Viewing cable 07JAKARTA1076
Title: UNSC/KOSOVO: GETTING INDONESIA TO YES

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
07JAKARTA10762007-04-16 10:28:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
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DE RUEHJA #1076/01 1061028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161028Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4366
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0018
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 0006
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 0007
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RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR U/S BURNS FROM JOHN HEFFERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK KFLU TBIO YI ID
SUBJECT: UNSC/KOSOVO: GETTING INDONESIA TO YES 
 
REF: A. STATE 49723 
     ¶B. JAKARTA 994 
     ¶C. JAKARTA 930 
     ¶D. JAKARTA 673 
 
Classified By: John A. Heffern, Charge d'affaires.  Reason: 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In response to Under Secretary Burns' 
request (ref A), I recommend that the Secretary, and even the 
President if necessary, contact their Indonesian counterparts 
to urge support for the Kosovo resolution.  I have pressed 
the case with a former Foreign Minister, the Speaker of the 
Parliament, the President's foreign policy advisor, and a key 
think tanker.  On April 18, I will meet with key Foreign 
Ministry official Desra Percaya, but these steps are 
insufficient.  UNSC votes have become unhelpfully politicized 
in Indonesia's domestic context, and President Yudhoyono will 
want to avoid the appearance of caving to U.S. pressure.  The 
factors most likely to sway the GOI in favor of Kosovo 
independence would be a P-5 consensus on the resolution, 
vocal support from other Muslim countries, and a strong and 
effective case for the plan by Matti Ahtisaari, who will meet 
with President Yudhoyono on April 23.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) We have seen no evolution in recent days on 
Indonesia's position on Kosovo (refs B - D).  President 
Yudhoyono (SBY) is still contending with political fallout 
from Indonesia's vote in favor of UNSCR 1747; a parliamentary 
petition to interpellate SBY on this matter has reportedly 
gathered 300 signatures.  While the Indonesian House of 
Representatives has little real authority in foreign affairs, 
its reactions to the Burma and Iran resolutions show that 
SBY's decisions carry a domestic political cost. 
Accordingly, SBY will be extremely reluctant to commit to 
supporting Kosovo independence.  Even before the uproar over 
the Iran vote (ref C), Foreign Ministry officials indicated 
clearly and consistently that longstanding doctrinal concerns 
about territorial integrity and separatism predispose the GOI 
to oppose Kosovar independence over Belgrade's objections 
(ref D). 
 
¶3.  (C) On April 16, I raised Kosovo with Speaker Laksono and 
other parliamentarians, and received blank stares and shrugs 
in response.  They had no knowledge of the issue.  An 
influential Indonesian who made informal soundings on our 
behalf confirmed that the legislature and others who had 
strong views on Iran and Burma are not cognizant of Kosovo. 
He therefore recommended that the less the issue is 
publicized locally, the better our chances of persuading the 
GOI to join us.   Nonetheless, the issue will be tough since 
the GOI will not want to open itself to criticism by 
nationalists for violating sacrosanct principles against 
separatism, which are ingrained in Indonesian foreign policy 
thinking. 
 
Ahtisaari Visit 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C) I have just learned that Special Representative 
Ahtisaari will meet President Yudhoyono on April 23.  This is 
crucial.  Ahtisaari is respected in Indonesia for his efforts 
in brokering the Aceh accord. SBY foreign policy advisor Dino 
Djalal told me today that SBY had no firm position on the 
issue.  He said that the only consideration that might trump 
Indonesia's commitment to "territorial integrity" is war and 
peace.  If Ahtisaari can convince the President that his plan 
has a better chance of bringing long-term peace to the 
Balkans than any alternative, then SBY might be convinced to 
support it. 
 
¶5. (C) Another decisive factor in getting the Indonesians to 
vote "yes" would be a clear signal from Russia and China that 
they will support the resolution.  In the absence of a P-5 
consensus, we are certain that the best we can hope for is 
Indonesia's abstention.  Calls from the Secretary and the 
President call to their Indonesian counterparts will be 
crucial to make the case for the Kosovo resolution. 
 
Call from Secretary Rice 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) In her call to Foreign Minister Wirajuda, Secretary 
Rice should allay concerns that the Kosovo resolution creates 
a precedent for increased U.N. meddling in the internal 
affairs of its member states.  Indonesia bitterly recalls the 
U.N.'s role in securing East Timor's independence, and is 
aware of calls from by NGOs and some foreign legislators for 
the U.N. to mediate between Jakarta and indigenous 
separatists in Papua province.  The Secretary should stress 
the specificity of the Kosovo case, and explain that the 
unique history of the Balkans, including many years of 
Security Council involvement, means that the case of Kosovo 
does not constitute a precedent for U.N. involvement in Papua 
or any other part of Indonesia, and that the Ahtisaari plan 
is the best hope for peace. 
 
¶7. (C) The Secretary should also be prepared to counter 
arguments that the U.S. is creating an artificial sense of 
urgency about this issue.  We have heard some complaints that 
while the U.S. is seized of the Kosovo question, there has 
been little progress in moving the Mideast Peace Process.  It 
would also be helpful if the Secretary could report any 
progress in securing support for Kosovo independence from 
Russia, China, or other Muslim states, especially fellow UNSC 
member Qatar. 
 
Call From POTUS 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The President should also telephone President 
Yudhoyono to raise Kosovo and other issues.  In planning the 
call, we should be aware that SBY has faced criticism that he 
is overly deferential to the U.S.  This means that the 
discussion should not consist solely of a full-court press on 
Kosovo, and that we should not expect SBY to clearly voice 
his position in the course of the conversation.  We believe 
that the President should make the case for Kosovo 
independence in general terms, which should be sufficient to 
impress upon Yudhoyono the importance of the issue to us. 
 
¶9. (C) Another topic the President could usefully raise 
during the call would be the sharing of samples of the avian 
influenza (AI) virus.  Indonesia leads the world in reported 
human AI cases, but stopped sharing AI samples with the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in December 
2006 out of pique over the apparent development of commercial 
AI vaccines from Indonesian samples.  After a series of 
negotiations with the World Health Organization (WHO), 
Indonesia won much praise when Minister of Health Fadillah 
Supari announced at a March 28 meeting in Jakarta that it 
would immediately resume sample sharing.  However, almost 
three weeks have passed since that pledge, and no samples 
have left Indonesia, despite continuing human AI cases.  It 
is unclear whether Indonesia intends to drag the issue into 
next month's World Health Assembly, or whether bureaucratic 
ineptitude is holding up sample sharing.  A mention to SBY of 
the significant potential damage to Indonesia's public health 
interests, and reputation, from continuing to boycott the 
world influenza surveillance system could be extremely 
helpful. 
HEFFERN