Viewing cable 08USOSCE70
Title: VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999: CFE SUSPENSION CASTS LONG

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08USOSCE702008-03-18 09:59:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mission USOSCE
VZCZCXRO7796
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0070/01 0780959
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180959Z MAR 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5606
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0476
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1036
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0976
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN, 
SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999: CFE SUSPENSION CASTS LONG 
SHADOW AT GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE SEMINAR 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Discussion of future challenges and 
opportunities in the implementation of the Vienna Document 
1999 was overshadowed at times by concern over the impasse 
created by Russia's suspension of its CFE commitments. 
Although most national representatives and several of the 
speakers called for continued work on confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs) in the FSC, there was also 
recognition that Vienna Document inspections and evaluations 
could not replace the CFE verification regime.  Much 
attention was given to the Vienna Document "quota race" but 
many of the remedies discussed relied on voluntary measures 
and use of multi-national inspection teams rather than 
reordering the inspection calendar along the lines of a 
recent German proposal in the FSC.  There was little 
enthusiasm for broadening the scope of the Vienna Document to 
somehow address new threats such as terrorism and 
proliferation.  Many of the representatives urged a renewed 
emphasis on "classical" arms control and there was much 
informal speculation that a new U.S. administration might be 
more engaged with arms control.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The German Foreign Office sponsored a seminar on the 
Vienna Document 1999 in Berlin March 11-13.  The seminar was 
one of a series organized by Germany on conventional arms 
control.  Over 60 representatives of OSCE participating 
States attended, including Russia, France, Canada, the UK, 
Georgia, and Moldova.  The Central Asia pS were absent, 
although a diplomat from the Kazakhstan embassy in Berlin was 
on the participant list. 
 
Groening: Time to Adapt Vienna Document 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Friedrich Groening, German Federal 
Commissioner for Arms Control, declared in his welcoming 
remarks that some arms control measures are "out of synch" 
with current reality and need to be revised.  Groening cited 
the "quota race" as an example and said it "needed to be 
fixed."  It was, he concluded, time to adapt the Vienna 
Document to the current security situation in the 
Euro-Atlantic area. 
 
Limits of Arms Control 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Pal Dunay of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, 
addressed the role of the Vienna Document and the 
expectations of participating States.  Dunay noted that 
"classical" arms control was predicated on the assumption 
that more familiarity leads to better relations.  But there 
were times when the opposite resulted: for example, when 
discussing an Open Skies type inspection regime with South 
Asian air force commanders, one remarked of his neighbor to 
Dunay, "We know them, that's why we hate them." 
Expectations, Dunay concluded, had to be based on the 
capacities of the arms control instrument. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Dunay also cited a recent Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute criticism that the Vienna Document 
aims "to prevent the now most unlikely conflict between the 
now most unlikely antagonists."  Nonetheless, he saw three 
possible approaches to reinvigorate the Vienna Document: (1) 
stricter observance and implementation; (2) an "escape 
forward" through new measures; or (3) some combination of the 
first two approaches. 
 
USOSCE 00000070  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
U.S. Arms Control Skepticism 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Dunay said although current U.S. skepticism of arms 
control was based on its global threat assessments, rather 
than an exclusive European focus, communication on arms 
control and CSBMs at the OSCE might become increasingly 
important as the CFE suspension impasse was likely to be 
protracted.  (Note:  Many of the seminar participants 
informally discussed the U.S. presidential campaign in great 
detail.  Most concluded that the next U.S. administration, 
regardless of party, would be more active in arms control. 
End note.) 
 
Russia Misses "Old" Arms Control 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) At the same time, Dunay assessed that Russia feels 
betrayed by the current arms control arrangement, a feeling 
that, in Dunay's opinion, was not entirely without merit. He 
offered that Russia misses "old arms control" and would like 
to return to a more traditional approach, if for no more than 
symbolic reasons. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Dunay speculated, in response to the question 
whether the Vienna Document would had a future after the 
entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty (A/CFE), it was 
unlikely A/CFE would enter into force soon, citing Russian 
foreign minister Lavrov's concern over the size of 
"potential" NATO forces even though NATO was currently well 
below CFE limits.  Dunay wondered whether NATO could "meet 
Russia half-way over Istanbul" commitments.  He recalled then 
Secretary of State Albright promised "to leave no state 
 
SIPDIS 
behind" at Istanbul, adding he believed this "might be 
overdoing it." 
 
