Viewing cable 06TOKYO6404

06TOKYO64042006-11-07 22:56:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Embassy Tokyo
DE RUEHKO #6404/01 3112256
O 072256Z NOV 06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 006404 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016 
REF: A. 05 STATE 179157 
     ¶B. 05 STATE 191306 
     ¶C. 05 STATE 180524 
     ¶D. CANBERRA 352 
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Classified By: Ambassador J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER.  Reasons 1.4 (B), (D). 
 ¶1.  (S/REL AUS) Summary:  U.S., Australian, and Japanese 
Ambassadors for Counterterrorism and their interagency 
delegations held the second round of trilateral 
counterterrorism consultations in Tokyo on October 24. 
Participants offered general threat assessments for 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  The Australians 
believed that while Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was adapting to 
governments' counterterrorism efforts, JI's rhetoric was not 
gaining political traction in Indonesia.  A Japanese delegate 
worried that the impasse in the peace process between the 
Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
might be exploited by terrorists.  S/CT Ambassador Crumpton 
was concerned that the ethnic conflict in southern Thailand 
could be cast into the larger radicalization context. 
Crumpton provided a brief review of progress in the war on 
terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S. views on Iran's 
terrorism activities at the request of the Japanese 
delegation.  The three sides expressed concern about North 
Korea selling weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and 
about the threat of bioterrorism. 
¶2.  (S/REL AUS) The six breakout sessions discussed law 
enforcement/legal affairs, maritime security, 
border/transport security, terrorist financing, intelligence 
sharing, and biological terrorism.  There was consensus in 
all sessions that the three countries should share 
assessments and coordinate training efforts.  Proposals for 
future cooperation included supporting currency reporting 
systems in Southeast Asia in an effort to stop terrorists 
from transporting bulk cash to finance their efforts, and 
sharing open source analysis to inform counter-radicalization 
efforts.  The U.S. and Australian delegations also emphasized 
the long-term need to challenge terrorist ideologies.  A U.S. 
delegation debrief highlighted concerns about the lack of 
time for in-depth discussion and concrete proposals for the 
future, noting Japanese hesitancy as a recurring problem. 
The delegates encouraged intersessional work to prepare 
deliverables for the next trilat which Australia will host in 
early 2007.  End Summary. 
¶3.  (C/REL AUS/JPN) U.S., Australian, and Japanese 
Ambassadors for Counterterrorism and their interagency 
delegations met on October 24 in Tokyo for the second round 
of trilateral counterterrorism consultations.  (Note:  Refs 
A, B, and C are the reports from the inaugural meeting in 
September 2005.)  S/CT Ambassador Henry Crumpton led the U.S. 
team which included participants from the Departments of 
State, Homeland Security (including Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, the Office of 
International Affairs, and the U.S. Coast Guard),  Defense 
(including PACOM), and Justice (including the FBI). 
Australian Counterterrorism Ambassador Mike Smith led the GOA 
delegation which included representatives from the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence, 
Attorney-General's Department, Australian Customs Service, 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, 
Australian Federal Police, Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs, Department of Transport and Regional 
Services, Office of National Assessments, and the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet.  International 
Counterterrorism Cooperation Ambassador Akio Suda headed the 
Japanese delegation which included officials from the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet Office, National Police 
Agency, Japan Defense Agency, Ministry of Justice, Public 
Security Intelligence Agency, Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Coast Guard, and the 
Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society. 
Opening Remarks Highlight Continued Threat 
¶4.  (C/REL AUS/JPN) Japanese Counterterrorism (CT) Ambassador 
Suda opened the meeting by reminding participants of the 
continued threat of terrorism, noting terrorist attacks that 
had occurred since the inaugural September 2005 trilateral 
meeting - primarily the October 2005 Bali bombings and the 
disrupted August 2006 London airline hijacking plot.  (Note: 
He later suggested that the trilateral partners discuss 
aviation security in response to the plot.)  Suda highlighted 
the evolving methods of terrorists and the continued appeal 
of violent Islamic extremism as challenges we face. 
Ambassadors Crumpton and Smith agreed and reiterated the 
importance of eliminating stove pipes and fostering 
interagency cooperation to better combat terrorism.  They 
also expressed their desire for concrete, practical outcomes 
on which to move forward. 
