Viewing cable 06JAKARTA59

06JAKARTA592006-01-03 11:22:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L  JAKARTA 000059 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016 
Classified By: CDA W. LEWIS AMSELEM.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
¶1. (U) Madame Secretary:  Your team in Jakarta warmly 
welcomes your January 8-10 visit to Indonesia, the most 
senior USG visit since Secretary Powell's of January 4-6, 
¶2005.  We have underway preparations to ensure a visit high 
in substance and symbolism. 
¶2.  (C) On learning of the Administration's waiver of 
conditions on military cooperation, an enthusiastic 
Indonesian President Susilo Bangbang Yudhoyono (SBY) 
privately told his staff that "we can now have a new 
relationship with the United States." As a senior GOI 
Presidential advisor told us, your visit for the Indonesians 
"comprises the first day" of that relationship. You will hear 
that theme emphatically from the President, the Foreign 
Minister, and the Defense Minister. 
¶3.  (C) Although our bilateral cooperation improved following 
Indonesia's landmark 2004 national elections, SBY's 
inauguration in October 2004, and the splendid world-beating 
U.S. response to the December 2004 tsumani, our military aid 
"embargo" proved a major irritant to SBY and the Indonesian 
political class, and an impediment to working with Indonesia 
in key areas of mutual concern. 
¶4.  (C) SBY understands that your personal involvement and 
commitment made possible our policy shift.  He will want to 
work with you to craft the direction of our renewed 
relations. We have heard from senior GOI officials that in 
addition to discussing military relations, the President and 
his ministers will raise their hopes for continuing the CT 
cooperation that has produced excellent results; exchange 
thoughts with you on the role of China in SE Asia; and 
discuss the threat posed by avian influenza.  We seek to 
assure SBY of our support for Indonesia's new democracy and 
commitment to reform, and that we look to Indonesia to adopt 
a greater role in handling regional and global issues in 
partnership with us.  We need also remind SBY that failure to 
address key issues -- e.g., resolve the Timika murder case 
and hold officials responsible for misdeeds including human 
rights violations -- could lead to a return of restrictions. 
We want Indonesia to sign an Article 98 waiver and move its 
UN voting record closer 
to us on key issues and away from a fixation on "Non-aligned" 
¶5.  (C) SBY seeks progress on many fronts: consolidating 
gains against terrorists; pushing economic reform and tsunami 
reconstruction under the leadership of a new economic team; 
and promoting military reform, in which we can now play a 
full partnership role.  Much work remains to solidify 
Indonesian democracy, inter alia, combating corruption, 
reforming the judiciary, improving government responsiveness, 
and addressing still lethal sectarian and ethnic divides. 
That said, however, Indonesia, the world's largest 
Muslim-majority nation, has put in place democratic 
structures over the last seven years, making it the world's 
third largest democracy, and has emerged as an example for 
other countries of the transformational power of freedom. 
Objectives of Your Visit 
¶6.  (C) We see your visit as a major opportunity to affirm 
the Indonesian model and pledge continued support.  Building 
on the very positive Indonesian reaction to changes in 
bilateral military relations, you could chip away at 
attitudes that remain from Indonesia's authoritarian and 
"non-aligned" days, bolster continued efforts for political 
and economic reform, and push democratic Indonesia to take 
greater responsibility to address regional and global issues 
in partnership with us.  You could also pursue the following 
a)  Urge Indonesia, the world's third-largest democracy, to 
help us push democratic progress and religious tolerance; 
b)  Move our counterterrorism agenda forward by urging 
strengthened legal reforms and greater internal coordination; 
congratulate the government for recent successes - including 
the neutralizing of terrorist mass murderer Dr. Azahari last 
c)  Propose further military cooperation and continued 
support for the modernization and professionalization of 
Indonesia's military and efforts to bring it fully under 
civilian control, paying continued attention to human rights 
and accountability; note Administration efforts to increase 
engagement and funding for assistance with maritime security 
issues and strengthening humanitarian response capabilities, 
which you will visibly demonstrate in your public event 
donating the fleet hospital to TNI; 
d)  Encourage Indonesian economic reform, the GOI's Achilles 
heel, and pledge U.S. support; 
e)  Underline your support for an Article 98 agreement, 
noting the personal commitment that POTUS made and you 
implemented to make normal military relations possible, and 
explain that such an agreement would benefit both parties and 
assist during discussions with and within Congress next year 
on military relations with Indonesia; 
f)  Affirm that Indonesia has "no better friend than the 
United States."  You can remind Indonesia of our huge aid 
program, including our response to the tsunami and to the AI 
threat.  We see Indonesia as a fellow democracy with shared 
values of tolerance and pluralism, as a nation of crucial 
importance to the region and the world, and one we want to 
Ensuring Democracy and Moderate Islam Prevail 
¶7.  (C) We have a great stake in helping consolidate 
democracy in Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous 
nation and its largest Muslim-majority country.  Indonesia's 
emerging success as a democracy has profound implications for 
our bilateral objectives, for our broader goals in Asia and 
throughout the developing world, most notably among other 
Muslim-majority countries.  Within Indonesia, democracy has 
created opportunities for a U.S.-Indonesia partnership that 
supports mutual objectives in key areas such as combating 
extremism and terrorism, and promoting human rights, security 
cooperation, economic development and investment. Indonesia 
provides a strong democratic example for countries that lag 
in political freedom and stands out as a living example of 
Islam's compatibility with freedom and modernity. 
