Viewing cable 09USOSCE85
Title: CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN VIENNA, A SPRING

IdentifierCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin
09USOSCE852009-04-07 14:51:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USOSCE
VZCZCXRO2230
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0085/01 0971451
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071451Z APR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6318
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0729
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1284
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1224
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000085 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN VIENNA, A SPRING 
SNAPSHOT 
 
REF: A. USOSCE 0080 
     ¶B. USOSCE 84 
     ¶C. USOSCE 60 
     ¶D. USOSCE 73 
 
USOSCE 00000085  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour for reason 1. 
4 (b & d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The OSCE spring recess provides a useful 
occasion to take stock of conventional arms control work in 
Vienna.  The crisis in CFE continues to overshadow all else. 
Most states continue to faithfully implement the Treaty, but 
the impasse over Russia's suspension of CFE implementation 
continues.  Our Allies are increasingly restive, with Germany 
leading a chorus urging greater effort on the Parallel 
Actions Package.  With only one negotiating session since 
July 2008, and none now scheduled, Allies are increasingly 
concerned this has little credibility as a "process." 
Skepticism is increasing on the margins that A/CFE can ever 
be revived or have the leverage needed to extract concessions 
from Russia over Georgia. 
 
¶2. (C) The Vienna Document 1999 remains the second major arms 
control and CSBM vehicle supervised from Vienna.  Russia 
continues to demand a limited revision of the Vienna 
Document, which was revised several times in the 1990s, but 
has now gone unrevised for ten years.  Many other delegations 
would welcome this as well, especially if any revision could 
focus on a change in the current system of quotas for 
evaluations and inspections that so heavily favors Russia at 
NATO expense.  On other FSC issues, the U.S. chairs a 
newly-formed informal group of participating States to 
develop specific proposals to further implementation of UNSCR 
1540 on nonproliferation.  U.S. suggestions last month in the 
FSC for next steps on cyber security were also favorably 
received; several states hope the U.S. will follow up on its 
ideas. 
 
¶3. (C) The Open Skies Treaty remains a model of openness, 
transparency and cooperation, but the agreement needs to be 
updated to bring it into the digital age.  The technology to 
fly actual missions is readily available, but consensus 
remains elusive due to its complexity and varying approaches. 
 The U.S. can take a major leadership role in guiding this 
process through its chairmanship of the sensors working group 
and in the run-up to the second Open Skies review conference 
to take place under U.S. Chairmanship in 2010.  A separate 
success story is the Dayton Article IV Sub-Regional 
Consultative Commission (SRCC) that implements the arms 
control portion of the Dayton Peace Accords. 
 
¶4. (C) In all these areas, our Allies are waiting for U.S. 
leadership.  They look forward to learning how the new 
Administration approaches these problems, and how they fit in 
with our global arms control agenda.  End summary. 
 
Early Spring Recap from Vienna 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) With the OSCE momentarily quiet for its spring 
recess, this cable recaps where conventional arms control in 
Vienna stands at this point.  Reftels A through D are the 
reporting cables on the most recent meetings of the Joint 
Consultative Group on the CFE Treaty, the Forum for Security 
 
USOSCE 00000085  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
Cooperation, the Open Skies Plenary, and the Dayton Article 
IV Sub-Regional Consultative Commission respectively. 
 
CFE Treaty: Restive Mood in JCG 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The mood in Vienna surrounding CFE is not positive. 
Allies continue to isolate Russia in the JCG and have en 
masse consistently called Russia out for its acts of 
noncompliance, such as refusal of CFE inspections and failure 
to provide Treaty-required data.  Still, Allies do not feel 
that the current situation, where 29 States Parties continue 
to implement CFE but Russia does not, is sustainable. 
 
¶7. (C) A growing sense of frustration is becoming apparent, 
and Allies have informally begun to question USDel on next 
steps, with  Germany being the most outspoken.  Although the 
Germans believe that the Parallel Actions Package 
appropriately responds to Russian concerns, in the last JCG 
before spring recess they asserted that the current dialogue 
needs assisting.  Germany alleges, inter alia, the pace of 
U.S.-Russia negotiating meetings since the Madrid Ministerial 
in December 2007 has been far too slow, Russian aggression in 
Georgia and the U.S. change in administrations 
notwithstanding.  Germany is receiving support on the margins 
from several other Allied delegations which worry that the 
Allied position is losing credibility.  Although these 
delegations still publicly call on Russia to "work 
cooperatively on the basis of the Parallel Actions Package," 
privately they express a degree of sympathy when Russia 
complains there have been only two meetings to negotiate in 
almost a full year.  There is a growing number of voices 
arguing that if high-level U.S.-Russia negotiators cannot 
manage to meet more often, supporting talks on technical 
details at lower levels elsewhere (e.g., in Vienna or at 
NATO) would seem to be a natural alternative. 
 
