Viewing cable 05MUSCAT232
Title: OMAN NOT READY TO COMMIT TO PSI

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
05MUSCAT2322005-02-09 13:32:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Embassy Muscat
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000232 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, NP/RA, PM, NEA/RA, NEA/ARPI 
SECDEF FOR OUSD(P) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015 
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP EWWT MU
SUBJECT: OMAN NOT READY TO COMMIT TO PSI 
 
REF: A. 04 MUSCAT 1331 
 
     ¶B. 04 MUSCAT 603 
     ¶C. 04 MUSCAT 522 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. 
Reason:  1.4 (b, d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy 
by note verbale February 9 that while Oman seeks to comply 
with international laws, agreements and norms, "the 
government of the Sultanate welcomes the idea of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative without joining it or being 
committed to it."  The Ministry's disappointing decision 
comes despite Oman's active participation in a range of port 
and border security activities with the USG and international 
organizations.  End summary. 
 
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Noncommittal on PSI 
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¶2. (S) The Embassy received February 9 a note verbale from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI).  While indicating strong support 
for nonproliferation regimes, the note indicates that Oman 
will not formally join the growing list of states committing 
themselves to PSI activities.  The complete text, stamped 
"secret" by the MFA, is as follows: 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
Reference is made to the request by the United States 
government that the government of the Sultanate of Oman 
supports the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation 
Security Initiative. 
 
The Ministry would like to state that, based on its 
conviction on the danger posed by weapons of mass 
destruction, and being aware of the threat if such weapons 
fall in the hands of irresponsible terrorist entities or 
groups, the Sultanate Government has joined international 
agreements and treaties relevant to the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and is seeking to implement the 
principles of these agreements and treaties within its 
national laws. 
 
In this framework, and while stressing the necessity to 
comply with international laws, agreements and norms, the 
Government of the Sultanate welcomes the idea of the 
Initiative without joining it or being committed to it. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman 
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the 
assurance of its highest consideration. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
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Action, If Not Words 
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¶3. (C) This untimely declaration comes on the heels of active 
bilateral dialogue on Oman's request to be included in the 
U.S. Customs Service's Container Security Initiative (CSI). 
The Embassy has told interlocutors at the Ministries of 
Transportation, Commerce and Foreign Affairs that Oman could 
buttress its case for participating in the highly competitive 
CSI program by showing its resolve on a broad range of 
nonproliferation, export control and border security 
programs. 
 
¶4. (C) Oman has made strides in the past year on a number of 
these fronts.  Oman achieved compliance with the 
International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS Code), and by 
hosting in the near future several Export Control and Border 
Security (EXBS) training programs, including an upcoming 
seminar on WMD Awareness as well as an Export Control 
Legal-Regulatory Workshop.  There will even be a PSI-related 
event among the planned activities during a U.S.-led air 
interdiction exercise later this month.  Despite this 
cooperation, the MFA is dragging its feet on ratifying the 
IAEA safeguards agreement and agreeing to the additional 
protocols.  Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf 
bin Alawi has mentioned previously, as recently as February 8 
in a chat with the Ambassador, that Oman's involvement with 
the IAEA is circumscribed by its unwillingness/inability to 
make financial commitments to that body. 
 
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Comment 
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¶5. (C) It is difficult to speculate at this juncture the 
reasons for MFA's keeping PSI at arm's length.  There may be 
concerns about incurring expenses; about getting too far in 
front of other Arab allies; or possibly worry at causing 
offense to powerful neighbor Iran.  Without minimizing the 
symbolic importance of publicly committing to the PSI 
Statement of Interdiction Principles, we should likewise not 
devalue Oman's noteworthy deeds in the realm of export 
control and border security.  By continuing and broadening 
our engagement with Oman in this field, we may eventually 
succeed in winning the MFA's public support for PSI. 
BALTIMORE