¶8.  (C) Indonesia established new foundations for democracy 
over the past seven years.  The amended Constitution provides 
more effective checks and balances among the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches.  Indonesia now has a 
freely-elected legislature with a chamber representing 
different regions.  Security forces no longer have unelected 
seats in the House of Representatives (DPR).  The People's 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) resoundingly defeated attempts by 
Islamist parties to introduce Shari'a law in the 
Constitution.  The free and fair 2004 national elections put 
into practice a new electoral framework with a vibrant 
multi-party system.  The country's first direct presidential 
election defeated an incumbent President and brought 
reform-minded Yudhoyono into office.  Indonesia carried out a 
huge decentralization effort that shifted much authority from 
central government to local officials. A free, open, and 
frequently obstreperous press has replaced a tightly 
controlled and censored media, allowing public discussion of 
issues.  Our assistance programs and diplomatic efforts have 
supported these developments. 
¶9.  (C) Democratic progress has made Indonesia a player in 
the ongoing struggle between democratic modernization and 
militant retrograde Islam.  As the world's largest 
Muslim-majority country, Indonesia suffers the same radical, 
hate-filled strains of thought that afflict the rest of the 
Islamic world.  At the same time, Islam in Indonesia -- 
especially its syncretic Javanese version -- has a long 
history of moderation, combining Islamic beliefs with 
modernization and outreach to the rest of the world.  This 
has led most Indonesians to conclude that democracy and Islam 
prove compatible.  We have worked with Indonesia's civic 
organizations -- dominated by Islamic groups -- to make the 
point that democracy, modernization, and Islam can work 
together; Indonesians have adopted this view and created one 
of the world's largest democracies.  We must show that we can 
forge close, long-term mutually beneficial ties with this 
fourteen percent of the Islamic world (more Muslims live here 
than in all the Middle East). 
Encouraging Engagement in Region and Globally 
¶10.  (C) SBY's focus on repairing Indonesia's image gives the 
foreign policy apparatus an opportunity to change Indonesia's 
role in international fora.  We need Indonesia to take the 
side of democracy in world debates and act as a moderating, 
democratic influence on more radical regimes in the Middle 
East.  Indonesia's historical non-aligned orientation and 
jealous safeguarding of national sovereignty have made it 
cautious in entering into bilateral agreements, preferring 
multilateral fora and instruments.  Indonesia has begun to 
reassert its traditional leadership role in ASEAN and has 
made tentative attempts to press for democratic norms within 
ASEAN's nascent political community.  ASEAN members made 
helpful statements in Kuala Lumpur about the lack of progress 
in Burma, and agreed to send Malaysian FM Hamid to Rangoon. 
Indonesia can build on this positive movement by beginning to 
speak publicly about the need for reform in Burma. 
¶11.  (C) Indonesia should increase engagement in 
international security efforts, including maritime security 
and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Indonesia 
has worked with Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
International Maritime Organization to improve maritime 
security in the strategic Strait of Malacca, but needs more 
effective measures in this and other areas.  Indonesia 
professes strong support for non-proliferation, but has not 
endorsed the PSI Statement of Principles.  It should see PSI 
as a means to enhance cooperation as part of our mil-mil 
relationship and area in which it should take greater 
international responsibility.  It should consider endorsing 
PSI before the February 11 Asian Senior-Level Talks on 
Non-Proliferation (ASTOP). 
