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TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) U.S OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT,
NOVEMBER 13, 2008
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
Â¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-004.
Â¶2. (U) At paragraph 3 below is the text of the U.S.
Statement that was deliverd at the Opening Plenary Meeting of
the Thirty-third Session of the START Treaty's Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the U.S.
Mission on November 13, 2008.
Â¶3. (C) Begin text:
BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
AT THE OPENING PLENARY MEETING
OF THE THIRTY-THIRD SESSION
November 13, 2008
The United States delegation is pleased to join with
representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in opening
this thirty-third session of the START Treaty's Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission.
The United States continues to have serious concerns
regarding the conduct of reentry vehicle inspections (RVOSIs)
of the SS-27 ICBM, in both the silo launcher configuration
and the road-mobile configuration. During the most recent
SS-27 RVOSI inspection, conducted in August 2008 at the
Tatishchevo ICBM Base, U.S. inspectors experienced problems
with the SS-27 RV cover similar to those encountered and
subsequently solved with SS-25 RVOSI. Solution to the SS-25
RVOSI issue came as a result of our mutual hard work and
cooperative approach. The U.S. delegation hopes that our
discussions on the SS-27 RVOSI issue will likewise lead to
resolution of this issue in the very near future.
During JCIC-XXXII, the Parties held in-depth
discussions about the conversion of the B-1B heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear
air launched cruise missiles to a heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. To date, 19 B-1 heavy bombers have
been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments. Russian inspectors, however, continue to question
whether the conversion procedures used by the United States
are consistent with paragraph 11 of Section VI of the
Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
In October 2008, the Russian Federation conveyed an
aide-memoire on this issue in which it reiterated the view
that any such conversion must be irreversible. Moreover, the
Russian Federation asserts in its aide-memoire that the B-1
heavy bombers continue to be capable of "carrying" nuclear
armaments and that the distinguishing features demonstrated
by the United States are insufficient to categorize the
converted heavy bombers as heavy bombers equipped for
The United States does not share the view expressed in
the aide-memoire, and the U.S. delegation will provide the
U.S. views during this session.
The United States notes that, beginning in 2008, and in
keeping with the Russian Federation's statements delivered
during the closing plenary meeting of JCIC-XXXI, the Russian
Federation changed its elimination procedures for SS-25 ICBMs
by also beginning to eliminate the entire self-contained
dispensing mechanism (SCDM) associated with it. The United
States welcomes this change in procedure and concurs with
Russia's declaration that these ICBMs can be removed from
accountability. However, to remove this issue from the JCIC
agenda, we must address the elimination of the SCDMs
associated with the first 109 SS-25 ICBMs to undergo the
elimination process. As each of the 109 SCDMs is eliminated
- the remaining step of the SS-25 ICBM elimination process -
its associated SS-25 ICBM can be removed from accountability.
The U.S. delegation awaits Russia's planned schedule as to
when this will be accomplished in order to remove this issue
from the JCIC agenda.
Article XVII of the Treaty requires that, no later than
one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the
Parties meet to consider the question of whether the START
Treaty will be extended. This issue was briefly discussed
during JCIC-XXXII, and the Parties noted that the exact
format, timing, level of representation and the terms of the
meeting would be agreed to via diplomatic channels.
Therefore, the United States has placed on the agenda for
JCIC-XXXIII this issue to satisfy the Article XVII
requirement to meet to consider whether to extend START. The
United States looks forward to discussing this issue with the
Parties; however, it should be noted that the Treaty does not
require the Parties to make a decision about START extension
at this meeting. Moreover, the United States does not expect
such a decision to be reached at this meeting.
As we look to the future, it is only prudent that the
Parties begin to prepare for the closing of the portal
monitoring facility at Votkinsk. With this in mind, the
United States listened to the Russian delegation's concerns
expressed during JCIC-XXXII and developed a proposal which
was communicated through diplomatic channels in October 2008.
The U.S. delegation looks forward to discussing this in a
working group format during this session.
In closing, I welcome our Treaty partners to the
thirty-third session of the JCIC.The U.S. delegation looks
forward to working with our Treaty partners to fulfill the
mission of this Commission -- to discuss and resolve
questions about Treaty implementation and compliance issues.
Â¶4. (U) Taylor sends.
End Cable Text