Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK97
Title: KOSOVO: USUN RUNS INTERFERENCE AT UN FOR AHTISAARI

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
07USUNNEWYORK972007-02-02 23:03:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0024
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0097/01 0332303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 022303Z FEB 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1269
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0128
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0951
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0728
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000097 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL YI UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: USUN RUNS INTERFERENCE AT UN FOR AHTISAARI 
PAPERS 
 
 
Classified By: Acting Permanent Representative Alejandro D. Wolff for R 
easons 1.4 B/D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. USUN has delivered strong messages at several 
UN levels making clear our conviction that Special Envoy 
Ahtisaari should have the last word on the composition of his 
own settlement proposal and report.  UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Europe Director Harland 
reassured us that an agreement had been struck with Ahtisaari 
whereby DPKO and the UN department of political affairs (DPA) 
and office of legal affairs (OLA) provide input to Ahtisaari 
but leave the final pen to him.  Acting Permrep and P-3 
counterparts strongly cautioned U/SYG For Political Affairs 
Gambari against attempting to edit the Ahtisaari report once 
submitted.  Gambari was receptive, but his staff members were 
defensive about what they saw as their traditional role as 
reviewers of SE products.  Ahtisaari having thereafter 
privately indicated that SYG Ban had assured him he would 
have the last word on the report, Ambassador Wolff and U.S. 
Special Representative Wisner used an already scheduled 
meeting with Ban chief of staff Nambiar to solicit and 
receive assurances that there would be no UN-induced delay in 
the status process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
USUN PUSHES DPKO ON AHTISAARI REPORT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) USUN Deputy Polcounselor and Poloff met with DPKO 
Europe and Americas Director David Harland on January 22 to 
relay concerns that Special Envoy Ahtisaari's final report 
should reach the Security Council without DPKO or other UN 
edits.  Deputy Polcounselor underscored reports that certain 
parties in the UN were expecting to substantively edit 
Ahtisaari's report.  Harland said Ahtisaari had afforded DPKO 
access to the UNOSEK drafting process for several months and 
that DPKO has recently enjoyed a virtually continuous 
presence on the drafting team.  Drawing on this working 
relationship, Harland added, Ahtisaari and he had recently 
concluded two days of meetings with an agreement that DPKO 
would continue to provide suggestions to UNOSEK but would 
leave the final drafting pen to Ahtisaari.  Qualifying his 
comments with an express acknowledgment that he spoke with 
authority only with regard to DPKO's relations with 
Ahtisaari, Harland said he understood that DPA and OLA had 
made similar arrangements.  He added that DPA and OLA had 
been in direct communication with UNOSEK drafters only since 
January 4 and consequently were providing relatively more 
input of late than was DPKO.  He said OLA in particular was 
actively scrubbing the Ahtisaari draft in light of UN 
equities, in Kosovo and elsewhere, far beyond UNOSEK.  He 
said there would be a meeting soon between Ahtisaari and SYG 
Ban ki-Moon and concluded that,"unless the SYG has strong 
views, we can expect this approach will be finalized." 
(NOTE. Ahtisaari meets with Ban on February 8 in New York. 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (C) Harland elaborated his understanding of how 
Ahtisaari's product would reach the Security Council, 
employing the analogy of a wedding cake saying that the 
bottom layer would be Ahtisaari's settlement proposal, the 
middle his report explaining how he got there together with 
his final status recommendations, and the top (with the bride 
and groom) a note of transmission from SYG Ban to the 
Security Council.  He said the goal of this structure was to 
allow Russia and China to take aim at the middle layer if 
necessary without damaging the whole cake.  Harland then 
volunteered he had heard through the DPKO grapevine that Ban 
might be looking to carve out for himself a larger role on 
Kosovo and, almost in the same breath tasked DPKO Kosovo Desk 
Chief Marco Bianchini with drafting talking points calling 
for U/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno to counsel Ban 
to respect DPKO's deal with Ahtisaari by declining to modify 
his report.  Summing up, Deputy Polcounselor suggested that 
DPKO, in keeping with the arrangements made with Ahtisaari, 
should confine future comments on the settlement proposal to 
areas in it that Ahtisaari himself changes after consulting 
with the parties and should have no suggestions on 
Ahtisaari's report after its submission to the SYG. Harland 
agreed. 
 