Significant Progress on Terrorism; Problems Remain 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶12.  (C) The bombings in Bali October 1 left no doubt that 
terrorism remains a significant threat.  Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI), the most active terror group in Indonesia and one of 
the world's deadliest, has conducted most of the dozens of 
bombings in Indonesia since 2000, killing hundreds of persons 
(mostly Indonesians).  Founded in 1992 as an offshoot of the 
Darul Islam network that for decades sought to turn Indonesia 
into an Islamic state, JI has as its ultimate goal the 
establishment of an Islamic caliphate that spans the southern 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and southern 
Thailand.  JI's leaders (including its now imprisoned 
"spiritual" leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir or "ABB") returned to 
Indonesia from exile after Suharto's fall in 1998.  Thanks to 
the GOI's recent success in taking down bombing mastermind 
Azahari we see a much greater understanding within the GOI 
and the population of the dangers posed by these radicals. 
We see the greatest public commitment to act expressed by 
leaders since the first Bali bombings in 2002.  In your 
discussions with Yudhoyono and others you could stress the 
importance of government efforts to achieve clear public 
understanding that jihadist radicalism has no place in 
Reform of the Indonesian Military 
¶13.  (C) SBY, a retired General, has continued the reform of 
the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) begun after the fall of 
Suharto.  As Defense Minister he has a strong-willed civilian 
military expert, Juwono Sudarsono, who also served as 
Minister of Defense in Gus Dur's cabinet.  Juwono's Ministry 
implemented the TNI law enacted in September 2004 and has in 
preparation legislation to bring TNI fully under control of 
the Ministry.  Under Juwono, TNI professionalism and respect 
for human rights continue to improve; TNI has stayed out of 
politics and submitted to increased civilian control; TNI has 
observed legal restrictions on its domestic CT involvement 
and allowed the Indonesian National Police to take the lead 
on the issue; and TNI has fulfilled its obligations under the 
GOI-GAM MOU ending three decades of conflict in Aceh. 
Although making progress, the GOI has not yet ended TNI's 
business activities and provided it a realistic budget -- 
most of TNI's budget comes from "self-financing."  While TNI 
respect for human rights and punishment of individuals who 
abuse rights has increased, accountability has remained 
incomplete in the  ase of 1999 East Timor abuses.  Indonesia 
and Eas Timor have established a i(aterall Truth and 
Friendship Commission (TFC) to achieve accountability for 
crimes committed in East Timor in 1999, but we must work to 
assure the TFC performs credibly by including naming names of 
perpetrators, having international advisors, holding public 
hearings, and protecting witness confidentiality.  Progress 
on human rights remains key to consolidating democracy and 
has implications for further mil-mil normalization. 
Normalized Mil-Mil Relationship 
¶14.  (C) The decision to sign the waiver and normalize 
mil-mil relations enhances our ability to support GOI efforts 
to develop democratic institutions and reform and 
professionalize TNI.  Congress and we remain keenly 
interested that TNI reform continues, and the form 
Congressional conditions take in FY07 could depend on GOI 
performance this year. We propose to focus our efforts on 
priority areas: (1) maritime security/regional 
stability/counterterrorism; (2) professionalization and 
modernization of TNI, including civilian control; and (3) TNI 
ability to respond to domestic humanitarian crises; overseas 
peacekeeping operations and disaster assistance.  We will 
engage with the TNI and Defense Ministry in January to 
determine ways to tailor our activities to Indonesian needs. 
When discussing our commitment to normalized relations and 
increased funding for programs, you might wish to make known 
your support for an Article 98 agreement, and explain that an 
Article 98 agreement could prove of major help during talks 
with and within Congress on bilateral military relations. 
The Timika Case 
¶15.  (C) Resolution of the August 31, 2002 murders of 
American schoolteachers Leon Burgon and Rickey Spier near 
Timika, Papua became a key benchmark for our overall 
bilateral relationship -- and a normalized 
military-to-military relationship.  The FBI's exemplary 
investigation, leading to the indictment June 2004 in a U.S. 
court of Anthonius Wamang, a renegade member of the Papuan 
separatist guerrilla group OPM (Free Papua Movement), proved 
vital to U.S. efforts to address and resolve the issue.  At 
present, a joint task force consisting of members of the FBI, 
TNI, and Indonesian National Police (INP) continue the 
investigation and focus on apprehending Wamang, as well as on 
the identification and indictment of additional subjects. 
