Viewing cable 06TOKYO1989
Title: VCI SENIOR ADVISOR HEINTZELMAN AND ISN/RA SENIOR

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
06TOKYO19892006-04-13 00:20:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
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DE RUEHKO #1989/01 1030020
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P 130020Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0882
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1707
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0967
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 7874
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0358
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001989 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP JA KS KN
SUBJECT: VCI SENIOR ADVISOR HEINTZELMAN AND ISN/RA SENIOR 
ADVISOR KANG DISCUSS NORTH KOREA WITH MOFA 
NON-PROLIFERATION DIRECTOR SUZUKI 
 
 
Classified By: VCI Senior Advisor for Noncompliance Harry Heintzelman; 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Bureau of Verification, Compliance and 
Inspection Senior Advisor for Harry Heintzelman, IV, and ISN 
Regional Affairs Senior Advisor Eliot Kang met with MOFA 
non-proliferation officials on April 7 to discuss potential 
areas of cooperation in dismantling North Korean nuclear 
facilities.  Heintzelman briefed MOFA Director for 
Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Satoshi Suzuki 
on his experience with dismantling Libyan nuclear facilities 
and removing sensitive documents and materials from that 
country.  Heintzelman suggested that Japan may have valuable 
experience with dismantling graphite-moderated reactors that 
could facilitate operations in North Korea should the 
opportunity arise.  Suzuki agreed that Japan could add real 
value to operations in North Korea, but cautioned that Tokyo 
was not yet in a position to determine to what extent Japan 
would be involved or the nature of its involvement. 
Heintzelman also briefed Suzuki on USG efforts to determine 
the best site for a base of operations for coordinating 
activities in North Korea and suggested the USG would likely 
want to use Yokota Air Base as a gateway for US teams. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On April 7, VCI's Senior Advisor for Noncompliance 
Harry Heintzelman and ISN's Office of Regional Affairs Senior 
Advisor Eliot Kang met with MOFA Non-proliferation, Science 
and Nuclear Energy Division Director Satoshi Suzuki to 
discuss potential areas of cooperation in dismantling North 
Korean nuclear facilities.  Heintzelman told Suzuki that a 
working group was established in the U.S. last fall but its 
work has been slowed somewhat by other proliferation 
challenges.  Nevertheless technical experts have been working 
on the challenges presented by the denuclearization and 
verification of the DPRK nuclear and nuclear weapons program. 
 For example, finding a single governing protocol for health 
and safety guidelines for nuclear facility inspectors 
operating in North Korea is a prime example of the type of 
challenges facing USG Departments and Agencies that will have 
to be resolved before plans can move ahead.  There also are 
various domestic laws and acts that affect the activities 
which could arise during this effort.  Heintzelman said, as 
the working group is moving ahead in planning, it would be 
useful to learn the other Parties views and of their 
experience in nuclear-related dismantlement efforts. 
 
¶3.  (C) From the US's experience in Libya, Heintzelman argued 
that we must look at each facility individually to determine 
the best course of action for decommissioning and/or 
dismantling.  The USG already is conducting such studies on 
known facilities and is consulting with its partners on how 
to implement plans.  Heintzelman told Suzuki that Japan's 
experience dismantling a small graphite-moderated reactor at 
Tokai makes it uniquely qualified to provide information and 
ideas for planning how to dismantle the Yongbyon reactor in 
North Korea.  Suzuki added that aside from the Tokai reactor, 
Japan also previously had decommissioned a light water 
reactor and a small pilot-scale enrichment facility.  Suzuki 
said he supports holding technical talks in June to continue 
discussions along these lines. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Suzuki continued that in order to determine the best 
course of action, all groups involved must consider how to 
handle North Korean hardware (facilities and material), 
software (documentation and personnel), as well as 
cooperation among the parties.  North Korean issues are 
highly charged in Japan, but it is essential to have a firm 
timeline that realistically reflects the political and 
technical obstacles dismantlement operations would face in 
North Korea, according to Suzuki.  Heintzelman emphasized the 
need to quickly identify and remove critical items from North 
Korea facilities; dismantling or removing any weapons would 
be the top priority.  However, the pace of this effort would 
be dictated by DPRK's strategic decision to verifiably 
dismantle its programs and the cooperation the DPRK extended 
to the dismantlement and verification effort.  Suzuki assured 
Heintzelman that Japan is not interested in being involved in 
 
 
any weapons-related activities or in having access to 
sensitive weapons-related information. 
 
