Viewing cable 07JAKARTA1187
Title: UNSC: DISCUSSION WITH INDONESIA ON MINURSO, KOSOVO

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
07JAKARTA11872007-04-27 09:35:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
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C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MTS, EUR/SCE, IO/PSC (THOMAS), NEA/MAG (EWING) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK RU YI MO WI ID
SUBJECT: UNSC: DISCUSSION WITH INDONESIA ON MINURSO, KOSOVO 
 
REF: STATE 56431 (UNSC MINURSO MANDATE RENEWAL) 
 
Classified By: Marc L. Desjardins.  Reason: 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  On April 27, an Indonesian Department 
Foreign Affairs official indicated that the GOI was undecided 
about whether to support the Friends of the Western Sahara 
draft resolution on the MINURSO mandate (reftel), but said 
that as a matter of principle it was unlikely to do so in the 
absence of indications that the draft was acceptable to all 
parties in the dispute.  The official added that he had just 
received a demarche from the Russians on Kosovo independence. 
 The Russians' position on Kosovo, he said, was still 
"diametrically opposed" to that of the U.S. and the EU.  End 
summary. 
 
Western Sahara: Indonesia Ambivalent 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) On April 27, we met with Hery Saripudin of the 
Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs' Directorate of 
International Security to urge that the GOI accept without 
changes the Friends of the Western Sahara's draft UNSCR on 
renewing MINURSO's mandate (reftel).  Saripudin said that the 
GOI fundamentally regarded the issue as a decolonization 
problem, since it considered the Western Sahara to be an 
"occupied territory."  Reciting the history of the issue, he 
deplored the fact that arrangements for a plebiscite under 
the two Baker Plans had broken down over questions of 
modalities.  Saripudin said that he had met with the Moroccan 
Ambassador the day before, who had conveyed the impression 
that any plebiscite leading to independence was now off the 
table. 
 
¶3. (C) Saripudin said that the GOI would support the draft 
UNSCR only if it were persuaded that it was acceptable to the 
Polisario as well as to Morocco.  Otherwise, the GOI would 
not agree to imposing the UNSCR out of a sense of undue 
urgency.  He said that the GOI was proceeding very carefully, 
since it had realized that its UNSC votes had domestic 
political ramifications.  He added, however, that 
developments were breaking very rapidly in New York and that 
he might not be informed of the latest.  He thanked us for 
our presentation and said he would convey our position 
together with the draft Friends UNSCR (which he said he had 
not yet seen) to the Indonesian Mission to the UN. 
 
Kosovo: Russians Intransigent 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) On Kosovo, Saripudin said he had just received a 
demarche from the Russian DCM, Kyrill Barsky.  Barsky, he 
said, had provided a readout of Foreign Minister Lavrov's 
April 19 visit to Belgrade.  The Russians reaffirmed their 
strong opposition to Kosovo independence and had pressed the 
GOI to join them, according to Saripudin.  The Russians 
regard UNSCR 1244 (1999) as the basis for the status of 
Kosovo and oppose any effort to change this.  Saripudin 
observed dryly that Russia's position was "diametrically 
opposed" to that of the United States and European Union on 
this question. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶5. (C) Post believes that the GOI will not commit to 
supporting managed independence for Kosovo unless it gets 
clear signals that Russia and China do not oppose it.  As 
with the Iranian resolution, generation of a P-5 consensus 
remains key to pushing the GOI to "yes."  End comment. 
HEFFERN