Cooperation with the Indonesian authorities on the case has 
become good, particularly since December 2003 when the focus 
shifted to Wamang.  President Yudhoyono during his May visit 
to the U.S. met Patsy Spier, widow of Rickey Spier.  Ms. 
Spier will arrive in Indonesia this month and travel to Papua 
with the FBI team.  Apprehending Wamang remains a high 
priority for us. 
Indonesia's Judicial Sector and Corruption 
¶16.  (C) Indonesia's judicial sector must overcome the 
corruption, ineffectiveness and pervasive impunity from which 
it suffered during the Suharto regime.  A broad range of U.S. 
programs assists Indonesia to do so.  We successfully 
encouraged the Attorney General to establish in September a 
counter terrorism and transnational crime task force and we 
support it financially.  Our ICITAP and ATA training programs 
have helped develop the operational and organizational 
capacity of the Indonesian National Police (INP) as 
highlighted by the success of U.S.-trained "Task Force 88," 
which killed JI bomber and mass murderer Azahari last October 
in the course of a well-executed raid on a terrorist 
"safehouse."  USAID has a multi-year rule of law initiative 
focusing on the courts, the AG's office and other judicial 
institutions, including the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK).  CT cooperation has led to arrests, prosecutions and 
convictions of large numbers of terrorists.  Assistance to 
the judicial sector also helps SBY pursue his high priority 
anti-corruption agenda and create a better climate for 
foreign investment. 
Public Diplomacy Environment 
¶17.  (C) Indonesian institutions have proven remarkably open 
and receptive to U.S. public diplomacy efforts.  The point 
made elsewhere in this cable that Indonesia has "no better 
friend than the U.S." seems widely recognized both among the 
elite who have benefited from U.S. education (a large number 
of the cabinet have studied in the U.S., often under USG 
sponsorship) as well as the man in the street.  While public 
opinion polls show disagreement with many U.S. policies, 
other polling results and our daily experience show a 
substantial positive feeling about the U.S., and our values 
and social institutions.  Our effective response and 
significant contributions to the tsunami relief had a 
tremendous impact, receiving wide publicity and praise in 
Indonesia, and helped turn around the decline in our approval 
ratings.  More important, our access to all levels of society 
provides opportunity for aggressive public affairs 
programming.  We have set up American Corners throughout 
Indonesia -- half in Islamic universities -- and carry out a 
large program of student exchanges with Islamic institutions. 
 Media remain receptive to training programs and 
participation in State Department reporting tours.  A large 
Fulbright program enhances mutual understanding by sending 
the next generation of leaders to study in the U.S. 
Economic Reform 
¶18.  (SBU) Although Indonesia's record on counterterrorism 
and military reform receive the bulk of attention in the 
U.S., President Yudhoyono's domestic political future will 
rise or fall on the success of his economic reform program. 
Indonesia, once one of the "Asian Tigers" before the 1997-98 
financial crisis, enjoyed annual GDP growth of almost seven 
percent from 1990-96. The crisis triggered the collapse of 
Indonesia's state-centered, cronyist development model, and 
the country has since made halting progress toward a more 
open, private sector economic system.  Yudhoyono came into 
office with a ringing pledge to implement a "pro-growth, 
pro-poor, and pro-jobs" economic policy that, for the first 
time, explicitly recognized the private sector as a key 
partner in development.  He set the ambitious target of 
raising Indonesia's average GDP growth from 2006-09 to 6.6 
from its current 5.0 percent level, and halving the poverty 
and unemployment rates.  The Indonesian and foreign business 
communities responded warmly to Yudhoyono's agenda, and 
continue to support him strongly. 
¶19. (SBU) Aside from the tsunami disaster, the defining 
moment of Yudhoyono's first year in office proved his bold 
decision to raise subsidized fuel prices by an average of 126 
percent on October 1, 2005.  The fuel price hikes open the 
door to the most significant expansion of GOI social and 
development spending in a decade, and Indonesia's FY 2006 
budget shows a 28 percent increase in non-interest, 
non-subsidy spending.  But the fuel price hikes caused 
hardship to millions of low-income Indonesians accustomed to 
decades of cheap gasoline and kerosene, and eroded 
Yudhoyono's popularity.  The price hikes also led to a surge 
in inflation and took steam out of the economy.  In order to 
raise growth, SBY's highly regarded Coordinating Minister for 
Economics, Dr. Boediono, has said that the GOI will ramp up 
government development spending and improve the business 
climate to draw new foreign investment.  As Indonesia's 
largest non-oil and gas export market and leading investor in 
the energy sector, we have an interest in Boediono's success. 
