Viewing cable 08RIGA560
Title: OUTCOMES - U.S.-BALTIC CFE CONSULTATIONS

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
08RIGA5602008-09-16 10:59:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Riga
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DE RUEHRA #0560/01 2601059
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O 161059Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000560 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE LG EN LH
SUBJECT: OUTCOMES - U.S.-BALTIC CFE CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 66678 - JUN 24 HLTF GUIDANCE 
     ¶B. (B) STATE 28933 - NAC STATEMENT ON CFE TREATY 
     ¶C. (C) USNATO 236 - JUN 24 HLTF REPORTING CABLE 
     ¶D. (D) STATE 83574 - READOUT OF A/S FRIED'S 
        BRIEFING TO NATO AMBASSADORS ON HIS JULY 
        29 CFE MEETING WITH MFA DIRECTOR ANTONOV 
     ¶E. (E) STATE 89769 - GEORGIA CONFLICT:SHAPING 
        FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT 
     ¶F. (F) STATE 96113 - GUIDANCE FOR SEPT 11 HLTF 
        MEETING AND SEP 8-9 CONSULTATIONS WITH 
        BALTIC STATE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles W. Larson Jr. for reason 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY: The three Baltic states used annual CFE and 
conventional arms control consultations with the U.S. HLTF 
delegation on September 8-9 to underscore the need for 
increased cooperation on NATO defense planning in light of 
Russia's actions in Georgia.  Far from fixated on notions of 
developing Article 5 contingency plans, the Baltics called 
instead for Allied engagement on Baltic defense needs, a 
recognition of their exposed position, and a serious NATO 
planning process similar to U.S. mil-mil engagement with them 
over the past year.  The Latvian host (Kaspars Ozolins) 
indicated in a private bilateral session that such engagement 
is necessary to make it possible for Latvia to maintain its 
focus on expeditionary capabilities against a backdrop of 
public and Parliamentary pressure deriving from their 
concerns about Russian intentions.  Representatives of all 
three Baltic states: 
 
-- were relieved that the U.S. was not prepared to move 
forward with further engagement with Russia on CFE via the 
Fried-Antonov channel until the situation in Georgia improved 
significantly; 
 
-- agreed that NATO should consider CFE options for 
responding to Russia's actions in Georgia and send a signal 
that NATO will not do business as usual; 
 
-- emphasized that Allies' unambiguous priority should be to 
maintain Alliance unity; 
 
-- repeatedly cited the U.S.-Baltic CFE consultative process 
- which involved discussions on Russian and Belarusian forces 
in the region, political consultations on objectives for CFE 
and related issues, and, most importantly, EUCOM engagement 
on defense planning - as a model for the type of NATO-based 
effort that would help address their security concerns about 
the "new" Russia. 
 
¶2. (U)  The U.S. delegation, led by STATE/VCI DAS Karin L. 
Look, included Jennifer Laurendeau, Jeffrey Gibbs, Kathryn 
Ducceschi, and Jim Starkey from State Department; Peter 
Perenyi and LtCol Anne Marie Fenton from OSD Policy; and Ann 
Mason (Emb Riga), Doug Hoyt (Emb Vilnius) and Alamanda 
Gribbin (Emb Tallinn).  END SUMMARY 
 
                        ------------ 
Importance of CFE and the Impact of Russian Actions in Georgia 
                             ------------ 
 
¶3. (C)  All three Baltic delegations stressed the importance 
they attach to CFE as an instrument for building security and 
confidence.  They emphasized that entry into force of a/CFE 
and eventual accession remained in the interest of Baltic 
security.  They stressed that Alliance unity - and U.S. 
leadership - in the face of Russian suspension has been key 
to successfully managing the CFE impasse over the past nine 
months and agreed with the U.S. that Alliance solidarity is 
critical to maintain considering the situation in Georgia. 
They agreed with the U.S. that Russian military action in 
Georgia violated core principles on which CFE is based 
including the principle of host nation consent to the 
presence of foreign forces.  They welcomed the U.S. idea that 
Allies should discuss CFE options for responding to Russia,s 
actions which Look outlined per reftel. 
 
