Viewing cable 05MUSCAT1350

05MUSCAT13502005-09-07 09:28:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Muscat
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001350 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015 
REF: A. STATE 163224 
     ¶B. STATE 160880 
     ¶C. STATE 162146 
     ¶D. STATE 162169 
Classified By: DCM William R. Stewart. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
¶1. (C) On September 5, Pol/Econ Chief delivered ref demarches 
to MFA International Organization Department Chief Ambassador 
Talib Miran al-Raisi.  Ambassador al-Raisi acknowledged USG 
desires for flexibility in negotiations, and agreed that a 
separate declaration on innovative sources of financing was 
an unwelcome distraction.  He sympathized with USG opposition 
to calls for developed states to earmark a percentage of GDP 
for official development assistance, and agreed that trade 
and good governance carried more weight than ODA in promoting 
economic growth.  While receptive to USG concerns, the Omani 
mission may nevertheless remain low-key during the 
deliberations on the Outcome Document.  End summary. 
¶2. (U) Pol/Econ Chief delivered demarches (refs A-C) 
regarding the UN Summit Outcome Document on September 5 to 
MFA IO Department Chief (A/S-equivalent) Ambassador Talib bin 
Miran al-Raisi.  (Note: Ambassador al-Raisi departs September 
8 for New York, where he will be part of the Omani delegation 
to the Summit and will remain for the general debates until 
early October.  End note.) 
Concurrence with Broad Principles 
¶3. (C) Ambassador al-Raisi took on board our request that all 
missions take a flexible approach to the deliberations on the 
outcome document, acknowledging that by its nature it will be 
broad and full of compromises.  He expressed interest in USG 
red-lines.  He agreed that the Outcome Document is not a 
binding resolution and that the parties should modify the 
text accordingly.  He likewise agreed that the effort of six 
nations in circulating a "Declaration of Innovative Sources 
of Financing for Development" was counterproductive at a time 
when energies should be concentrated on the Outcome Document. 
 Ambassador al-Raisi noted the significant reduction in aid 
effectiveness that would result from the UK proposal for an 
international finance facility (IFF).  He supported the idea 
that the development chapter of the Outcome Document should 
focus more on marking progress toward meeting the goals of 
the Millennium Declaration than on setting ambitious new 
targets.  He added that the Doha G-77 meeting on June 12 
possessed just such a spirit, in preparation for the UN 
ODA and Persistent Crises 
¶4. (C) Ambassador al-Raisi specifically inquired about the 
proposed call to raise ODA levels to 0.7% of developed 
states' GDP.  P/E Chief went through the numerous facets of 
USG opposition.  Given the fact that Oman has limited 
financial resources, Ambassador al-Raisi understood USG 
concerns about the arbitrary nature of the ODA targets, and 
on the need to focus more on trade and good governance.  He 
wondered, however, whether the 0.7% goal might have merit if 
not attached to any set timetable.  He expressed impatience 
with various developing countries that seem to face crisis 
year after year.  P/E Chief noted the potential of the New 
Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in making a 
lasting impact in the fight against poverty, and drew upon 
talking points in ref D to highlight pressing needs in 
certain African countries (apart from that of the USG) has 
been lacking. 
¶5. (U) Though Ambassador al-Raisi had heard that a revised 
version of the Outcome Document would soon be circulated in 
New York, he was not aware of the "Dear Colleague" letters on 
the various chapters that USUN had shared with other 
missions.  P/E Chief provided copies of those "Dear 
Colleague" letters posted on the USUN website, and encouraged 
Ambassador al-Raisi to look for future position papers that 
we might circulate in New York and to share with us any views 
Oman may have on them. 
¶6. (C) Ambassador al-Raisi tends to be both open and 
positively inclined toward USG positions, particularly 
concerning UN reform; he is also fully aware that Omani 
policy often adopts a more wait-and-see attitude.  While the 
views he expressed above may track with Oman's overall 
judgment on the issues, it will not necessarily translate 
into Oman's active lobbying in support of those viewpoints 
during deliberations on the Outcome Document.