SE Asia Assessment: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶5.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Session I began with general assessments 
of the terrorist threat.  Australian CT Ambassador Smith 
summarized developments in the Southeast Asia region.  Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) operatives were responding to governments' 
counterterrorism efforts by adapting their methods and 
ideology, he said.  They were increasingly using the 
internet, promoting the single narrative of Muslim 
victimhood, and successfully evading authorities.  On the 
positive side, however, JI's appeal and tactics were not 
gaining political traction in Indonesia, Smith believed.  The 
Indonesian parliament supported UN declarations on terrorism 
and moderate Muslim leaders were arguing against terrorist 
diatribes.  Indonesian law enforcement and intelligence 
authorities were also disrupting JI networks and reducing its 
capabilities.  He noted that ongoing efforts in Jolo in the 
southern Philippines were forcing JI operatives to flee. 
¶6.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) The bigger, long-term challenge was the 
ideological battle, Smith emphasized, stating that we needed 
to do a better job of replying to JI rhetoric with appealing 
counterarguments.  Australian Office of National Assessments 
Southeast Asia Assistant Secretary David Engel added that 
Indonesians had a developing attachment to democracy and did 
not see it as contradicting Islam.  Indonesians were 
expressing themselves more as Muslims in recent times but 
greater religiosity should not be equated with 
radicalization, Engel cautioned.  S/CT Ambassador Crumpton 
agreed with the GOA assessment and added that he was 
concerned that the ethnic conflict in southern Thailand could 
be cast into the larger radicalization context. 
¶7.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Taeko Takahashi, Minister at the Japanese 
Embassy in Manila, was concerned that the peace process 
between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) was at an impasse that might be 
exploited by terrorists.  She said that the Japanese would 
try to pressure officials to get back on track and suggested 
U.S. and Australian officials do the same.  Japan was taking 
a more active role in the peace process as well, Takahashi 
added.  In July 2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Aso announced 
that Japan would send an expert to monitor the rehabilitation 
and economic development situation in the MILF-conflicted 
areas as part of the International Monitoring Team.  This 
expert would be supported by a "Mindanao Task Force" made up 
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of officials from the Japanese Embassy, Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, and Japan Bank for International 
Stocktake of Iraq/Afghanistan/Iran 
¶8.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) At the request of the Japanese 
delegation, Ambassador Crumpton briefly reviewed of the 
status of the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S. 
views on Iran's terrorism activities.  He acknowledged that 
violence in Iraq continued at high levels and that the 
insurgency was being used as a recruiting tool by terrorists. 
 He said there were four types of violence in Iraq: 
international terrorism perpetrated by al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
sectarian violence (mainly Sunni v. Shia), the insurgency 
against Coalition forces, and criminal violence (kidnapping, 
etc.).  Ambassador Smith did not believe that Southeast Asian 
terrorists were involved in the Iraq insurgency, although 
they had been in Afghanistan.  He lamented the role of Iran 
and Syria in introducing jihadis into Iraq and asked about 
the threat of returning jihadis; would Iraq have larger 
numbers than the conflict between Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union?  Crumpton replied that the number of foreign fighters 
leaving Iraq was very small because they were either suicide 
bombers or killed in combat. 
¶9.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) In Afghanistan, NATO and Coalition forces 
were doing well, Crumpton stated, but there was still the 
problem of poppy production and economic development.  A U.S. 
delegation of senior executives recently went to Afghanistan 
to look at investment opportunities, he noted.  Japanese 
delegates inquired about terrorism from Pakistan, as Indian 
officials had expressed concern to them about Pakistani 
terrorists committing acts across their border.  Crumpton 
stated that Pakistan had captured more al-Qaeda leaders than 
any other country and that the main concern was the stability 
of the Musharraf government.  If Musharraf were overthrown, 
what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapon arsenal? 
¶10.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Iran was the most active state sponsor 
of terrorism since the revolution of 1979, Crumpton assessed. 
 Iran was sponsoring activities inside Iraq by providing 
training and explosives to insurgents, supporting attacks 
against Israel through Hezbollah, and supporting Sunni 
terrorist groups in a temporary alliance.  The Iranian 
Government was also holding al-Qaeda leaders as "bargaining 
chips," he said. 
Potential for DPRK to Sell Weapons to Terrorists 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶11.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) The Japanese delegation also requested 
U.S. and Australian comments on North Korea's recent nuclear 
test in the context of the DPRK selling such weapons to 
terrorists.  Secretary Rice was firmly committed to 
maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula and was 
similarly concerned about North Korea selling weapons to 
terrorists, Ambassador Crumpton said.  He mentioned that the 
U.S. was currently conducting an intelligence assessment on 
North Korean capability to conduct terrorist actions, 
including employment of a nuclear device and would share that 
review when it was complete.  He was particularly concerned 
about North Korea infiltrating South Korea or Japan with a 
CBRN weapon. 
