Viewing cable 06TOKYO2613
Title: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MAY 10 MEETING WITH

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
06TOKYO26132006-05-12 13:12:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXYZ0019
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #2613/01 1321312
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121312Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1971
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0104
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2215
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1017
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 8397
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002613 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USDA FOR U/S PENN AND TERPSTRA. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2026 
TAGS: PREL KNNP ETRD EAGR ECON IR IZ KS CH KN JA
SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MAY 10 MEETING WITH 
ASSISTANT CABINET SECRETARY ANDO 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan.  Reason: 1.4 (b)(d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During a May 10 meeting with S/P Director 
Krasner, Assistant Cabinet Secretary Ando: 
 
-- expressed interest in possible response scenarios to 
Iranian nuclear ambitions; 
 
-- asked about U.S. confidence in the new Iraqi government; 
 
-- sought confirmation of continued U.S. commitment to the 
Six-Party framework; and 
 
-- inquired about U.S. audit of affected beef slaughter 
facilities.  End Summary. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶2. (C) Assistant Cabinet Secretary Hiroyasu Ando opened his 
May 10 meeting by assuring S/P Director Stephen D. Krasner 
that Japan shares the international community's concerns 
regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions.  Japan has encouraged 
Iran to emerge from isolation and yield to inspections, but 
there has been no response to these messages thus far, Ando 
observed.  Referring to a statement by President Bush the 
previous day in which he had reiterated the U.S. commitment 
to diplomacy, Ando sought further information about the U.S. 
position on Iran.  Krasner explained that the United States 
was committed to a diplomatic path at the Security Council 
and that the international community is in the early stages 
of diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear issue.  Asked about the 
recent letter from Iranian President Ahmadinejad, S/P 
Director Krasner said he did not think it contained anything 
substantial.  However, the decision to send it demonstrates 
the Iranian government is not completely indifferent to the 
situation at hand.  In response to Ando's questions 
concerning possible economic sanctions, Krasner noted that 
sanctions would need to be credible to both the Iranians and 
the international community.  He noted, for example, that 
targeting individual Iranian officials and their financial 
activities would impede Iran's ability to do business. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶3. (C) Japan was considering withdrawing its Self-Defense 
Force (SDF) mission from Iraq, Ando explained, adding that 
Japan had just sent its 10th contingent of SDF ground 
personnel and hoped they would be able to return soon. 
Looking to focus more on economic assistance to Iraq, Japan 
has committed USD 5 billion, with USD 1.5 billion already 
spent, Ando explained.  He related that a discussion of how 
Japan can best contribute to Iraqi reconstruction is taking 
place against the backdrop of an overall reassessment of 
Japan's official development assistance (ODA) goals and 
policies.  Thus on May 8, Prime Minister Koizumi, Foreign 
Minister Aso, Finance Minister Tanigaki, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Abe and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry 
 
SIPDIS 
Nikai met in a new Cabinet sub-committee on ODA to discuss 
how to match ODA to strategic goals. 
 
Japan-ROK Relations 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) In response to Krasner's question about the 
possibility of overcoming tensions to enhance 
Japan-Korea-U.S. trilateral relations and policy 
coordination, Ando expressed his personal optimism.  When 
Japan and the ROK normalized diplomatic relations 40 years 
ago, Ando observed, 10,000 Japanese and Koreans visited each 
other's countries annually for exchanges, but now the number 
is 10,000 per day.  As Japan-Korea relations become 
economically interdependent and their cultures more 
intertwined, the bilateral relationship is growing "closer 
and closer and stronger and stronger."  Ando argued that 
domestic political considerations in Korea are primarily to 
blame for the current political climate, noting that 
President Roh is taking a hard line on Japan to increase his 
declining popularity at home.  Pressed whether a change in 
ROK government would change the tone of the relationship, 
Ando said he thought it "might be possible."  He was quick to 
emphasize that, in spite of the territorial and historical 
differe 
nces, the Korea-Japan economic, social and cultural 
relationship is quite "healthy." 
 
 
China an Opportunity, Not a Threat 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Koizumi administration does not see China as a 
threat to Japan, but an opportunity, Ando asserted, citing 
the fact that China is Japan's top trading partner and 
Japan's imports from China are second only to those from the 
United States.  He noted Vice Minister Yachi's efforts at 
recent meetings in Beijing to set up a meeting between the 
two countries' foreign ministers, a positive step, given that 
the last minister-level meeting was more than a year ago. 
This ministerial would include discussion of East China Sea 
gas and would take place on May 22.  There had been no 
Chinese preconditions for the meeting, Ando added.  While 
Japan had suspended its yen loans to China, if all goes well 
during the May 22 meeting, Japan plans to resume the loans, 
Ando confided.  According to Ando, domestic issues drive PRC 
attitudes toward Japan.  By channeling Chinese nationalism 
against Japan, the Communist Party is able to maintain its 
grip on power.  If China were to take a softer line toward 
Japan, it would jeopardize the communist regime by inflaming 
popular nationalism, Ando asserted.  However, there is room 
for optimism; economic integration and regional organizations 
can serve to address and resolve the political problems of 
East Asia, "much like the European Union" has successfully 
settled past historical grievances. 
 
Dialogue with and Pressure on the DPRK 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The basic bilateral Japanese policy toward the DPRK is 
to combine dialogue and pressure, Ando noted.  Japan held its 
most recent bilateral dialogue with the DPRK in February but 
did not receive a serious response to its proposal.  Japan 
will continue to pressure the DPRK on the abduction issue. 
In response to Ando's concern that the United States would 
abandon the Six-Party framework, Krasner assured him this was 
not the case. 
 
Beef Questions 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In response to Ando's questions, the DCM related that 
the U.S. audits will conclude within the next couple of days. 
 The DCM relayed his concern that the longer the GOJ drags 
this issue out, the harder it will be to convince the 
Japanese public of the safety of U.S. beef.  Ando asserted 
that political pressure from the United States on reopening 
Japan's beef market was "not productive."  The DCM urged 
Japan to send its auditing teams to the United States as soon 
as possible. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (U) Particpants in the meeting included: 
 
United States 
------------- 
 
S/P Director Stephen D. Krasner 
Joe Donovan, Deputy Chief of Mission 
Evan Feigenbaum, S/P Staff 
Kate Szpila, notetaker 
David Wolff, control officer 
 
Japan 
----- 
 
Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Mitoji Ando 
Hideaki Adachi, Assistant Counsellor to Assistant Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Ando (notetaker) 
 
¶9. (U) S/P Director Krasner cleared this message. 
SCHIEFFER