Viewing cable 09STATE61832

09STATE618322009-06-16 00:54:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Secretary of State

DE RUEHC #1832 1670116
O 160054Z JUN 09
S E C R E T STATE 061832 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2029 
REF: A. STATE 41125 
     ¶B. STATE 50911 
     ¶C. STATE 50910 
     ¶D. STATE 60487 
     ¶E. STATE 60343 
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. 
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) 
¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, 
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to 
continue negotiations regarding a START follow-on treaty 
with Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament 
Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, during meetings of the U.S. and 
Russian Delegations in Moscow on June 16, 2009. 
¶2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw, as necessary, from 
the points in Ref A and Ref B with regard to U.S. views 
relating to a START follow-on treaty.  Delegation may draw 
from the U.S. non-paper on the Elements of a START 
Follow-on Treaty (Ref C), the U.S.-proposed Joint 
Understanding (Ref D) and the U.S. non-paper on counting 
SNDVs and ODSNW (Ref E) to explain U.S. views with respect 
to a START Follow-on treaty.  Delegation should report on 
all meetings as expeditiously as possible. 
¶3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) In response to 
the Russian non-paper, "How the Russian Side Envisions the 
New START Treaty" (June 1, 2009), Delegation may provide 
the text below to the Russian Delegation in the form of a 
Begin text. 
U.S. Non-paper 
U.S. Comments on the paper of the Russian Side: "How the 
Russian Side Envisions the new START Treaty" 
The United States notes that in a number of significant 
areas the views of the United States and the Russian 
Federation, as stipulated in their respective papers, 
appear to coincide to a substantial degree.  There are, of 
course, other areas where our views are markedly 
different.  The purpose of this paper is to provide U.S. 
views on the specific proposals made in the Russian paper, 
and where possible, to note the areas of congruence. 
¶1. Title of the Treaty:  Although the United States does 
not object to the title proposed by the Russian Federation 
for the new treaty, we do not believe it is something that 
needs to be decided now.  The United States agrees that 
the new treaty will be strictly bilateral. 
¶2. Structure of the Treaty: 
a. Preamble:  Although there may be some redundancy in the 
proposed preamble elements, the United States does not 
object in principle to the Russian proposals. The United 
States acknowledges that the Russian Federation has 
concerns regarding U.S. missile defense programs, and is 
addressing these concerns on their own merit in a separate 
venue; however the United States recognizes that there is 
an interrelationship between strategic offensive and 
defensive arms, but believes that it does not need to be 
addressed now in the context of the START follow-on 
treaty.  As the sides draft the text for the new treaty, 
the United States will be willing to consider language 
Russia may propose for the preamble that includes a 
general reference to this interrelationship on the 
understanding that this would be the only reference to 
defensive arms in the new treaty. 
b. General Provisions:  The proposal to reduce and limit 
strategic offensive arms both "quantitatively and 
qualitatively" was not sufficiently explained in the 
Russian paper, especially with respect to what qualitative 
limitations are being proposed by Russia, including how 
the sides might verify the qualitative nature of such 
reductions and limitations.  The United States opposes 
inclusion of any limitations on ballistic missile defense 
systems within the context of the proposed new treaty, 
which as instructed by our Presidents in their April 1, 
2009, Joint Statement, is to be focused on strategic 
offensive arms. 
c. Maximum levels:  The United States does not object to 
the proposed seven-year reduction period.  The United 
States acknowledges that the term "warhead," as used in 
the U.S. paper, does not correspond with the meaning of 
that term in the START Treaty.  However, as was pointed 
out in the U.S. paper, some START terminology and 
definitions will need to be changed to meet the needs of 
the new treaty. 
d. Counting Procedures: The United States has provided 
separately an explanation of the U.S. proposal for 
counting ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and is prepared 
to discuss it during the sessions of our talks in Geneva 
later this month. 
e. Data Base:  The U.S. and Russian proposals with respect 
to maintaining a data base appear to be similar, although 
details on newly constructed SOAs and exceptions for 
specified missiles will have to be clarified. 
f. Location:  The United States does not object to the 
concept of locational restrictions for SOAs; however, the 
United States opposes the proposed restriction on the 
basing of SOA only within the "continental portion" of 
each Party's national territory.  The United States does 
not object to inclusion of provisions similar to those in 
the START Treaty that would address the temporary 
stationing of heavy bombers outside national territory 
(but not the "continental portion" of national territory), 
in conjunction with the development of less stringent 
notification requirements for the temporary stationing of 
heavy bombers outside national territory for purposes not 
inconsistent with the treaty. 
g. Additional Limitations:  The United States opposes the 
Russian-proposed bans on ICBMs or SLBMs in non-nuclear 
configuration, as well as a ban on stationing heavy 
bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs outside the 
continental portion of a Party's national territory. 
h. Notifications:  The United States agrees that the new 
treaty should retain the START notification regime, with 
adaptations as appropriate. 
i. Elimination and Conversion:  The United States agrees 
that conversion or elimination procedures should be made 
simpler and less expensive, while ensuring those 
procedures provide effective verification. 
j. Confidence-Building Measures:  The United States 
supports the development of suitable confidence building 
measures and believes the sides will need to consider 
whether they will be contained in the new treaty or be 
recorded in documents that are not part of the formal 
k. Use of NTM:  The United States supports carrying 
forward the START provisions associated with NTM. 
However, the United States does not believe that NTM and 
the verification measures proposed by the Russian 
Federation alone would be sufficient to provide effective 
verification of the Treaty as directed by our Presidents, 
particularly as it pertains to verification of mobile 
ICBMs.  Therefore, other START verification measures 
should also be carried forward. 
l. Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions:  The United States 
supports the development of the Russian proposals 
regarding inspections, visits, and exhibitions; however 
these matters and the distinctions between inspections and 
visits will need to be explored and developed in more 
detail.  The United States supports inclusion of 
provisions according privileges and immunities for 
inspectors and aircrew members. 
m. Bilateral Consultative Commission:  The United States 
supports the establishment of an oversight body and agrees 
that questions that do not affect the substance of the 
treaty can be referred to such a body for consideration 
and decision, in which case they would not be considered 
to be amendments to the treaty and thus not subject to 
n. Entry into force and Termination:  The United States 
does not object to the 10-year treaty duration proposed by 
the Russian Federation, but opposes the proposal to 
include specific reference to certain activities as cause 
for withdrawal from the treaty.  The United States 
supports a withdrawal clause that invokes the supreme 
national interest as reason for withdrawal.  The United 
States supports superseding the Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty with the new treaty at entry into force 
of the new treaty. 
End text.