Viewing cable 08GENEVA1006
Title: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) U.S.-UKRAINE HEAD OF DELEGATION

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08GENEVA10062008-11-21 16:04:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
O 211604Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001006 
 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  (U) U.S.-UKRAINE HEAD OF DELEGATION 
MEETING ON ARTICLE XVII, NOVEMBER 20, 2008 
 
REF: GENEVA 0991 JCIC-XXXIII-013 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-021. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 20, 2008 
                Time:  3:00 - 3:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (S) At Ukrainian request, U.S. and Ukrainian Heads of 
Delegation (HOD) met to discuss and clarify the Ukrainian 
position outlined during the November 17, 2008 (Ref), HOD 
meeting on Article XVII.  Nykonenko stated that Ukraine 
wanted to remain part of the START process if START is 
extended and to be included as part of any post-START 
process.  If START is not extended and if Ukraine is not part 
of the post-START process, Ukraine, for internal political 
purposes, would ask for reconfirmation by the United States 
and Russia of the security assurances contained in the 1994 
Trilateral Statement.  He also previewed that he would be 
proposing three JCIC sessions in 2009 primarily for the 
purpose of allowing the Ukrainian side to discuss START 
extension. 
 
End Summary. 
 
¶4.  (S) After being welcomed by U.S. HOD Taylor, AMB 
Nykonenko, who had been absent during the November 17, 2008, 
HOD meeting on Article XVII, stated that he was aware that 
there had been a lively debate on the question of the 
possible extension of START or its replacement by a new 
instrument, and that the latter possibility posed a great 
concern to Ukraine.  He stressed that Ukraine wanted to 
remain part of the process, explaining that his government 
thought that Ukraine deserved to be included, taking into 
account all of its contributions to START.  He recalled that 
Ukraine had held an unambiguous and steadfast position from 
the beginning but that its decision to reject nuclear weapons 
was not taken easily: the Trilateral Statement and the 
Budapest Memorandum were not just for the experts but also 
for domestic politics, emphasizing that it had a very large 
domestic political dimension.  It was for that reason, he 
said, that Ukraine wanted to remain part of the process. 
Nykonenko added that Ukraine had a major concern that "our 
Russian colleagues" might unilaterally expand their nuclear 
capability in a way that would directly affect Ukraine's 
national security.  Aside from the political aspects of the 
issue, Nykonenko said that the main problem was that Ukraine 
still had solid fuel and solid rocket motors that require 
elimination. 
 
¶5.  (S) Nykonenko then turned to the question of the 
U.S-Russian draft agreement on post-START.  He said that this 
question was even more acute, adding that he was aware of the 
U.S. and Russian position, and said that what he was going to 
tell Taylor may become the foundation of how Ukraine develops 
its position.   Ukraine knows that Russia does not want 
Ukraine to remain in this process but Ukraine has a different 
position, which may diverge from that of the Russians. 
 
¶6.  (S) Taylor stated that the United States does not see 
START being extended although some provisions of the Treaty 
might be carried over, and that the U.S. view in the future 
would be guided by the results of senior level discussions. 
He acknowledged that the United States had provided a draft 
of a post-START agreement to Russia, that it was based on the 
Moscow Treaty, and focused on operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads.  Taylor agreed that Ukraine had 
contributed to the successful implementation of START, 
especially through the removal of all nuclear warheads from 
Ukraine.  At present, the only Treaty-accountable items that 
remained in Ukraine were the remaining SS-24 solid rocket 
motors, as all other strategic offensive arms had been 
eliminated.  The post-START document developed by the United 
States did not include Ukraine. 
 
¶7.  (S) Nykonenko asked whether his understanding was correct 
that the United States did not see Ukraine as part of that 
future process.  Taylor confirmed Nykonenko's understanding. 
Nykonenko then asked what sort of confirmation of the 
security assurances contained in the Trilateral Statement and 
the Budapest Memorandum the United States foresaw providing 
to Ukraine.  Taylor responded that he did not have an answer 
to that question at this time but he noted that he had 
reviewed the Trilateral Statement with his legal adviser and 
had not seen any provision therein that would cause it to 
terminate when START expired. 
 
¶8.  (S) Nykonenko, setting aside the legal aspects, said that 
it was for good reason that he had stressed the memorandum 
and the domestic political scene that could impact the 
situation.  He said that it was important for Ukraine to have 
a document that would reconfirm the U.S. position in the 
framework of the Trilateral Statement, and Ukraine would also 
like this document to be trilateral, while recognizing that 
Ukraine cannot ask Russia for that at this time.  Such a 
document was more salient after what happened in Georgia in 
August.  He added that, while he was not going to say much 
more, it was also based on Crimea and the presence of the 
Black Sea Fleet and its continued presence there.  He asked 
that Taylor pass on to his authorities the attention that 
Ukraine is devoting to this issue.  He explained that he 
would not characterize this as a major concern but that it 
should be seen in the context of U.S.-Ukrainian relationship, 
and that he would note the reaction of the Russians to the 
Ukrainian proposal about continuing participation in the 
process. 
 
¶9.  (S) Taylor expressed his regret that the two sides had 
not had a chance to have this meeting earlier, before the 
November 17 meeting, because of the strong reactions the 
Ukrainian statement had elicited.  He noted, however, that he 
understood the seriousness of the political situation. 
Nykonenko concluded the meeting by giving Taylor a preview of 
an idea the Ukrainian side would be proposing at the November 
21 Closing Plenary:  Given the complexity of issues related 
to START extension, Ukraine will propose the possibility that 
the JCIC meet not just in the two normal sessions but in at 
least three sessions, proposing April, August and December as 
possibilities.  Nykonenko said that such a schedule would 
provide a forum to discuss this issue more with all involved. 
 
¶10.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
 
¶11.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Kuehne 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
AMB Nykonenko 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Bodarenko 
 
¶12.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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