¶12.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Australian CT Ambassador Smith spoke 
briefly about the North Korean ship Pong Su which was 
captured smuggling drugs into Australia (Ref D).  He recalled 
the recent GOA decision to ban all North Korean-flagged 
vessels from stopping at Australian ports in response to the 
DPRK's nuclear test.  However, this did not stop the North 
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Koreans from using vessels with flags of convenience, Smith 
said.  He noted GOA concern that the DPRK had both the 
technological capability to produce weapons and a leader 
willing to go to any length to obtain money for the regime - 
a fortuitous combination for international terrorists. 
¶13.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Crumpton believed bioterrorism was the 
least mature and least advanced portion of international 
counterterrorism cooperation, which was why the U.S. 
requested it be added to the agenda for the trilat.  State's 
Senior Advisor for Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health 
Security Marc Ostfield explained that bioterrorism was at the 
intersection of several areas such as public health, law 
enforcement, foreign policy, and intelligence.  It had no 
boundaries unlike other forms of terrorism and was much more 
difficult to contain.  Interagency and intergovernmental 
cooperation were key to combating this threat and the U.S. 
welcomed suggestions from the international community about 
how to develop guidelines for prevention and response. 
Overview of Current CT Programs 
¶14.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) The Japanese hosts gave a detailed 
presentation about their recent CT efforts, including their 
domestic Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism, 
amendments to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition 
Act, activities through the UN, CTAG, ASEAN, APEC, and ARF, 
and bilateral cooperation.  They listed nine main areas in 
which they have provided capacity-building assistance to 
other nations:  aviation security, port and maritime 
security, immigration, combating terrorist financing, customs 
cooperation, export control and nonproliferation, law 
enforcement cooperation, counter-CBRN terrorism, and 
counterterrorism international conventions and protocols. 
¶15.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) In FY 2006, Japan started two new 
frameworks:  grant aid for cooperation on counterterrorism 
and security enhancement, and the Japan-ASEAN Integration 
Fund, funded at US$63 million and US$68 million respectively, 
Japanese officials continued.  Under the former framework, a 
US$1.75 million grant of three patrol vessels to Indonesia 
had already been given.  This was an exception to the Three 
Principles on Arms Exports, Japanese officials noted.  Japan 
also pushed CT as an agenda for ASEAN at the June 2006 
ASEAN-Japan Counterterrorism Dialogue.  MOFA International 
Counterterrorism Cooperation Director Rokuichiro Michii said 
that ASEAN officials had been hesitant to use the term 
"counter-radicalization" in discussions because it implied 
that "Islam was wrong."  They preferred to use the term 
"public involvement in countering terrorism" instead.  Japan 
would continue to push for more activity on this front, he 
¶16.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Crumpton listed several areas 
in which the U.S. was advancing since the inaugural 
trilateral meeting:  PACOM and DOD were working aggressively 
in the Philippines; the U.S. now had military-to-military 
relations with Indonesia which enabled increased engagement; 
DOD and State were cooperating more on funding for combating 
terrorism; transformational diplomacy had shifted positions 
to more troubled regions of the world which would help the 
U.S. understand more fully the local grievances that 
terrorists try to exploit; and the U.S. was keen to include 
the private sector in CT efforts that promoted economic 
¶17.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Smith announced that 
Australia and Indonesia would co-host a subregional 
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ministerial meeting on CT in Indonesia in mid-January (Ref 
E).  The GOA had committed A$450 million (US$ 340 million) in 
CT assistance to Southeast Asia since 2004, focused on border 
and maritime security, law enforcement, and intelligence 
sharing. (Note: This figure does not include defense and 
select intelligence activities.) In May 2006, the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade alone received A$35 million (US$ 
26 million) over four years for additional CT programs aimed 
primarily at the battle of ideas, CBRN terrorism, and 
emergency/incidence response. 
Breakout Sessions & Areas for Future Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶18.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Session II reviewed breakout session 
discussions and potential areas for intensified trilateral 
engagement.  There were six breakout sessions:  law 
enforcement/legal affairs (chaired by the U.S.), maritime 
security (chaired by Australia), border/transport security 
(chaired by Australia), financing (chaired by the U.S.), 
intelligence sharing (chaired by Japan), and biological 
terrorism (chaired by Japan).  (Note:  Non-papers will be 
drawn up by each session chair summarizing key points and 
potential areas for future cooperation.  These papers will be 
distributed to embassies upon completion.  A brief summary of 
the breakout sessions follows below.) 
¶19.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) In the law enforcement session, 
participants discussed the importance of coordinating 
training efforts, perhaps through in-country joint meetings 
with designated CT POCs or on the Bali Process website. 
