Viewing cable 08GENEVA976
Title: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

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08GENEVA9762008-11-18 14:54:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
O 181454Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000976 
 
 
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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
SS-27 RVOSI AND MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER 14, 2008 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-010. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 14, 2008 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 11:30 A.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, to discuss the SS-27 
Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) and Minuteman III 
(MM III) RVOSI procedures.  All Parties were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. Delegation stated that the United States 
remained concerned that the covers used during SS-27 RVOSIs 
did not allow inspectors to determine that the number of 
reentry vehicles (RVs) present did not exceed the one warhead 
attributed to the SS-27 ICBM.  Additionally, these concerns 
had been heightened by press accounts inside Russia that 
continued to indicate that Russia is planning to deploy the 
SS-27 with multiple warheads and the similarities between the 
SS-27 attributed with a single warhead and the prototype 
RS-24 that has been flight tested with multiple RVs. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Delegation stated that the mass media 
sometimes confused issues because it did not have all the 
facts and that the Russian Federation had no intention of 
deploying the SS-27 with more warheads than the number with 
which it is attributed. 
 
¶6.  (S) On the issue of MMIII RVOSI, the Russian Delegation 
stated there were four main points of the Russian side's 
position regarding a one-time demonstration of the MM III 
ICBM front section:  1) the Russian side was interested in a 
one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front 
section in order to ascertain that the space inside the lower 
portion of the missile front section could not contain items 
commensurate with reentry vehicles and was prepared to 
participate in this event; 2) in the Russian side's view, it 
did not appear possible to resolve this concern without 
holding a one-time demonstration; 3) the mere fact of 
conducting a demonstration, without analyzing its results, 
could not guarantee resolution of the problem; and 4) based 
on the results of the demonstration, the Russian side was 
also prepared to consider the U.S. position that any 
additional devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used 
during the demonstration would not be used in future 
inspections. 
 
-------------------------- 
SS-27 - OPEN PRESS IS GOOD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Taylor opened the HOD Meeting at the Russian Mission 
on November 14, 2008, and stated that the United States 
remained concerned that the covers used during SS-27 RVOSIs 
did not allow inspectors to determine that the number of RVs 
present did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the 
SS-27 ICBM.  These concerns had been heightened by specific 
facts pertaining to the SS-27.  First, press accounts inside 
Russia continued to indicate that Russia was planning to 
deploy the SS-27 with multiple warheads.  Second, the United 
 
 
States saw similarities between the SS-27 attributed with a 
single warhead and the prototype RS-24 that had been flight 
tested with multiple RVs.  Furthermore, the SS-27 was a 
variant of the SS-25 which had been flight-tested with a 
substantially lighter RV.  Taylor stated that although 
Russian press had also reported that the SS-27 was deployed 
with only one RV, Russia had maintained its practice of using 
a very large cover on the front section during all road 
mobile and silo-based SS-27 RVOSIs.  This cover prevented 
U.S. inspectors from exercising their treaty right to confirm 
that these missiles contained no more reentry vehicles than 
the number of warheads attributed to them.  All of this 
increased U.S. concerns regarding the number of RVs deployed 
on both the silo-based and road-mobile versions of the SS-27 
ICBM. 
 
----------------- 
YOUR SYSTEM, YOUR 
RESPONSIBILITY 
----------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor said that the United States believed that the 
responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve 
U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, not only 
because it was the obligation of the inspected Party not to 
hamper the inspecting Party in ascertaining that the front 
section contained no more RVs than the number of warheads 
attributed to missiles of that type, but also because Russia, 
not the United States, understood the sensitivities involved 
with the SS-27 system.  The United States remained prepared 
to work seriously, and in good faith, with the Russian 
Federation to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of both 
sides and would be willing to explore possible SS-27 RVOSI 
solutions that took into account whatever sensitive know-how 
exists on that system that has led to the use of overly large 
covers. 
 
