
consisting of two inspectors each.  When requested by the 
in-country escort, each group in turn moves to the temporary 
structure specially intended for preparing the front section 
for the viewing of the SLBM launcher, where it is given the 
opportunity to examine the measuring device used during 
Trident II reentry vehicle inspections.  Each group in turn 
observes as facility personnel take one measurement per group 
to determine the distance from the upper point of the hard 
cover to the upper point of the SLBM third stage motor, as 
was done during the demonstration. 
 
     ¶2.  If each of the two measurements differs by no more 
than three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, the 
two measurements are averaged to determine the distance from 
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the 
SLBM third stage motor.  In this regard, as stated by the 
United States of America during the demonstration, the 
benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A SLBM 
configuration is 23 centimeters, and the benchmark 
measurement for a Trident II Type B SLBM configuration is 24 
centimeters. 
 
     ¶3.  The measurements taken and the average obtained for 
the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the 
upper point of the SLBM third stage motor are recorded in the 
Inspection Report. 
     Provided that the average value for the distance from 
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the 
SLBM third stage motor, obtained on the basis of the 
measurements taken using the aforementioned device, does not 
differ from the benchmark measurement by more than three 
centimeters, the inspecting Party will: 
 
     ¶1.  Insert an asterisk ("*") as a note instead of a 
number in Section II of the Inspection Report, in the column 
"Confirmed by inspecting Party" and indicate on that page 
that the asterisk refers to the relevant note in Section IV 
of the Inspection Report. 
 
     ¶2.  Include the following as a note in Section IV of the 
Inspection Report: 
 
     "In addition to the reentry vehicle inspection 
procedures, the inspected Party used the measuring device 
demonstrated earlier during the demonstration on February 
7-9, 2005, at the Kings Bay submarine base, Georgia.  The 
measurement results specified in this report show that the 
cover used during the inspection was installed on the missile 
front section in the same manner as was observed during the 
demonstration. 
 
     "Thus, it has been indirectly confirmed, with the 
assistance of the measuring device demonstrated during the 
February 7-9, 2005, demonstration, that the front section of 
the inspected SLBM contains no more than eight reentry 
vehicles." 
 
End text. 
 
¶4.  Taylor sends. 
Moley