Referring to Indonesia specifically, they discussed current 
efforts to train prosecutors and the successful Japanese 
program of developing community policing, which Ambassador 
Smith noted had been very useful given the fear of 
approaching corrupt policemen.  They also suggested that 
training efforts take advantage of regional centers such as 
the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) 
and the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism 
(SEARCCT).  The maritime security group discussed various 
assessments conducted by the trilateral partners, including a 
maritime needs assessment by Australia and the Border Control 
Assessment Initiative (BCAI) by the U.S., and the need to 
share such information so as not to duplicate efforts. 
Participants also discussed progress on the Coast Watch South 
initiative in the Philippines, for which a bilateral approach 
might be more appropriate at this time, according to the 
Australian delegation.  The border/transport security session 
covered a range of areas such as identity security, including 
biometrics, movement alert lists, and lost and stolen 
passport information exchanges, as well as the need to screen 
air cargo.  Air cargo was more of a vulnerability now that 
cockpits had been fortified. 
¶20.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Department of Homeland Security 
officials led a discussion on cash couriers and the movement 
of bulk cash in the finance session.  With anti-terrorist 
financing efforts forcing terrorists to use cash instead of 
banks, there was a new need to create rules and penalties for 
transporting cash.  Legislative reporting requirements were 
essential to force public involvement.  The U.S., Australia, 
and Japan could work together to develop effective currency 
reporting systems in Southeast Asia. 
¶21.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) One question remained:  how do we deal 
with virtual money transfers?  On the intelligence front, 
participants discussed the importance of sharing lists of 
suspected terrorists and threat assessments.  One possible 
area for cooperation was sharing open source analysis on 
particular countries or issues as a useful research element 
for counter-radicalization projects.  The bioterrorism 
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session emphasized the need to raise awareness of the threat 
and to force public health and law enforcement agencies to 
cooperate on prevention and response planning.  Participants 
noted that public health elicited less sensitivity as a topic 
than counterterrorism so that might be a good way to frame 
Follow-up on Manila Experts' Meeting 
¶22.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Session III focused on follow-up 
discussion from the February 2006 Australia-Japan-U.S. 
trilateral counterterrorism experts' meeting in Manila.  The 
Australian delegation gave an update on the GOA's 
adopt-a-port proposal which they said the Philippine 
Government would have to take the lead on, with discreet 
U.S.-Australia-Japan involvement.  The port proposal had a 
"rough road ahead," Smith admitted.  The GOA would hire a 
consultant to report on the feasibility of and options for 
working with specific ports.  The GOA hoped to meet in May 
2007 to discuss the report and possible contributions and 
start the project in July or August.  The U.S. delegation 
mentioned that the BCAI report should be completed by 
December and that could direct efforts to a particular port 
as well.  Ambassador Smith added that the BCAI could help 
raise awareness with the Philippine Government and encourage 
buy-in for the port proposal.  Ambassador Crumpton raised the 
possibility of the adopt-a-port project attracting foreign 
investment as security improved.  This would assist with the 
economic growth portion of our CT efforts. 
Ideological Issues 
¶23.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) In Session IV, participants generated a 
discussion about the struggle to counter terrorist 
ideologies.  U.S. analyst Katherine Marquis described 
different types of radicalism and activism, emphasizing that 
there was no unified extremist Islamic ideology.  We needed 
to consider the possibility that Muslims who oppose bin Laden 
might also oppose us and think about how to connect with that 
constituency.  "What issues resonate with Muslims?" Marquis 
asked.  Is it really women's rights or more education? 
Crumpton underscored Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs Karen Hughes' initiative to discredit 
terrorist rhetoric and look for common values.  He also 
addressed the growing value of non-state actors as partners 
in countering extremist ideologies, mentioning several 
projects that private companies had already begun. 
¶24.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Smith reiterated the need to 
challenge the "single narrative" of terrorist rhetoric.  He 
said the GOA had commissioned a survey in Indonesia about 
attitudes toward terrorism and hoped to do the same in the 
Philippines.  The Indonesian Government's CT Coordinating 
Desk had approached Australia about supporting a documentary 
on how terrorism affects the daily lives of people.  The GOA 
was also looking at working with Islamic NGOs to promote 
moderate Islam, stigmatizing terrorism through media 
projects, and studying the economic costs of terrorism.  He 
again stressed the need for the trilateral partners to 
conduct these efforts discreetly to create the biggest 
effect.  Australian Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs Southeast Asia Assistant Director Glen 
Elson described Australia's domestic approach to countering 
extremism.  The GOA released a National Action Plan (NAP)in 
July to build social cohesion and security.  It would include 
establishing a National Institute of Islamic Studies, 
providing crisis management training, and starting education 
and employment initiatives. 