A Russian Replies 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Disagreeing with Dunay's comments regarding Russian 
nostalgia for "old arms control," Sergey Federyakov, 
counselor in the Russian MFA Department of Security Affairs 
and Disarmament, argued that a new generation of officers and 
diplomats are leading the MoD and MFA in this area. 
Federyakov   asserted that European security should be 
indivisible, and that if one country felt insecure, then 
there was no security.  It should be, he said, no surprise 
then that Russia had suspended implementation of CFE.  Russia 
had warned of its discontent for long time but the U.S. and 
Europe had ignored Russian concerns and were focused only on 
their own security.  Although NATO was expanding up to 
Russia's borders, Europe must realize that European security 
is indivisible.  Despite suspension of CFE, Russia remained 
interested in arms control that was based on treaties.  Dunay 
replied that there was also a need to address Russia's 
attempts to inhibit its neighbors' security arrangements. 
 
CPC Works with "Reluctant" Participating States 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (SBU) Anton Martyniuk of the OSCE Conflict Prevention 
Center (CPC), said that his organization had shifted its 
focus from documenting non-compliance to enhancing 
transparency and contacts with participating States with less 
 
USOSCE 00000070  003 OF 004 
 
 
experience and capacity in arms control and CSBMs.  He 
described CPC outreach to Tajikistan that reversed 
unfavorable reporting and compliance trends there, and 
ongoing efforts to encourage Uzbekistan to return to more 
active participation in the Vienna Document and other CSBMs. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Martyniuk noted the "tremendous" increase in the 
number of inspections under the Vienna Document in early 2008 
in the wake of Russia's suspension of its CFE obligations. 
For the future, Martyniuk said there was no political 
consensus to develop new CSBMs, or even refine existing ones. 
 He noted that arms control tools to address ongoing crises 
do not yet exist at the OSCE. 
 
New Challenges for Vienna Document 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Jeffrey McCausland, former NSC director for arms 
control, discussed the possibilities and limitations of the 
Vienna Document.  He recommended several areas for future 
development: (1) renewed efforts on regional CSBMs (Chapter 
X) with a focus of perhaps the Balkans or the Caucasus; (2) 
greater efforts to enhance transparency in SALW and 
conventional ammunition transfers; (3) expanded export 
controls for MANPADS; and (4) export of the OSCE program in 
arms control and CSBMs to other regions outside Europe. 
 
Russo-Chinese CSBMs 
------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Vladislav Verchenko, deputy director in the First 
Asian Department at the Russian MFA, described progress begun 
during the Soviet period at developing CSBMs with China along 
the common border.  These have since been expanded under the 
"Five Power CSBM Border Agreement" to include Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  The agreement includes exchanges 
of data, limits on forces according to geographic zones, and 
reciprocal inspections. 
 
Quota Race Dominates Implementation Discussion 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶14. (SBU) Three working groups were held to discuss: (1) 
current implementation issues; (2) regional agreements under 
Chapter X, Vienna Document; and (3) the future of the Vienna 
Document.  Group one's focus on current implementation issues 
quickly evolved into a debate over the quota race. 
Discussions proceeded along familiar themes: the importance 
of eliminating the race, the preservation of pS rights, and 
an emphasis on restraint. Many participants weighed in with 
possible solutions, including: emphasizing bilateral 
arrangements and multi-national teams, increasing the number 
of team members, increasing the number of quotas, lowering 
the threshold for assessing evaluation visits, and creating 
an entirely new CSBM to allow for additional confidence 
building visits.  While discussion proved lively, no proposal 
gained wide support.  Pierre von Arx, military adviser in the 
Swiss delegation at the OSCE, capped the discussion by 
predicting that under the current political atmosphere in 
Vienna, none of the proposed solutions would be adopted. 
 
CFE Suspension Clouds Future of Vienna Document 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Discussion in group three on the future of the 
 
USOSCE 00000070  004 OF 004 
 
 
Vienna Document ranged widely over current issues such as the 
CFE suspension and the quota race.  There was broad agreement 
that ongoing CFE issues would continue to hamper work on 
CSBMs in the FSC.  The group also largely agreed that the 
quota race needed to be addressed in the near future, 
although there was no preferred solution, although voluntary 
measures and multi-national inspection teams received the 
most attention.  While no one disputed that there were new 
and emerging issues like proliferation of WMD and MANPADS 
that required attention, there was no suggestion that the 
Vienna Document was the right instrument to address these 
issues.  To use the Vienna Document to counter MANPADS 
proliferation, said one participant, was "like pouring water 
into a bottle of good wine." 
SCOTT