Viewing cable 07STATE138402
Title: (U) EUR A/S FRIED,S SEPTEMBER 27, 2007, MEETING

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
07STATE1384022007-10-01 21:24:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Secretary of State
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DE RUEHC #8402 2742139
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O 012124Z OCT 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
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S E C R E T STATE 138402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017 
TAGS: OVIP FRIED DANIEL UNGA PREL MOPS NATO MARR KPKO PO
CU, RU 
SUBJECT: (U) EUR A/S FRIED,S SEPTEMBER 27, 2007, MEETING 
WITH  PORTUGUESE POLITICAL DIRECTOR VASCO BRAMAO RAMOS 
 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by: EUR Assistant Secretary of State 
Daniel Fried, Department of State.  Reason 1.4 (b and d) 
 
2.(U) September 27 2007, 10:30 a.m., New York 
 
¶3. (U) Participants: 
 
United States 
A/S Dan Fried, EUR 
Elaine Samson, EUR (Notetaker) 
 
Portugal 
Political Director Vasco Bramao Ramos 
MFA Europe Officer Joao Ribeiro de Almeida 
 
¶4. (C) SUMMARY.  Portuguese Political Director Ramos 
reassured the United States that EU and U.S. policy on 
Cuba are converging.  A/S Fried advised that Cuba needed 
to go through a normal post-Communist transformation 
(i.e., one resembling the democratization course of 
Central and East European states after 1989), and not a 
communist-controlled transfer of power.  He urged that 
Europe not, for the sake of a false stability, support 
a continued dictatorial regime.  Ramos admitted that 
for the EU, the continuation of KFOR is a political 
issue rather than a legal one, and predicted that the 
Europeans would end up with a consensus to support an 
independent Kosovo even absent a UNSCR, but only at the 
last minute.  A/S Fried suggested that Portugal be alert 
for a surprise maneuver by Russia on Kosovo, and Ramos 
promised to be very hard on the Russians in his 
upcoming visit.  Fried urged Ramos to warn Russia to not 
recognize Abkhazia in the wake of Kosovo independence, 
and noted Russian incursions into Georgian territory. 
Portugal should convey that Russia risked condemnation 
by the international community if it re-opened 
territorial arrangements that followed the end of the 
USSR in 1991.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---- 
Cuba 
---- 
 
¶5. (C) Portuguese Political Director Ramos gave a 
brief readout of his September 26 meeting with WHA A/S 
Shannon (septel) and their discussion on Cuba.  Ramos 
asserted that the EU and US positions on Cuba are 
converging and are now not far apart.  A/S Fried noted 
that it is a very delicate moment in the political 
transition in Cuba, and that when the transition occurs, 
the EU must not, in the name of false stability, accept 
the continuation of a dictatorial regime.  Both Ramos 
and Fried agreed that it would be good if the US and EU 
were able to do something to help the transition, but 
that ultimately it must be done by the Cubans themselves. 
Cuba needs to follow a normal path of post-Communist 
transformation, like Poland and Hungary, hopefully 
avoiding the bloodshed of the overthrow of the Ceaucescu 
regime. 
 
------ 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Fried noted that at the September 26 
Transatlantic Dinner some of the strongest presentations 
on Kosovo were from Javier Solana and NATO Sec Gen 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.  EU and NATO lawyers see an ample 
legal basis for EU and NATO missions in Kosovo even absent 
a new UNSCR; UNSCR 1244 in this case would remain in 
effect and does not prohibit an independent Kosovo. 
Solana and de Hoop Scheffer noted to the Ministers that 
UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon had indicated that he will support the 
interpretation continuing UNSCR 1244 and maintaining KFOR. 
Ramos bluntly admitted that for the EU it is not really 
matter of legal interpretation, but that it is a political 
issue.  If the political decision is made to support a 
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by Kosovo, 
national and European lawyers will find legal arguments to 
justify it.  Ramos predicted that the EU would end up with 
a consensus to support Kosovo post-independence, but that 
it would be at the last moment ) on December 9, 10 or 11. 
A/S Fried noted that Secretary Rice had been very clear that 
moving forward to Kosovo,s independence after December 10 
has 
risks, but not moving ahead has greater risks. 
 
------ 
Russia 
------ 
 
¶7. (C) Fried also noted the need to be alert for surprise 
moves on Kosovo by Russia in the final week before 
December 10, as Putin has a habit of springing last minute 
complications.  Ramos noted that he was going to Russia 
next week and that he was going to "hammer them on Kosovo." 
Ramos committed to telling the Russians what had to be done 
in Kosovo and that every country needed to be on board so 
the situation did not fall apart. 
 
 
¶8. (S) Fried suggested that the Portuguese might want to 
lay down a marker and warn the Russians that recognizing 
Abkhazia in the ake of Kosovo independence would be 
dangerous.  Fried urged Ramos to warn the Russians that 
they will be condemned by the international community if 
they re-open the territorial arrangements that emerged 
from the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union.  Fried told 
Ramos that the USG understood that the leader of an 
Abkhaz unit recently killed in Upper Kodori Valley 
appeared to be an active duty Russian soldier. 
Fried noted that while the USG was not making a major 
public issue of this incident at this time, this 
constituted another incursion into Georgian territory. 
Fried also noted that in a recent discussion about 
Russia, the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington 
acknowledged that he EU was re-evaluating Russia. 
Fried congratulated the EU for its recent progress on 
regulating energy markets, which will affect the 
Russian energy giant Gazprom. 
RICE