Viewing cable 07JAKARTA871
Title: UNSC/KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO INDONESIA ON AHTISAARI

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
07JAKARTA8712007-03-26 23:05:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
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DE RUEHJA #0871 0852305
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O 262305Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4043
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C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MTS, IO/UNP, AND EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK YI ID
SUBJECT: UNSC/KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO INDONESIA ON AHTISAARI 
PROPOSALS 
 
REF: A. STATE 37835 (DEMARCHE TO SUPPORT UN KOSOVO 
        PROPOSALS) 
     ¶B. JAKARTA 738 (NEXT STEPS ON KOSOVO) 
     ¶C. JAKARTA 683 (INDONESIA WOULD ONLY SUPPORT 
        CONSENSUS RESOLUTION) 
 
Classified By: Marc L. Desjardins, Political Counselor.  Reason (1.4 b, 
 d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. According to an official at Indonesia's 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the GOI is still developing 
its position on independence for Kosovo.  Despite long-held 
principles that would preclude support for an independent 
Kosovo, our contact conceded that the GOI would remain 
flexible on the issue in light of the specifics of the Kosovo 
case and support for Kosovo Muslims on the part of the 
Indonesian public and politicians.  He said that the OIC was 
divided on the matter.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) We met March 26 with Hery Saripudin, Deputy Director 
for International Security at Indonesia's Department of 
Foreign Affairs, to urge that Indonesia support the 
recommendations of UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari.  In light of 
past GOI statements (refs B and C), we stressed that the case 
of Kosovo is unique, and that support for its independence 
does not create a precedent for other areas, such as 
Indonesia's Papua province. 
 
¶3. (C) Saripudin replied that Indonesia was still thinking 
through its position on the matter, and would study 
Ahtisaari's recommendations closely.  Repeating comments we 
have heard in previous discussions, Saripudin said that the 
GOI had three guiding principles on the issue.  First, the 
GOI supports the territorial integrity of existing states, 
including Serbia.  Second, the GOI does not want to create a 
precedent for international community involvement in 
separatist movements.  Third, the GOI promotes resolution of 
such conflicts by means of dialogue and negotiation. 
Saripudin cautioned, however, that these reflected ideals, 
and said that the GOI would have to be flexible in looking at 
this issue of Kosovo.  He went on to note that public opinion 
and many Muslim leaders and politicians in Indonesia tend to 
support Kosovo independence, and that this would influence 
the decision-making process. 
 
¶4. (C) We asked whether there was an OIC position on the 
Kosovo question.  Saripudin said that there was still a "tug 
of war" in progress within the OIC on the matter.  Although 
most members were sympathetic to the plight of Kosovar 
Muslims, he said, some argued that taking a collective 
position had implications for other regions such as Cyprus 
and the Western Sahara. 
 
¶5. (C) Saripudin asked whether Russia would support 
independence for Kosovo.  We responded drawing of reftel A 
para 7.  Saripudin said he felt that China would not be 
inclined to support it, and that Chinese diplomats had 
recently told the Indonesians that supporting independence 
for Kosovo would create a precedent for international 
community involvement in ethnic issues in the PRC such as 
Uighur separatism.  Saripudin said that he looked forward to 
being in touch with us as the Kosovo issue moved forward in 
the coming months. 
HEFFERN