Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK1155
Title: CDG MINUS RUSSIA DISCUSSES RUSSIAN PRST ELEMENTS

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
07USUNNEWYORK11552007-12-11 22:19:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO9331
PP RUEHBZ RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #1155 3452219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 112219Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3312
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0214
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1119
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 1055
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001155 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNSC UNMIK KV YI
SUBJECT: CDG MINUS RUSSIA DISCUSSES RUSSIAN PRST ELEMENTS 
AND DECEMBER 19 MEETING 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) On December 10, Ambassador Khalilzad convoked 
Permreps of the CDG minus Russia to discuss the Russian 
distributed elements for a PRST and format issues for the 
December 19 UNSC meeting on the Troika report.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad framed the options for dealing with Russia's PRST 
elements and for pushing for direct Kosovar participation in 
the Security Council meeting.  UK Permrep Sawers argued all 
should keep in mind Russia's goals of preventing closure of 
the Kosovo issue in the UNSC and dividing Europeans, and 
therefore, oppose a PRST.  Belgian Permrep Verbeke believed 
there could be a tactical advantage in some kind of 
compromise PRST containing anodyne language because Russia 
then could not reasonably ask for more later.  German Permrep 
Matussek noted that Verbeke's argument assumes, probably 
incorrectly, that Russia is ready to agree to any text, which 
was unlikely so proposing "killer amendments" would be a 
better approach.  France's PolCoordinator also spoke in favor 
of "killer amendments," such as adding that the Ahtisaari 
plan should go into effect in 120 days.  France did not think 
a benign PRST was necessary or that Russia would agree to 
one.  Sawers stated that even a neutral PRST would draw us 
into Russia's game and undesirably show the UNSC to be 
engaged. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad raised the issue of how to show 
the Council is deadlocked and asked whether we could use 
affirmation of the Ahtisaari plan for that purpose.  Sawyers 
argued that attempting to use a resolution to show blockage 
in the Council has the disadvantage that if it does not work 
it could call into question our plans for going forward. 
Sawers argued for a "political approach" of telling Permrep 
Churkin directly that we do not accept his PRST and do not 
want to engage on it.  Ambassador Khalilzad proposed giving 
to experts the question of how to kill Russia's PRST. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a follow-on meeting on December 11, CDG minus 
experts met and tentatively agreed on a proposal to raise 
Russia's elements on the margins of consultations on December 
14 and have one member deliver coordinated points in a press 
statement after the meeting that could also be distributed to 
Security Council members.  Those present also agreed, subject 
to agreement from capitals, to request that President Sejdiu 
be allowed to speak for the Kosovars on December 19 in a 
public meeting and to be prepared to accept a private meeting 
as a fallback.  The group agreed to divide up meeting elected 
Security Council members to sound out their views in advance 
of December 19. 
Khalilzad