Viewing cable 06JAKARTA1179

06JAKARTA11792006-01-31 11:16:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Embassy Jakarta
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T  JAKARTA 001179 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016 
Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, 
reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  President Yudhoyono (SBY) convoked the 
Ambassador to an extraordinary meeting January 31, attended 
by four ministers, to convey Indonesia's intention to decide 
its position on Iran's nuclear program when the IAEA Board of 
Governors meet on March 6.  He conveyed concerns with respect 
to stability in the Middle East and the world economy along 
the same lines as Foreign Minister Wirajuda the previous day 
(reftel).  When the Ambassador encouraged Indonesia to vote 
on February 2 to report Iran to the Security Council, SBY was 
caught unaware.  The Ambassador briefed SBY on the P5 plus 
Germany position on reporting Iran on February 2 coupled with 
UNSC action delayed until March 6.  After obtaining 
confirmation of the upcoming vote from Wirajuda, SBY replied 
that he would need a more complete briefing on the February 2 
agenda, and closed by thanking the Ambassador for providing 
"more complete information" on the situation at hand. 
Clearly caught off guard about having to decide soon, and 
visibly not well briefed by his staff, SBY gave no concrete 
indication on how Indonesia will vote February 2.  End Summary 
¶2. (S) In a highly unusual event, President Yudhoyono (SBY) 
convoked the Ambassador the afternoon of January 31 (a local 
holiday) to convey the Government of Indonesia's policy on 
Iran's nuclear program.  The President was accompanied by 
Coordinating Minister for Security, Political and Legal 
Affairs Widodo, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, State Secretary 
Mahendra, Cabinet Secretary Silalahi and foreign affairs 
adviser Djalal.  The Ambassador was accompanied by PolCouns 
(notetaker).  SBY had already met with the Russian Ambassador 
and with EU Ambassadors.  He was scheduled to meet as well 
with the Chinese Ambassador. 
Hope for a Resolution Before March 6 
¶3. (S) Apparently poorly briefed and not aware of the 
importance of the upcoming February 2 meeting of the IAEA 
Board of Governors, SBY said that he hoped the Iran nuclear 
program issue could be resolved before the March 6 meeting 
would have to decide whether Tehran should be referred to the 
UN Security Council.  He stressed the importance of Iran 
continuing to work the issue with the EU-3 and the Russians. 
He said Wirajuda conveyed the importance of positive action 
to the Iranians when the FM was in Tehran the previous week. 
SBY emphasized the need to avoid tensions in the Middle East, 
noting that there were strong emotional ties between some 
Indonesians and Iran.  He also cited the possible effect of a 
resulting increase in oil prices resulting from any such 
tensions as deleterious to the economies of Third World 
nations such as Indonesia.  Referring to a visit of an 
Iranian special envoy, SBY said that Indonesia made clear 
that it opposes the development of any nuclear weapon by 
Iran, and that Tehran must comply with all IAEA safeguard 
provisions.  The Iranians must only pursue nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes.  SBY closed by inviting the Ambassador to 
present U.S. views. 
Iranian Blackmail Should Not Be Tolerated 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador said the issue is neither religious 
nor regional but global.  Iran acquired its technology 
illicitly from the A.Q. Khan network and never admitted to 
anything until the outside world managed to expose its 
activities.  Only then was the IAEA allowed to inspect. 
Iran's cutting the seals effectively ended the EU-3 effort, 
and it has given lip service thus far to the Russian 
proposal.  They have already contracted for the fuel for 
their nuclear power plant and do not need to enrich uranium 
themselves in order to supply it.  The Ambassador reviewed 
Iranian behavior over the last few months, concluding that 
Iranian threats with respect to the price of oil constituted 
blackmail that the international community should reject. 
The P5 and Germany will Refer Iran 
¶5.  (S) The Ambassador reported that the P-5 foreign 
ministers and Germany worked late the previous night on the 
issue and said that there was a sense of frustration among 
them with Iranian behavior.  At the end of the meeting, they 
issued a statement calling for the reporting of the steps 
required of Iran to the UNSC on February 2.  The UNSC would 
take no further steps until the IAEA report of March 6.  SBY 
reiterated that Indonesia would base its decision on the 
March 6 report. 
What Will Indonesia Do February 2? 
¶6. (S) When the Ambassador then encouraged Indonesia to join 
with the P-5 on February 2 to report Iran to the UNSC, SBY 
was taken aback.  The Ambassador continued by noting that 
while there was a majority in favor of reporting Iran, 
Indonesia's vote would be important and we did not want to 
see Indonesia separate itself from the will of the 
international community.  SBY turned to Wirajuda and asked 
whether there would in fact be a vote February 2 and the FM 
so confirmed.  A discussion then broke out on what that vote 
would constitute.  The Ambassador then read out the operative 
paragraph from the P5 1 statement about reporting Iran on 
February 2, and copies of the statement were passed out to 
each minister. 
SBY: I Need More Information 
¶7. (S) SBY then told the Ambassador that he would obtain the 
"concrete agenda" for the Feb. 2 meeting.  The Ambassador 
pointed out that Iran would not have Russia or China to hide 
behind during that vote, and should not have Indonesia 
either.  SBY said that he would obtain a further brief from 
his people.  He closed by thanking the Ambassador for 
providing "more complete information" on the situation that 
would help the GOI prepare for the next IAEA meeting on 
February 2.