 Obtaining final agreement from the state-owned oil company 
on ExxonMobil's USD 3 billion Cepu oilfield project in East 
Java has shaped up as a test of his ability to resolve major 
bureaucratic problems. 
U.S. Assistance Programs 
¶20.  (SBU) For more than 40 years, the U.S. has had an active 
bilateral assistance program in education, public health, 
support for democracy, and economic growth including 
infrastructure development.  In FY05 the bilateral USAID 
program came in at more than $135 million (appropriated 
dollars and food aid combined) and we actively work with 
Indonesian partners in areas Indonesia has identified as of 
highest priority.  The USAID program in Indonesia aims to 
"Help Indonesia Succeed."  The USAID country-wide assistance 
program works with the GOI, local governments and private 
partners, including civil society, to improve the quality of 
basic education; improve the delivery of essential public 
services at the community level, including health services 
and clean water; create a better business, trade and 
investment environment that will support economic growth that 
generates new and better jobs; promote more accountable and 
transparent governance at the national and local levels; and 
promote biodiversity and environmental protection. 
¶21.  (SBU) These programs allow the U.S. to lay the 
foundation for a better future for the people of Indonesia, 
while responding rapidly to more immediate requirements as 
varied as response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster; 
implementation of the Aceh peace accord; avian influenza and 
polio outbreaks; and an HIV/AIDS epidemic that risks breaking 
out.  Anti-corruption support, including a focus on 
"governance" issues in all sectors in which we work, as well 
as specific institutional support for justice sector reform, 
addresses one of the most difficult economic and democratic 
development issues faced by Indonesia today, and one of the 
highest priorities of SBY's government.  With USAID and other 
assistance, continued progress in the fight against 
corruption and better delivery of basic services will help 
Indonesia qualify for full support from the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation.  Indonesia just received MCC 
"threshold status." 
Assistance Programs for Aceh 
¶22.  (SBU) The U.S. has provided Indonesia tsunami recovery 
and reconstruction assistance totaling $400.1 million (and 
U.S. the private sector contributed more than $1.4 billion to 
the regions).  USAID implemented more than $43 million for 
relief and transition activities in the weeks following the 
tsunami and earthquake.  We have directed the remaining $357 
million to U.S.-managed reconstruction activities, debt 
relief ($20.1 million), a contribution to the jointly-managed 
Government of Indonesia-World Bank Multi-donor Trust Fund 
($10 million), and activities of the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency ($2.5 million).  The U.S. will rebuild the 
road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh and other vital 
infrastructure, restore livelihoods, and improve essential 
basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, and 
environment) while strengthening local governance capacity to 
manage these services.  We provide technical assistance to 
develop national and local disaster planning and 
preparedness, including early warning systems.  We have 
programmed more than $10 million to assist the implementation 
of the landmark peace agreement between the GOI and Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) separatist movement.  Our programs promote 
public understanding and support of the agreement, help 
integrate former combatants into Acehenese society and 
sustain community-based development. 
Avian Influenza 
¶23.  (SBU) Indonesia's size and complexity complicated its 
response to H5N1 avian influenza (AI), and while we should 
praise Indonesia's efforts to prepare for a potential 
pandemic, much work remains.  Of a total 17 confirmed cases 
since July 2005, 12 have proven fatal.  Since SBY designated 
Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Aburizal Bakrie to 
coordinate its AI activities, the GOI has developed an 
initial AI preparedness framework, but must improve 
coordination among health, agriculture and other sectors. 
Since the first confirmed AI patient in July 2005, Indonesia 
has responded with case investigations, has proven quick to 
report findings and shared samples for confirmation with 
international laboratories.  The Ministry of Health (MOH) has 
established outbreak response teams to investigate reported 
human cases.  As active surveillance improves, increasing 
investigatory caseloads could occur.  The U.S. Navy Medical 
Research Unit (NAMRU-2) in Jakarta has supported the Health 
Ministry through its 24-hospital influenza surveillance 
system, initial laboratory testing for the AI virus in 
hundreds of human samples, and outbreak investigations. 
However, NAMRU-2's legal status remains in question pending 
negotiation of a bilateral agreement.  The GOI presented us a 
draft agreement in early December and we hope to present a 
U.S. counter proposal very soon.