--------------------- 
SS-27 RVOSI - AND THE 
NUMBER SHALL BE ONE 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Kashirin repeated that Russia had no intention of 
deploying the SS-27 with more warheads than what it was 
attributed with, which was one.  The United States could 
check the Russian-provided telemetry for SS-27 flight tests 
to confirm this position and validate that Russia was not 
violating the Treaty.  Missile experts could determine 
through telemetry that the SS-25 and SS-27 had only one 
reentry vehicle and that the RS-24 was MIRVd.  Further 
complicating the issue was that it was difficult to get funds 
to construct a new cover for use during RVOSIs at this stage 
in START.  Kashirin said that he was working with experts in 
Moscow to find steps to resolve U.S. concerns.  However, he 
was encountering the same difficulties he encountered when 
developing the Vypolzovo demonstration. 
 
------------------------ 
SS-27 RVOSI - MASS MEDIA 
JUST CAUSES PROBLEMS 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (S) Kashirin stated that the press and mass media are to 
blame for the confusion with Russian SS-27 RVOSI procedures. 
The press and mass media that covered missile development 
sometimes mistakenly called all missiles Topol.  The same 
situation existed when the U.S. press published incorrect 
facts concerning missile flights out of Plesetsk Test Range 
or Baikanour Space Launch Facility. 
 
------------------- 
CAN'T BLAME THE 
PRESS FOR THIS MESS 
------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Taylor appreciated the predicament that both sides 
found themselves in as START got closer to expiration. 
However, limited funding did not relieve the obligation to 
meet the requirements of the Treaty.  He could also 
appreciate that our press took liberties, and that this 
created problems by having insufficient information. 
Concerns raised by press reports could be understandable, but 
taking into consideration all of the other sources of 
information available is what created the U.S. concern. 
 
¶12.  (S) Taylor said he appreciated all of the effort and 
time taken to conduct the Vypolzovo SS-25 demonstration. 
That demonstration and others such as the Trident RVOSI and 
Tridents in containers demonstrations showed the effort 
needed to resolve an issue.  Taylor asked Kashirin if it was 
an accurate statement to say that the Russian Federation 
continued to work to resolve this issue. 
 
¶13.  (S) Kashirin added the SS-18 RVOSI demonstration to the 
list of successful demonstrations and confirmed that Russia 
was continuing to work to resolve the SS-27 RVOSI issue. 
 
----------------- 
MM III's BIG FOUR 
----------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Kashirin said that as a result of the Russian 
Delegation describing Russian MM III RVOSI concerns in detail 
at the last session, the Parties could now work out the 
details of the demonstration.  He said that there were four 
main points of the Russian side's position regarding a 
one-time demonstration of the MM III ICBM front section:  1) 
the Russian side was interested in a one-time demonstration 
of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in order to ascertain 
that the space inside the lower portion of the missile front 
section could not contain items commensurate with reentry 
vehicles and was prepared to participate in this event; 2) in 
the Russian side's view, it did not appear possible to 
resolve this concern without holding a one-time 
demonstration; 3) the mere fact of conducting a 
demonstration, without analyzing its results, could not 
guarantee resolution of the problem; and 4) based on the 
results of the demonstration, the Russian side was also 
prepared to consider the U.S. position that any additional 
devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used during the 
demonstration would not be used in future inspections. 
 
¶15.  (S) Kashirin requested clarification of the U.S. plans 
to arrange a one-time demonstration and expressed readiness 
to further discuss any issues in order to move forward on 
resolving this problem.  He said the Russian Delegation was 
also prepared to take part in further discussion of this 
issue in the working group format, so as to consider in 
detail, with the participation of experts, and if possible 
reach agreement on, the procedural, technical, and 
organizational aspects. 
 
¶16.  (S) Taylor ended the meeting by stating that it would be 
helpful if the Russian Delegation provided these four points 
in writing so that the United States could fully understand 
Russian concerns, to which Kashirin agreed. 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Documents Exchanged:  None 
 
¶18.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
LTC Oppenheim 
CDR Rust 
Mr. Smith 
Col Summers 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Col Akhmetalin 
Mr. Kasenov 
Mr. Torekeldi 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Kashirin 
Col Ryzhkov 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Bondarenko 
 
¶19.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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