¶5.  (C) Suzuki noted that the GOJ assesses that the term 
"point of no return" potentially could offer North Korea an 
opportunity to stall on implementing its obligations and that 
Japan prefers instead the USG-favored "substantial 
degradation." Heintzelman told Suzuki that the issue of when 
there had been a substantial degradation of North Korea's 
nuclear weapons and nuclear program was not time driven but 
dependant upon North Korean cooperation and progress on 
dismantlement, elimination and verification.  Suzuki noted 
that there would be political pressure for an expeditious 
implementation process and for substantial progress to be 
made at the one-year point; momentum that would be vital to 
keeping North Korea on track.  Heintzelman agreed that an 
expedited process is preferable but it would depend on the 
North's behavior and the progress made on the ground. 
 
¶6.  (C) Suzuki asked whether the USG intended to enlist the 
help of other nuclear weapons states, particularly France and 
the UK, in CVID.  Heintzelman responded that outside 
participation was an important factor to consider as plans 
move forward and that those states had unique expertise that 
could facilitate dismantlement and verification operations in 
North Korea.  This was an issue that should be discussed 
further and broached with the other Parties. Responding to 
Heintzelman's question on where a multilateral entity to 
provide technical support to teams in North Korea should be 
sited, Suzuki noted that both China and South Korea would 
likely prefer to host such an entity.  Although more 
discussion is needed, Suzuki suggested that Japanese 
politicians might wish Japan to play such a role.  Suzuki 
also asked whether the USG intended to use U.S. bases in 
Japan as staging or storage areas for operations in Japan. 
Heintzelman replied that this issue was still under study but 
use of Yokota could be an attractive option.  Suzuki said 
Japan generally was supportive of such use but would need to 
know the details and also would have to coordinate such use 
with other parts of the government. 
 
¶7.  (C) During a follow-on lunch, Suzuki mentioned that Iran 
and India currently are high priority issues for his office. 
Referring to the India civil nuclear agreement as "the India 
problem," Suzuki restated Japan's concerns that the agreement 
could set a double standard and potentially undermine the 
credibility of the NPT regime.   (BIOGRAPHIC NOTE:  Suzuki is 
very well spoken in English and very knowledgeable about 
international non-proliferation issues. Like most MOFA 
officials in the Disarmament, Science and Non-proliferation 
Department, Suzuki takes an almost puritanically legalistic 
approach to most non-proliferation issues, particularly with 
regards to the NPT.  Suzuki tends to wait till the end of 
meetings to bring up more provocative issues, such as 
criticism of US policy or new GOJ positions.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶8.  (U) Deputy Director for Non-proliferation, Science and 
Nuclear Energy Kenji Enoshita proposed meeting again with 
Heintzelman at a later date to discuss North Korean issues in 
more detail. 
 
Participant List: 
 
Japan: 
 
Satoshi SUZUKI, Director, Non-proliferation, Science and 
Nuclear Energy Division 
Kenji ENOSHITA, Deputy Director, Non-proliferation, Science 
and Nuclear Energy Division 
Kaoru MAGOSAKI, Principal Deputy Director, Non-proliferation, 
Science and Nuclear Energy Division 
Takuya IWAMOTO, Special Assistant for North Korean Issues, 
Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division 
Hiroyuki SHIMIZU, Reprocessing Specialist, Japan Atomic 
Energy Agency, seconded to Non-proliferation, Science and 
Nuclear Energy Division 
 
U.S.: 
 
 
 
Henry Heintzelman, IV, Senior Advisor, VCI 
Eliot Kang, Senior Advisor, Regional Affairs, ISN 
Joyce Rabens, Minister-Counselor for Environment, Science and 
Technology, US Embassy Tokyo 
Matthew Wallace, Second Secretary, Environment, Science and 
Technology Affairs, US Embassy Tokyo 
 
 
 
SCHIEFFER