Viewing cable 05GENEVA2749
Title: JCIC-XXVII: (U) UKRAINIAN GRIEVANCES WITH CTR AND

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
05GENEVA27492005-11-10 03:54:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002749 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) UKRAINIAN GRIEVANCES WITH CTR AND 
INTEREST IN FOLLOW-ON TO START 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 2712 (JCIC-XXVII-038) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 2719 (JCIC-XXVII-039) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-046. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 8, 2005 
                Time:  4:00 - 5:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (S) Ukraine took the opportunity, during a bilateral 
meeting at the U.S. Mission on November 8, 2005, to complain 
about its perceived lack of support from the United States 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.  The U.S. 
Delegation pointed out that this subject was not within the 
framework of the JCIC, but that it would forward the 
Ukrainian concerns to the appropriate authorities in 
Washington. 
 
¶4.  (S) Ukraine also asked whether or not the U.S. had 
considered a follow-on to the START Treaty.  The U.S. 
Delegation said that the U.S. had begun consideration of such 
a process at high levels, but had not yet completed it and, 
therefore, had no comment.  Shevtsov said that Ukraine would 
be a willing participant in a follow-on to the START Treaty 
if the U.S. could provide Ukraine monetary incentives to help 
it eliminate the remnants of nuclear weapons systems. 
 
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UKRAINIAN GRIEVANCES 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) At a bilateral working group meeting at the U.S. 
Mission on November 8, 2005, the Ukrainian Delegation briefed 
the U.S. Delegation regarding the situation "on the ground" 
at Pavlograd.  They strongly defended the water wash-out 
method as the best means of eliminating SS-24 solid rocket 
motors (SRMs) while, at the same time, "recycling" the solid 
propellant into commercial explosive material for use in 
Ukraine's mining industry.  They expressed their "discomfort" 
with a perceived lack of funding from the U.S. Government. 
Specifically, the Ukrainian Delegation claimed that the U.S. 
was not fully implementing its obligations under the CTR 
Program.  They expressed their belief that people at the U.S. 
"CTR Organization" were balking at getting funding deemed 
necessary for solid propellant elimination.  In particular, 
they perceived a lack of funding for safe storage of SRMs at 
the Pavlograd site.  Dotsenko asserted that while he believed 
that the U.S. Government had invested over $25 million on the 
water wash-out facility, Ukraine believed that the amount 
spent was considerably less, at around $2.5 million.  As for 
Pavlograd, they claimed that U.S. funding had dried up from 
$2 million per year to less than $300,000 per year. 
 
¶6.  (S) Buttrick responded that, while this issue was not 
strictly within the framework of the JCIC, he would certainly 
forward the Ukrainian concerns to the appropriate people in 
Washington.  Further, Mullins explained the high level at 
which CTR policy was made within the U.S. Government, as well 
as the high degree of professionalism that goes along with 
executing this policy.  Mullins also encouraged the Ukrainian 
Delegation to consider eliminating SRMs by explosive 
detonation, similar to the C-4 elimination procedure he 
witnessed earlier this year in Utah.  However, Shevtsov 
remained faithful to Ukraine's water wash-out method -- no 
matter what the cost -- because it provided "economic return" 
in the form of industrial explosives used in mining. 
Shevtsov also stated that Ukraine would not be able to finish 
its START eliminations in the time frame of the Treaty 
without international monetary support.  In this regard, he 
mentioned possible Japanese financing, but said that Japan 
had conditioned its assistance on U.S. sponsorship, even if 
it were symbolic.  Lastly, Shevtsov linked the CTR funding 
issue to Ukraine's Pavlograd issues discussed earlier in 
JCIC-XXVII (REFS A and B).  The U.S. Delegation repeated that 
it would take Ukraine's message back to Washington. 
 
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UKRAINE ASKS ABOUT 
START FOLLOW-ON 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (S) Shevtsov asked whether the U.S. had plans to extend 
the START Treaty.  The U.S. Delegation said that the U.S. had 
begun to consider the question at high levels, but had not 
yet completed its review and, therefore, had no comment. 
Buttrick turned the question around to the Ukrainians, and 
Shevtsov responded that Ukraine would be a willing 
participant in a follow-on to the START Treaty if the United 
States would provide Ukraine monetary incentives to help it 
eliminate remnants of nuclear weapons systems.  According to 
Shevtsov, those remnants included large quantities of heptyl 
at eight sites, 17,000 tons of cruise missile fuel, and 
radiological and nuclear material. 
 
¶8.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶9.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
Mr. Dotsenko 
Mr. Fedotov 
 
¶10.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Cassel