S E C R E T STATE 061832
SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT START JCIC US KTIA RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO THE U.S./RUSSIA
NEGOTIATIONS ON A START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, MOSCOW, JUNE 16,
REF: A. STATE 41125
Â¶B. STATE 50911
Â¶C. STATE 50910
Â¶D. STATE 60487
Â¶E. STATE 60343
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)
Â¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to
continue negotiations regarding a START follow-on treaty
with Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament
Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, during meetings of the U.S. and
Russian Delegations in Moscow on June 16, 2009.
Â¶2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw, as necessary, from
the points in Ref A and Ref B with regard to U.S. views
relating to a START follow-on treaty. Delegation may draw
from the U.S. non-paper on the Elements of a START
Follow-on Treaty (Ref C), the U.S.-proposed Joint
Understanding (Ref D) and the U.S. non-paper on counting
SNDVs and ODSNW (Ref E) to explain U.S. views with respect
to a START Follow-on treaty. Delegation should report on
all meetings as expeditiously as possible.
Â¶3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) In response to
the Russian non-paper, "How the Russian Side Envisions the
New START Treaty" (June 1, 2009), Delegation may provide
the text below to the Russian Delegation in the form of a
U.S. Comments on the paper of the Russian Side: "How the
Russian Side Envisions the new START Treaty"
The United States notes that in a number of significant
areas the views of the United States and the Russian
Federation, as stipulated in their respective papers,
appear to coincide to a substantial degree. There are, of
course, other areas where our views are markedly
different. The purpose of this paper is to provide U.S.
views on the specific proposals made in the Russian paper,
and where possible, to note the areas of congruence.
Â¶1. Title of the Treaty: Although the United States does
not object to the title proposed by the Russian Federation
for the new treaty, we do not believe it is something that
needs to be decided now. The United States agrees that
the new treaty will be strictly bilateral.
Â¶2. Structure of the Treaty:
a. Preamble: Although there may be some redundancy in the
proposed preamble elements, the United States does not
object in principle to the Russian proposals. The United
States acknowledges that the Russian Federation has
concerns regarding U.S. missile defense programs, and is
addressing these concerns on their own merit in a separate
venue; however the United States recognizes that there is
an interrelationship between strategic offensive and
defensive arms, but believes that it does not need to be
addressed now in the context of the START follow-on
treaty. As the sides draft the text for the new treaty,
the United States will be willing to consider language
Russia may propose for the preamble that includes a
general reference to this interrelationship on the
understanding that this would be the only reference to
defensive arms in the new treaty.
b. General Provisions: The proposal to reduce and limit
strategic offensive arms both "quantitatively and
qualitatively" was not sufficiently explained in the
Russian paper, especially with respect to what qualitative
limitations are being proposed by Russia, including how
the sides might verify the qualitative nature of such
reductions and limitations. The United States opposes
inclusion of any limitations on ballistic missile defense
systems within the context of the proposed new treaty,
which as instructed by our Presidents in their April 1,
2009, Joint Statement, is to be focused on strategic
c. Maximum levels: The United States does not object to
the proposed seven-year reduction period. The United
States acknowledges that the term "warhead," as used in
the U.S. paper, does not correspond with the meaning of
that term in the START Treaty. However, as was pointed
out in the U.S. paper, some START terminology and
definitions will need to be changed to meet the needs of
the new treaty.
d. Counting Procedures: The United States has provided
separately an explanation of the U.S. proposal for
counting ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and is prepared
to discuss it during the sessions of our talks in Geneva
later this month.
e. Data Base: The U.S. and Russian proposals with respect
to maintaining a data base appear to be similar, although
details on newly constructed SOAs and exceptions for
specified missiles will have to be clarified.
f. Location: The United States does not object to the
concept of locational restrictions for SOAs; however, the
United States opposes the proposed restriction on the
basing of SOA only within the "continental portion" of
each Party's national territory. The United States does
not object to inclusion of provisions similar to those in
the START Treaty that would address the temporary
stationing of heavy bombers outside national territory
(but not the "continental portion" of national territory),
in conjunction with the development of less stringent
notification requirements for the temporary stationing of
heavy bombers outside national territory for purposes not
inconsistent with the treaty.
g. Additional Limitations: The United States opposes the
Russian-proposed bans on ICBMs or SLBMs in non-nuclear
configuration, as well as a ban on stationing heavy
bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs outside the
continental portion of a Party's national territory.
h. Notifications: The United States agrees that the new
treaty should retain the START notification regime, with
adaptations as appropriate.
i. Elimination and Conversion: The United States agrees
that conversion or elimination procedures should be made
simpler and less expensive, while ensuring those
procedures provide effective verification.
j. Confidence-Building Measures: The United States
supports the development of suitable confidence building
measures and believes the sides will need to consider
whether they will be contained in the new treaty or be
recorded in documents that are not part of the formal
k. Use of NTM: The United States supports carrying
forward the START provisions associated with NTM.
However, the United States does not believe that NTM and
the verification measures proposed by the Russian
Federation alone would be sufficient to provide effective
verification of the Treaty as directed by our Presidents,
particularly as it pertains to verification of mobile
ICBMs. Therefore, other START verification measures
should also be carried forward.
l. Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions: The United States
supports the development of the Russian proposals
regarding inspections, visits, and exhibitions; however
these matters and the distinctions between inspections and
visits will need to be explored and developed in more
detail. The United States supports inclusion of
provisions according privileges and immunities for
inspectors and aircrew members.
m. Bilateral Consultative Commission: The United States
supports the establishment of an oversight body and agrees
that questions that do not affect the substance of the
treaty can be referred to such a body for consideration
and decision, in which case they would not be considered
to be amendments to the treaty and thus not subject to
n. Entry into force and Termination: The United States
does not object to the 10-year treaty duration proposed by
the Russian Federation, but opposes the proposal to
include specific reference to certain activities as cause
for withdrawal from the treaty. The United States
supports a withdrawal clause that invokes the supreme
national interest as reason for withdrawal. The United
States supports superseding the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty with the new treaty at entry into force
of the new treaty.