¶25.  (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Suda concluded the session by 
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underscoring the need to address a range of issues to be most 
effective in the ideological battle, including poverty, 
education, government instability, and mutual respect and 
understanding among cultures and religions.  He reinforced 
that this work would be most effective when conducted by 
non-state groups.  Underlying Islamic radicalism was an 
anti-Western sentiment, he assessed.  Though Japan was often 
seen as "Western" by its Asian neighbors, it still had a 
distinctly Asian history and culture that could help it play 
a unique role in countering extremist ideologies in Southeast 
Asia, he asserted.  Japan found through its exchange program 
with Indonesian teachers that most teachers believed Islam in 
the Middle East was not "real" Islam; rather Islam in 
Southeast Asia was more authentic.  The Australian delegation 
also found this to be the case.  This belief could be 
exploited in future counter-radicalization projects, Suda 
¶26.  (C/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Smith said Australia would 
host the next trilateral meeting in the first half of 2007, 
likely in March.  He suggested that trilateral working groups 
at embassies in Manila, Jakarta, and Bangkok meet 
intersessionally to pave the way for concrete proposals at 
the next meeting.  Ambassador Crumpton agreed that embassies 
should take the lead in maintaining the momentum of the 
trilat.  He also highlighted a few areas of particular 
interest that arose in the plenary discussion:  biometrics, 
seafarer identification, stored value cards (as a terrorist 
financing problem), and cooperation on open source analysis. 
Debrief Comments & Way Forward 
¶27.  (S) Comment: The U.S. delegation held a debrief on 
October 25 to assess the outcomes of the trilateral 
consultations and consider next steps.  Overall, the 
delegation was disappointed with the lack of both substantive 
discussions in the plenary and breakout sessions and 
proposals for further cooperation.  The main issue was the 
cautious and hesitant approach of the Japanese delegation. 
While the U.S. and Australian delegations came prepared with 
specific proposals and were ready to commit to action, the 
Japanese were not ready to put forth concrete ideas and 
seemed unable to agree to any actions during the 
consultations.  The delegates also believed the breakout 
sessions were too short which did not allow for full 
engagement on the issues.  The language barrier was cited as 
another hindrance to detailed discussions.  On the positive 
side, there was consensus in every breakout session about the 
importance of sharing assessments and coordinating training 
efforts, including curriculum development and equipment 
¶28.  (S) Ambassador Crumpton stated that the U.S. and 
Australia were ready to move ahead bilaterally with several 
proposals, but they would give the Japanese every opportunity 
to participate along the way.  He suggested that we reassess 
after the next trilateral whether the trilateral 
consultations were worth continuing and whether bilateral 
efforts with the Australians would be more productive.  The 
U.S. delegation proposed the following ideas to ensure a more 
productive encounter at the next trilateral counterterrorism 
consultations in Australia in 2007. 
--Work intersessionally to prepare deliverables. 
This could be done in Washington and through more formal 
embassy trilateral working groups in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, 
Manila, and Bangkok.  The Department would send a cable to 
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these embassies to encourage such coordination and follow-up, 
focused particularly on threat assessments and training 
efforts.  Embassies would also be encouraged to keep the 
trilateral framework in mind when proposing any CT programs. 
Ambassador Crumpton will meet with Australian CT Ambassador 
Smith the second week of December at a conference in London. 
He suggested that the U.S. delegates prepare non-papers for 
each breakout session topic with brief summaries of U.S. 
thinking and proposals for further action.  These should be 
ready by the end of November to pass to Embassy Canberra and 
Tokyo to obtain host government feedback.  Crumpton could 
then confirm projects with Smith at their meeting. 
Additional suggestions for facilitating more substantive 
discussions at the next trilat included having longer 
breakout sessions and conducting breakout sessions at the 
working level the day before the plenary. 
--Make proposals to the Japanese about projects they could 
fund with their unused FY 06 CT budget. 
Michii's presentation of the Japan's current CT efforts only 
showed a US$1.75 million allocation out of US$63 million for 
the new grant aid program for cooperation on counterterrorism 
and security enhancement.  DHS Director for Asia/Pacific 
International Affairs Paul Fujimura suggested that we propose 
specific projects that the Japan could support from their 
remaining budget.  The public/private economic partnership 
idea discussed in the plenary could be one area in which to 
engage the Japanese. 
--On bioterrorism specifically, fold APEC events into 
trilateral work. 
¶29.  (U) This cable was cleared by S/CT.