Viewing cable 09STATE98566
Title: SFO-V GUIDANCE-004: MOBILE MISSILE MONITORING

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
09STATE985662009-09-23 04:04:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8566 2660423
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230404Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 098566 
 
SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019 
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: SFO-V GUIDANCE-004: MOBILE MISSILE MONITORING 
PROVISIONS 
 
REFS: A. STATE 84678 (SFO-DIP-09-001) 
      ¶B. MOSCOW 1347 
 
Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, VCI. 
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.(S) Background: In a non-paper delivered on August 14, 
2009, the United States informed Russia that it remained 
committed to including in the START Follow-on Treaty 
provisions that would continue the U.S. right to conduct 
Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) at Votkinsk 
(Ref A).  In addition, the non-paper underscored the U.S. 
would continue to exercise its START Treaty right to 
conduct PPCM at Votkinsk through December 4, 2009, and 
acknowledged, without prejudice to the U.S. position in 
the START Follow-on negotiations, the necessity of 
planning for the conclusion of PPCM at Votkinsk upon the 
expiration of START.  The Russian side has consistently 
made clear that Russia will not agree to include a 
provision on any U.S. PPCM rights at Votkinsk in the START 
Follow-on Treaty, and that U.S. inspectors and equipment 
must be removed from Votkinsk before START expires 
(Ref B). 
 
¶2. (S)  Washington recognizes that the U.S. START Treaty 
right to conduct PPCM at Votkinsk expires on December 4, 
2009, and that time is growing short to work out the 
practical arrangements for the withdrawal of U.S. 
equipment and personnel from the Votkinsk facility by that 
date.  In light of Russia's clearly stated position that 
it will not permit the United States to conduct PPCM at 
Votkinsk under a future Treaty, Washington is willing to 
consider alternative measures that would give the United 
States an adequate level of confidence regarding the 
number of mobile ICBMs Russia possesses. 
 
¶3. (S) Guidance:  On the margins of the SFO negotiations, 
Delegation is authorized to conform the draft Agreement on 
Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous 
Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at 
Votkinsk and letters of exchange on the use of ground 
transportation and settlement of accounts in connection 
with the Agreement that have been previously negotiated in 
the JCIC.  Delegation should request authorization from 
Washington before signing the documents, and should make a 
recommendation to Washington regarding the modalities of 
getting the necessary signatures from Belarus. 
 
¶4.  (S) With respect to mobile missile monitoring under 
the START Follow-on Treaty, Washington instructs the 
delegation to table a new U.S. position that the United 
States would be willing to consider foregoing PPCM at 
Votkinsk, if the following monitoring measures could be 
included in the new treaty in its place:  1) continuation 
of the practice of placing permanent unique identifiers on 
each mobile ICBM; 2) prenotification to the United States 
at least 60 hours in advance of the exit from the facility 
of a mobile ICBM subject to the limitations of the Treaty, 
to include information about the type and variant of the 
missile, the scheduled time of departure of the mobile 
ICBM, and its unique identifier number; and 3) 
installation and operation of a closed circuit TV camera 
at the rail exit of the facility that would be connected 
via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring facility to 
track the entry and exit of railcars from the final 
missile assembly facility to confirm that declarations are 
being provided accurately.  As a gesture of reciprocity, 
the United States would be prepared to pre-notify the 
exits of missiles or first stages from a similar United 
States facility and install a closed circuit TV there.  At 
para 5 below are talking points the Delegation may draw 
upon in presenting this proposal to the Russian side. 
 
¶5. (S) Begin talking points: 
 
--Since the beginning of our talks on the START Follow-on 
Treaty, the United States has been clear about its view 
that the unique monitoring challenges associated with 
mobile missiles make it necessary to retain in the new 
treaty the START provisions on conducting Perimeter Portal 
Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) at Votkinsk. 
 
--The reason for our position is simply that the United 
States needs to be able to verify with confidence the 
number of mobile ICBMs deployed by the Russian 
Federation.  The exercise of our right to conduct PPCM at 
Votkinsk has provided that confidence under the START 
Treaty. 
 
--However, the Russian side has made it very clear that it 
is not prepared to extend this right under a new Treaty, 
particularly since there is no analogous facility in the 
United States for Russia to monitor in the same fashion. 
 
--We, therefore, have been giving thought as to what 
alternative measures could give the United States an 
adequate level of confidence regarding the number of 
mobile ICBMs Russia possesses. 
--We are prepared to explore, instead of PPCM, a set of 
less intrusive measures that would assist our ability to 
effectively monitor this aspect of the Treaty. 
 
--Specifically, we would like to propose, in lieu of PPCM, 
the following package of measures: 
 
1)      Continuation of the Russian practice of 
permanently affixing a unique identifier to each mobile 
ICBM; 
 
2)      Prenotification to the United States at least 60 
hours in advance of the exit from the facility of a mobile 
ICBM subject to the limitations of the Treaty, to include 
information about the type and variant of the missile, the 
scheduled time of departure of the mobile ICBM, and its 
unique identifier number; and 
 
3)      Installation and operation of a closed circuit 
TV camera at the rail exit of the facility that would be 
connected via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring 
facility to track the entry and exit of railcars from the 
final missile assembly facility. 
 
--Finally, if the Russian side were to agree to this 
proposal, the United States would be prepared, as a 
gesture of reciprocity, to provide pre-notification of the 
exits of missiles or first stages from a similar United 
States facility and to install a closed circuit TV camera 
there. 
 
--In making this proposal, the United States has come a 
long way in the direction of Russia's position.  We trust, 
therefore, that you will give serious consideration to our 
proposal and our underlying objective, which is to ensure 
the United States will be able to verify with confidence 
the number of Russian mobile ICBMs. 
 
End talking points. 
 
End guidance. 
CLINTON