Viewing cable 05MUSCAT135
Title: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 01/25/2005

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
05MUSCAT1352005-01-25 12:26:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Muscat
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T MUSCAT 000135 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/DSS/OSAC, 
DS/OPO/FPD, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS KVPR MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 01/25/2005 
 
REF: A. TD-314/03138-05 
 
     ¶B. ITA/RSO E-MAILS DTD 01/20/2005 
     ¶C. MUSCAT 0110 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission William R. Stewart. 
Reason: 1.4(c). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU)  The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Emergency 
Action Committee January 25 to review the Embassy's security 
posture following the Eid al-Adha holiday.  Members of the 
EAC noted no substantive changes in the local security 
environment since the last meeting.  Accordingly, the EAC 
agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security posture 
and FPCON remain appropriate.  End Summary. 
 
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Security and Threat Environments 
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¶2.  (S/NF)  On January 25, the Ambassador chaired a meeting 
of the Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the 
Embassy's security posture following the Eid al-Adha holiday. 
 The meeting opened with a discussion of the local and 
regional security situations; the EAC continued to 
characterize the former as stable.  RMAS did, however, raise 
uncorroborated threat reporting alleging that, as of late 
December 2004, a group of extremists, traveling in groups of 
pilgrims, were ordered by Usama bin Ladin to travel to Oman 
and Dubai, U.A.E., to carry out terrorist attacks against 
Westerners (NFI) (reftels A and B).  RMAS noted that the 
information, of undetermined veracity, and originating from a 
source of unknown reliability, was referred to their Omani 
security service contacts for investigation.  Members of the 
EAC noted no additional threat reporting specific to Oman. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  RSO also described a situation that occurred on 
January 20, in which an Embassy employee reported his 
cellular telephone apparently stolen from his residence by a 
group of uncharacteristically rambunctious Omani youths who 
were walking door-to-door asking for gifts in conjunction 
with Eid al-Adha, which is customary on that holiday.  RSO is 
in the process of reporting details of the incident to the 
Royal Oman Police.  Members of the EAC cited no other 
security incidents among their staffs or family members over 
the weekend, and CONS confirmed that there were no security 
incidents or security-related queries from the private 
American citizen community. 
 
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Continued Vigilance 
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¶4.  (SBU)  Prior to concluding the meeting, RSO reiterated 
that, despite the relative calm, members of the EAC must 
continue reinforcing to both their staffs and family members 
the need for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal 
security, including the need to maintain a low profile and to 
remain unpredictable.  RSO further re-emphasized the 
importance of immediately reporting all suspicious activity 
or security-related incidents, especially those involving 
suspected surveillance, to Post One. 
 
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EAC Conclusion 
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¶5.  (S/NF)  The EAC concluded that there have been no 
substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the 
local security environment since the last meeting held on 
January 18 (reftel C), and that the Embassy's FPCON and 
already heightened security posture remain appropriate. 
Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of the need to 
monitor both the regional and local security and threat 
environments, and is prepared to take the necessary 
countermeasures should changes to either occur.  AMB, DCM, 
RSO, RMAS, P/E, PAO, CONS, MGT, DAO, MSG, OMC (USDR), and ECA 
(USCENTAF) participated in the meeting, which was followed by 
a meeting of the Visas Viper Committee. 
BALTIMORE