Viewing cable 09STATE75614
Title: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
09STATE756142009-07-21 02:39:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Secretary of State
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O 210239Z JUL 09
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000
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RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T STATE 075614 
 
SIPDIS 
GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2029 
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT KTIA START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA 
NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, GENEVA, 
SWITZERLAND, JULY 22-24, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 041125 
     ¶B. STATE 050911 
     ¶C. STATE 050910 
     ¶D. STATE 060343 
     ¶E. STATE 060487 
     ¶F. STATE 061832 
     ¶G. MOSCOW 01347 
     ¶H. GENEVA 00419 (SFO-GVA-I-007) 
     ¶I. STATE 064643 
     ¶J. GENEVA 000521 (SFO-GVA-II-004) 
     ¶K. GENEVA 000514 (SFO-GVA-II-003) 
     ¶L. 04 GENEVA 1026 (BIC-I-001) 
 
Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, VCI. 
Reason:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, 
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, will head the U.S. 
delegation in continuing negotiations regarding a START 
Follow-on treaty with Russian MFA Director of Security and 
Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, in Geneva, Switzerland 
on July 22-24, 2009. 
 
¶2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw from previous guidance 
and U.S. nonpapers (reftels) to discuss U.S. views relating to 
a START Follow-on treaty.  During discussions on the margins 
of the Moscow Summit, Antonov suggested that the next round of 
negotiations focus on (1)the offense-defense relationship; (2) 
conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs; (3) what will be counted 
under the treaty limits; and (4) the interest of Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan in participating in the negotiations. 
Delegation is authorized to reach agreement on these 
issues as detailed in paragraphs 3 ? 7, below.  Delegation 
should report on all meetings as expeditiously as 
possible. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Relationship Between Offense and Defense 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Delegation may draw from the discussion contained 
in Ref K to clarify Russia's concerns on the relationship 
between strategic offense and defense.  Delegation should 
reiterate that the U.S. position remains clear, as was 
explained during the drafting of the Joint Understanding 
(text in paragraph 8, below) that there would only be a 
single mention of defensive arms in the treaty and that 
would be in the preamble. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (S) As directed by the White House, on the margins of 
the July Moscow Summit, Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed 
the earlier U.S. proposal regarding the counting of 
non-nuclear warheads.  If the Russian Delegation raises 
the question of the U.S. proposal on non-nuclear warheads 
and treaty limits made in conjunction with the Moscow 
Summit Joint Understanding, Delegation should reaffirm 
that the United States is willing to resolve the issue of 
non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs by counting such 
warheads toward the treaty limit on strategic warheads in 
exchange for Russian agreement:  (a) to a strategic 
warhead limit of 1500 and a strategic delivery vehicle 
limit of 700-900 (with the specific number within this 
range to be agreed through further negotiation); and (b) 
to exclude from the treaty strategic delivery vehicles 
that are currently counted in START but that are not now 
part of the strategic nuclear forces of the parties.  As 
required, Delegation should draw on previous guidance to 
explain which U.S. strategic delivery vehicles currently 
counted in START should be excluded from the new treaty. 
If Russia proposes alternate numbers for warhead or 
delivery vehicle limits, proposes additional limitations 
on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs or asks questions about 
which non-nuclear warheads are to be counted, delegation 
should probe the Russian delegation for its views and 
report the Russian position and questions back to 
Washington. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
What Will Be Counted Under Treaty Limits 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Delegation may draw from discussions contained in 
Refs J and K to explain the U.S. views on what should be 
counted in the START Follow-on treaty, explaining that the 
U.S. was drawing from a Russian proposal tabled at the 
first meeting of the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral 
Implementation Commission (Ref L).  Depending on the 
results of discussion on conventionally-armed ICBMs and 
SLBMs (see paragraph 4, above), the delegation may delete 
the word "nuclear" as appropriate in the U.S. position on 
what should be counted in the START Follow-on treaty. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Participation of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. (S) Delegation should draw from points in the U.S. 
paper contained in paragraph 7 of Ref I as well as 
previous guidance to reiterate the U.S. view that the 
START Follow-on treaty will be a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and the Russian Federation. 
Delegation should also seek to draw out Russian views 
regarding the ideas presented earlier by the United States 
with respect to possible additional steps that could be 
taken to inform and reassure Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan on developments relating to further cuts in 
strategic offensive arms. 
 
---------------------------- 
Organization for Future Work 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Delegation should present a notional plan for 
organization of further work on the START Follow-on 
treaty, drawing on the experience gained during START 
negotiations.  In particular, working groups would be 
modeled on those that were in place during the negotiation 
of START.  Such work would begin in earnest at the end of 
August and continue until the work was completed. 
 
------------------------------- 
Text of the Joint Understanding 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) On July 6, 2009 during the Moscow Summit, Presidents 
Obama and Medvedev signed the following Joint 
Understanding: 
 
  The President of the United States of America and the 
President of the Russian Federation have decided on 
further reductions and limitations of their nations' 
strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early 
date a new legally binding agreement to replace the 
current START Treaty, and directed that the new treaty 
contain, inter alia, the following elements: 
 
  ¶1.  A provision to the effect that each Party will 
reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that 
seven years after entry into force of the treaty and 
thereafter, the limits will be in the range of 500-1100 
for strategic delivery vehicles, and in the range of 
1500-1675 for their associated warheads. 
 
  ¶2.  Provisions for calculating these limits. 
 
  ¶3.  Provisions on definitions, data exchanges, 
notifications, eliminations, inspections, and verification 
procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency 
measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as 
appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty. 
 
  ¶4.  A provision to the effect that each Party will 
determine for itself the composition and structure of its 
strategic offensive arms. 
 
  ¶5.  A provision on the interrelationship of strategic 
offensive and strategic defensive arms. 
 
  ¶6.  A provision on the impact of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic 
stability. 
 
  ¶7.  A provision on basing strategic offensive arms 
exclusively on the national territory of each Party. 
 
  ¶8.  Establishment of an implementation body to resolve 
questions related to treaty implementation. 
 
  ¶9.  A provision to the effect that the treaty will not 
apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of 
strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third 
state. 
 
  ¶10.  A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is 
superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the 
reduction of strategic offensive arms. 
 
  The two Presidents direct their negotiators to finish 
work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign 
and submit it for ratification in their respective 
countries. 
 
  Signed at Moscow, this sixth day of July, 2009, in 
duplicate, in the English and Russian languages. 
 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
 
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: 
 
End text. 
CLINTON