Viewing cable 09STATE60343
Title: U.S. NON-PAPER ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
09STATE603432009-06-11 18:20:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Secretary of State
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0343 1621842
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111820Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 060343 
 
SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2029 
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT START JCIC US KTIA RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY 
VEHICLES AND OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR 
WARHEADS 
 
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. 
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, 
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, during continuing 
negotiations regarding a START follow-on treaty with 
Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs 
Anatoliy Antonov, undertook to provide to the Russian 
Federation a U.S. non-paper explaining the U.S. approach 
for counting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads in the 
context of the START follow-on treaty. 
 
¶2.  (S) ACTION REQUEST:  Embassy Moscow is requested to 
provide the text contained in paragraph 3 below to 
appropriate host government officials in the form of a 
diplomatic note as soon as possible on June 15. 
Washington will provide the embassy with a courtesy 
Russian-language translation of the note in paragraph 3; 
however, delivery of the demarche should not be delayed if 
the translation is delayed.  Embassy is requested to 
confirm the delivery of the note, the name and office of 
the official to whom it was delivered, the date of the 
delivery, and any comment/reaction provided at that time. 
 
¶3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) 
Begin text. 
 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
                (Date) 
 
On Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles and Operationally 
Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads 
 
Limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) and 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) 
- During the Moscow meetings, the U.S. Delegation 
committed to explain more fully the U.S. approach with 
respect to limits on SNDVs and ODSNW. 
- The U.S. approach is a hybrid of the START Treaty limit 
on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed 
SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy 
bombers, and the Moscow Treaty limit on ODSNW. 
- The limit on each is independent of the other.  There is 
no direct relationship between the number of deployed 
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; and the 
number of ODSNW. 
On strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
- For strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. 
approach would continue to use the START conventions for 
counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, 
deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and 
deployed heavy bombers. 
- For the purpose of counting deployed ICBMs and their 
associated launchers against the limit for SNDVs, the 
general rule would be that each deployed launcher of ICBMs 
would be considered to contain a deployed ICBM. 
- However, under the U.S. approach, silo launchers that do 
not contain an ICBM and are no longer usable for launching 
and ICBM would not count against the limit for SNDVs. 
These launchers would either be eliminated using 
simplified elimination procedures (to be agreed) or 
exempted from the limitations of the treaty through an 
agreed exemption, which could include transparency 
measures. 
- ICBMs of a type tested and deployed for the delivery of 
nuclear warheads, but equipped with non-nuclear warheads, 
would count against the SNDV limit. 
- ICBMs of a type tested and deployed solely for the 
delivery of non-nuclear warheads would not count against 
the SNDV limit. 
- For the purpose of counting deployed SLBMs and their 
associated launchers against the limit for SNDVs, the 
general rule would be that each deployed launcher of SLBMs 
would be considered to contain a deployed SLBM. 
- SLBMs of a type tested and deployed for the delivery of 
nuclear warheads, but equipped with non-nuclear warheads, 
would still count against the SNDV limit. 
- However, SLBMs of a type tested and deployed solely for 
the delivery of non-nuclear warheads would not count 
against the SNDV limit. 
- Modified SLBM launchers on SSGNs would not be considered 
to contain SLBMs and would not count against the SNDV 
limit.  These launchers, which were modified in shipyards, 
are no longer capable of launching an SLBM and thus would 
be exempted from the limitations of the treaty through an 
agreed exemption for SSGNs, which could include 
transparency measures. 
- Launchers on SSBNs in refueling overhaul would count 
against the SNDV limit. 
- For heavy bombers, all heavy bombers equipped for 
nuclear armaments would count against the limit for SNDVs. 
- Under the U.S. approach, heavy bombers that were 
originally equipped for nuclear armaments but that are no 
longer usable for the delivery of nuclear armaments would 
not count against the limit for SNDVs.  These heavy 
bombers would either be eliminated using simplified 
elimination procedures (to be agreed) or exempted from the 
limitations of the treaty through an agreed exemption, 
which could include transparency measures. 
On operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
(ODSNW) 
- For ICBMs in their launchers, the actual number of 
nuclear warheads on each ICBM would count against the 
ODSNW limit. 
- ICBM launchers that do not contain an ICBM subject to 
the treaty would not contain ODSNW. 
- For SLBMs in their launchers, the actual number of 
nuclear warheads on each SLBM would count against the 
ODSNW limit. 
- SLBM launchers that do not contain an SLBM subject to 
the treaty would not contain ODSNW. 
- SLBM launchers on SSBNs in refueling overhaul do not 
contain SLBMs throughout the lengthy overhaul period and 
thus would not contain ODSNW. 
- For ICBMs and SLBMs in their launchers, if such ICBMs 
and SLBMs are equipped with non-nuclear warheads, those 
warheads would not count against the ODSNW limit.  Such 
launchers could be subject to transparency measures. 
- For heavy bombers, nuclear armaments loaded on a heavy 
bomber and nuclear armaments for heavy bombers located in 
specified weapon storage areas associated with or directly 
supporting heavy bomber air bases would count against the 
ODSNW limit. 
 
End text. 
CLINTON