¶4. (C)  All three Baltic reps were relieved that the U.S. was 
not prepared to move forward with further engagement with 
Russia on CFE via the Fried-Antonov channel until the 
situation in Georgia improved significantly, and supported 
the idea of a NATO statement to this effect.  As far as the 
Medvedev European security proposal, there was consensus that 
Allies should not engage on any new regional proposals that 
could undermine existing European security structures, 
including the Alliance, or existing agreements, like CFE. 
Regarding any actions specific to the CFE Treaty, each 
remarked they were in favor of concrete actions that clearly 
 
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demonstrated a "not business as usual" approach, but none 
felt in a position to elaborate as they are not States 
Parties.  The repeated message each delivered was that the 
unambiguous priority should remain maintaining Alliance 
unity. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Security Situation Update 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  Opposite the Baltic States:  The U.S. del provided an 
update - as per usual practice - on the security situation in 
the Baltic region to include the status of Russian forces in 
the Leningrad Military District and the Kaliningrad Oblast, 
as well as forces in Belarus.  During the past year there 
have been further eliminations of inactive units in the 
Leningrad Military District.  Russia's apparent focus with 
respect to land forces has been on smaller, better trained 
active forces with a notable emphasis on those in the south 
while air forces have seen no change in structure but 
emphasis on training.  Latvia noted the increased training 
included larger scale exercises across military districts. 
Lithuania stressed the need to consider both the political 
and tactical rationale behind Russian force posture in 
particular during the defense planning process. 
 
¶6. (C)  Georgia:  In response to a specific request from the 
Baltic states to include a discussion of Russian forces in 
the southern part of the flank area, the U.S. del provided a 
preliminary overview of the Georgia-Russia military conflict 
noting the effective planning, quick reaction and successful 
execution of the Russian forces in a short-distance, rapid 
deployment.  Latvia, characterizing Russia,s attack as 
"depressing" due to the force volume and effectiveness, 
questioned how CFE mechanisms and Russia,s "suspension" 
applied especially as regards Russian violations and, on a 
broader level, the linkage to the Sarkozy 6-point cease fire 
plan. 
 
¶7. (C)  Regarding CFE mechanisms on a practical level, the 
U.S. del noted that Russia,s actions resulted in an 
increased overage of equipment in the revised flank area, 
where holdings already exceeded Treaty limits, and that had 
Allies been able to carry out inspections it would have been 
possible to gain some additional information on the forces 
that had deployed.  Most importantly, Russia,s response was 
not only disproportionate, but also a clear violation of CFE 
host nation consent and Georgia,s territorial integrity, a 
principle which underpins the CFE Treaty regime and has 
broader implications as far as implementation of the cease 
fire plan and the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
 
            --------------------- 
Louder Call for Expanded Defense Planning 
            --------------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  Latvia noted that current situation with CFE would 
need to be viewed through both a Georgia "prism" and one of 
an Allied approach to defense planning.  On the eve of their 
16-18 September Riga planning meeting with EUCOM, the Baltic 
states expressed appreciation with EUCOM,s efforts to date, 
which were initiated by OSD at the State Department,s 
request following last year,s CFE consultations in Vilnius. 
All - particularly the Latvians - said that NATO engagement 
on defense planning was more important than the specific idea 
of developing contingency plans.  They cited EUCOM 
consultations on defense planning in the CFE context, if 
replicated with the military planning structures at NATO, as 
an example of a concrete and visible step that would help 
address their broader concerns about managing Russian 
pressure.  DAS Look observed that aside from the original 
issue of setting CFE limits EUCOM,s planning effort was 
useful in its own right in the context of the current 
situation. 
 
¶9. (U)  Delegation Lists: 
 
Latvia: Mr Kaspars Ozoli,  Head of Delegation, Director of 
Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA); Mr Raimonds Okalns, Head of Arms Control Division, 
MFA; Mr Juris Pkalis, Head of NATO and European Security 
Policy Division, MFA; Ms Dina Krieva, 2nd Secretary, Arms 
Control Division, MFA; Mr Andejs Viumsons, Deputy Head of 
Mission, Mission of Latvia to NATO; Ms Ieva Jirgensone, 2nd 
Secretary, Mission of Latvia to NATO; Mr Jnis Garisons, 
Director of Crisis Management Department, MOD; Ms Ginta 
Brmane, Senior Desk Officer of the Defence Policy and 
Strategy Section, MOD; Mr Normunds Daivis, Military 
Intelligence Service; Mr Lauris Kalni, Military 
Intelligence Service 
 
RIGA 00000560  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Lithuania: Mr Robertas Rosinas, Head of Delegation, Head of 
Arms Control and Terrorism Prevention Division, MFA; Ms Migl 
Budryt, Acting Director of International Relations and 
Operations Department, MOD; Major Darius Baranauskas, Deputy 
Chief of Arms Control Section, Lithuanian Armed Forces; Ms 
Egl Morknait, 3rd Secretary, Arms Control and Terrorism 
Prevention Division, MFA 
 
Estonia: Mr Margus Kolga, Head of Delegation, Director 
General, First Political Department, MFA ; Mr Christian-Marc 
Liflnder, Director, Policy Planning Department, MOD; Mr 
Kristjan Prikk, Director, International Cooperation 
Department, MOD; Mr Arti Hilpus, Director, Security Policy 
Division, MFA; Ms Kaili Terras, Desk Officer, Security Policy 
Division, MFA; Major Sten Allik, Analysis and Planning 
Department, Estonian Defense Forces Headquarters 
LARSON