P-3 PERMREPS PUSH DPA 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On January 24, Acting Permrep and P-3 counterparts 
met U/SYG for Political Affairs Gambari and laid down a clear 
marker that DPA, and ultimately Ban, should fall in line 
behind Ahtisaari, endorse his approach, and transmit the 
Ahtisaari plan untouched to the Security Council according to 
 
 
the current timeline.  Gambari was receptive, but his staff 
indicated the UN had questions about its role and commented 
that Russia was advocating that all involved should wait at 
least until there is a new government in Belgrade with which 
to discuss the settlement proposal.  The P-3 responded that 
if UN officials had questions or concerns, they should share 
them with Ahtisaari before his proposal and report are in 
final.  Responding to a Gambari staffer's suggestion that the 
EU might not speak with one voice on Kosovo policy, the 
French Charge stated decisively that the EU would be united 
in support of Ahtisaari's plan in both substance and timing 
and sharply told the staffers that he did not want the 
Secretariat sowing disunity with any ideas that drifted away 
 
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Ahtisaari's approach.  The P-3 also rebutted concerns about 
timing, underscoring that the Secretariat should not fall 
into the "Moscow trap" that alleges that the issue is 
essentially timing and can be resolved by slowing down the 
pace.  The P-3 said that any slow-down could enhance the 
prospect of violence. 
 
USG PUSHES SYG's CHIEF OF STAFF 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) On January 31, Ambassador Wolff and Ambassador 
Wisner, the Secretary's Special Representative to the Kosovo 
Status Talks, met U/SYG Vijay Nambiar, the SYG's chief of 
staff.  Having been informed just before the meeting that SYG 
Ban had assured Ahtisaari that he would have the final word 
on his own report, the ambassadors shifted the meeting's 
focus to the endgame of the status process and several 
potential problems.  Noting that Serbian Prime Minister 
Kostunica had refused to meet with Ahtisaari to receive his 
settlement proposal even though the PM continued to meet with 
visiting European officials, Ambassador Wisner warned that 
Belgrade might not engage with Ahtisaari at all in February. 
Wisner said we should also be prepared for ambiguity from 
Moscow in that the Russians seem to have not yet made up 
their minds what to do on Kosovo.  The U.S., he said, was 
telling Russia clearly that we have been in this negotiation 
together since the beginning and want to finish it with them. 
 Nambiar signaled understanding of these points.  His aide 
said China and other Security Council members might try to 
hide behind the Russians and that "the European position 
needs to be solid to prevent any problems."  Ambassadors 
Wolff and Wisner concurred with Wisner noting that "the 
European resolve I am seeing is as strong as I have witnessed 
on any issue."  Wisner also argued that the time frame was 
important as delay risked more violence.  Nambiar agreed it 
would be best to move quickly.  Wisner said SRSG Rucker and 
UNMIK would need full backing from the Secretariat to fashion 
a successful ending in Kosovo for the UN system.   Nambiar's 
aide said the SYG and Ahtisaari would need to discuss when 
Ahtisaari's package should be taken to the Security Council 
but that it should be soon, probably by "the end of February 
or early March." 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT.  We are somewhat comforted that DPKO seems to 
have found a reasonable procedural way forward with 
Ahtisaari, although our soundings indicate some DPKO 
officials continue to pursue personal agendas on Kosovo, and 
we aren't fully satisfied that Harland has his whole division 
singing from the same sheet of music.  Similarly at DPA, 
Gambari is saying the right things, but his staff seems 
inclined to begin walking his words back almost as soon as he 
utters them.  Nambiar seems to be on board, but we won't rest 
easy until we hear Ban, still on travel, expressly adopt the 
Kosovo process and timeline Ahtisaari envisages. 
WOLFF