Viewing cable 07PRETORIA1801
Title: DFA UN DIRECTORATE ON KOSOVO, LEBANON TRIBUNAL,

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
07PRETORIA18012007-05-17 15:42:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXYZ0021
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSA #1801/01 1371542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171542Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9872
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0018
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0500
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 4356
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0072
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0015
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 001801 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, AF/S, NEA/ARPI, EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC PINR KNNP UNSC UNMIK SF YI IR
LE 
SUBJECT: DFA UN DIRECTORATE ON KOSOVO, LEBANON TRIBUNAL, 
IRAN SANCTIONS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 063229 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 061222 
     ¶C. SECSTATE 061194 
     ¶D. SECSTATE 059351 
     ¶E. PRETORIA 1718 
     ¶F. PRETORIA 1676 
     ¶G. PRETORIA 1744 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Don Teitelbaum.  Reasons 1.4(b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The SAG has not finalized its position on 
Kosovo final status, but is getting closer.  The ForMin's 
Brussels meeting with President Sejdiu was positive and 
helpful.  Lower level Pretoria meetings with Bishop Artemije 
and Ulber Hysa were not.  DFA working levels remain poorly 
informed and ideological in their views, but may no longer 
have influence over decision-making.  The SAG is also 
undecided about the Hariri tribunal, but is uncomfortable 
with the idea of imposing a decision from outside and is 
sympathetic to the argument that Christians are 
overrepresented.  DFA working levels welcomed information 
about the Iranian solicitation of light water reactor bids 
and Gen. Zolqadr's travel to Russia, but did not believe 
South Africa would have legal grounds to prevent such 
activities or travel.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) DepPolCouns presented Ref A-D points regarding Kosovo 
final status, establishment of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, and implementation of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 to DFA 
United Nations: Political Deputy Directors Ilia du Buisson 
and Simon Cardy on 16 May.  Du Buisson covers European issues 
in the Security Council, while Cardy handles Middle East 
matters.  They share responsibility for UNSC 
counter-terrorism and sanctions issues. 
 
------------------- 
Kosovo Final Status 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Du Buisson reported that no decisions had yet been 
made on Kosovo policy; they are "close, but we're still 
consulting."  She confirmed that Ref D non-paper responding 
to questions raised during A/S Silverberg's 25 April visit 
had been circulated to DFA working levels (Ref E) and 
expressed appreciation for the level of detail it contained. 
She had no specific queries or comments on its contents.  Du 
Buisson confirmed that ForMin Dlamini Zuma had met with 
Kosovar President Sejdiu on 15 May in Brussels and that 
Kosovo had also been discussed at length during the ForMin's 
EU consultations.  She had no readouts, but said she 
understood the Sejdiu meeting went well and that the ForMin 
allowed it to continue beyond the allotted timeframe, due to 
her personal interest in hearing what Sejdiu had to say. 
(NOTE: Du Buisson was under the impression that the ForMin 
had initiated the Brussels meeting -- we did not correct 
her.)  She reported that DFA Chief Director: United Nations 
(Political) Xolisa Mabhongo had met seperately with both 
Bishop Artemije and Ulber Hysa in Pretoria the week of 07 
May.  Artemije, who was viewed as a level-headed, reasonable 
representative of the Serb minority, argued that the Kosovars 
would force the remaining Serbs from their homes as soon as 
managed independence was implemented and could never be 
trusted to protect Serb rights.  Hysa horrified the DFA reps 
in attendance with the statement "if we don't get what we 
need we will take it ourselves," playing directly into 
Artemije's portrayal of the Kosovars. 
 
¶4.  (C) Du Buisson and Cardy engaged in a wide-ranging 
discussion about Kosovo, the greater Balkans, and the 
Ahtisaari plan.  They demonstrated a simplistic understanding 
of the history and dynamics of the situation, which appeared 
heavily influenced by Serbian and Russian arguments.  Both 
remained steadfast in the belief that the single best global 
approach to conflicts such as Kosovo is the South African 
model -- peaceful negotiation until the parties reach a 
mutually acceptable solution.  They viewed anything less, 
certainly anything imposed from outside by the international 
community, as somehow immoral. 
 
¶5.  (C) It is not clear the degree to which Du Buisson and 
Cardy are echoing or influencing the views of SAG 
 
decision-makers.  The following comments were of greatest 
interest and/or are likely to have had wider circulation 
within DFA: 
 
-- They persistently refered to managed independence as 
"creating an EU protectorate." 
 
-- They noted that a number of (unnamed) European countries, 
while paying lip service to "European unity," had privately 
complained to them about various aspects of Ahtisaari. 
 
-- They expressed concern that the important benefits of 
economic reconstruction, foreign investment, and a guaranteed 
path to EU membership are not explicitly spelled out in 
Ahtisaari. 
 
-- They voiced profound doubt that the EU would expand again 
in the near-to-mid-term and that the EU would ever accept 
Kosovo as a member since "they won't even take Turkey." 
 
-- They appeared convinced the Kosovar Albanians could not be 
trusted to protect the rights of the Serb minority. 
 
-- They interpreted the UNSC report on its trip to the region 
very negatively, describing the visit as heavily biased to 
the Albanian side.  They said they had heard there was a lot 
of "whispered complaints on the margins" by attending 
PermReps about this fact.  (COMMENT: This sounds like 
something that might have come from PermRep Kumalo's own 
report of the trip, since it does not track with other 
reporting.) 
 
They also raised the usual concerns about precedent and 
repeated the age-old complaint that "the West" never listens 
to Africa about African issues, so why should Africa defer to 
Europe on Kosovo. 
 
---------------- 
Lebanon Tribunal 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Cardy reported that the SAG also has not reached a 
decision about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  South 
Africa's starting point is to listen to all sides and to 
encourage "internal processes" to continue to completion.  He 
admitted that "we're not sure we have heard from everyone 
yet" and said that their Embassy in Damascus had been sent 
out on "a fishing expedition" this week.  He agreed that all 
parties supported the idea of a tribunal in principle, but 
stubbornly insisted this was why it was inappropriate for the 
UN to "politicize" the matter by making "provocative 
political statements" and imposing a decision from outside. 
Cardy sidestepped pointed questions about how long justice 
could be delayed, arguing that "the UN is doing the spadework 
anyway."  He argued forcefully that Christians held "an 
artificial stranglehold on power" and therefore a 
parliamentary decision would not be representative; he also 
noted that the SAG had a close relationship with the Prime 
Minister and was sensitive to what he was trying to 
accomplish. 
 
-------------- 
Iran Sanctions 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Other than tongue-in-cheek expressions of 
thankfulness that DFA Deputy Director Combrink (Refs F-G) was 
the one responsible for the bulk of Iran sanctions 
implementation, du Buisson and Cardy had minimal reactions to 
Ref B-C demarches.  Both were thankful for the alert 
regarding the Iranian solicitation of reactor bids and 
speculated that it was a publicity stunt.  They repeated 
Combrink's Ref F caution that South Africa may not have legal 
grounds to prevent domestic companies from participating in 
such an effort.  Neither had heard about the Zolqadr incident 
and appreciated being alerted that the Iranians were using 
such tactics, but after a brief discussion concluded it was 
unlikely they would have legal grounds to refuse entry to an 
Iranian official who had legitimate business to conduct. 
They did take on board DepPolCouns' reminder that they could 
inquire whether an alternate Iranian official might be 
available, if a listed official applied for entry.  They also 
 
committed to ensure that senior officials were briefed about 
the incident and that it would be taken into account when 
considering travel requests. 
 
 
Bost