¶8. (C) A second strain heard with increasing frequency is 
skepticism that the remaining Istanbul Commitments issues 
related to Georgia can be addressed effectively using the 
A/CFE process.  Few in Vienna believe that A/CFE can remove 
Russian tanks from the Abkhazia region of Georgia. 
 
¶9. (C) Many Allies look forward to meeting with Washington 
reps during the April 28 HLTF and the May 27-28 HLTF 
"stocktaking" exercise.  They see these events as 
opportunities to better understand the new Administration's 
approach to CFE prior to the June 10 meeting in Berlin. 
(Note:  Although the U.S. will hold the JCG chairmanship 
through May 12, it is largely a technical function and offers 
little advantage.  End note.) 
 
FSC: Vienna Document Quotas 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia has repeatedly proposed revision of selected 
provisions in the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99), notably those 
on reporting "major" military activities and verification 
through inspection and evaluation visits.  Russia insists it 
is not interested in "reopening" the entire document but 
believes it possible to selectively revise portions of VD99 
without exposing the rest of it to review.  Russia suggests a 
time limit on negotiations over revisions: if consensus were 
not reached by a certain date, the negotiations would cease 
 
USOSCE 00000085  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
and the existing provisions would remain unchanged.  The 
current version of the document would remain in force until 
consensus was reached on a revision, to be formally adopted 
by the FSC.  Russia observes that the Vienna Document was 
updated several times in the 1990s and asserts that it is 
overdue for another revision. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Norway and Denmark have in fact already introduced 
proposals to increase the number of passive evaluation 
quotas, i.e., the number of evaluations a state is required 
to accept (FSC.AIAM/5/09), and to increase the number of 
personnel on inspection and evaluation teams (FSC.AIAM/6/09). 
 Russia earlier proposed several revisions of "technical 
aspects" of the Vienna Document, e.g., concrete parameters 
for a "specified area" and a single deadline for submission 
of defense planning information.  Russia also called for 
entirely new CSBMs that it argues could fit within the 
framework of VD99, including notifications and other 
transparency measures for multinational rapid reaction forces 
and naval forces.  Most delegations already have a dim view 
of Russia's proposed CSBM on naval forces. 
 
¶12. (C) While there is recognition in the FSC of the dangers 
inherent in reopening any part of the Vienna Document, there 
is also some agreement that parts of it could be updated in 
light of changes in the security environment since the last 
revision in 1999.  Germany is known to favor a selective 
approach to revision, generally along the same lines as 
proposed by Russia. 
 
¶13. (C) France shares U.S. and British skepticism that VD99 
is likely to be improved if opened to renegotiation and could 
even lose still vital provisions, e.g., those pertaining to 
verification, in the process.  In any case, France is on 
record as preferring a "more global" approach to modernizing 
European security, presumably a reference to the Medvedev 
proposal for a new European security treaty. 
 
¶14. (C) The UK has questioned whether participating States 
are prepared to bear the costs of the broader and more 
frequent verification activities anticipated by some of the 
proposals.  The UK also shares the U.S. reluctance to invest 
the political capital to revise a "second order" agreement 
when the "most important CSBM of all," the CFE Treaty, is 
threatened by Russia's suspension of implementation. 
 
¶15. (C) COMMENT:  Gaining additional inspections of Russia 
and a more rational distribution of quotas would make sense, 
including  added transparency while Russia suspends its 
implementation of CFE.  Any Allied steps to revise Vienna 
Document 1999, however, should be structured to prevent 
inadvertent signals that Allies do not expect the CFE Treaty 
ever to be restored to full health or that they would try to 
recreate CFE through a revised VD99.  END COMMENT. 
 
UNSCR 1540: Next Steps 
---------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The U.S. has proposed additional measures at the 
FSC to more fully implement UNSCR 1540, including a Best 
Practices Guide, an exchange of information by participating 
States (pS) on current implementation activities, and the 
development of a mutual technical assistance mechanism for 
pS.  The U.S. is also prepared to contribute funds to support 
 
USOSCE 00000085  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
a full-time position at the OSCE secretariat to coordinate 
1540 activities.  To develop specific proposals for adoption 
in the FSC, an "Informal Group of Friends on 
Nonproliferation," was formed on April 7 under U.S. 
chairmanship. 
 
Small Arms/Light Weapons 
------------------------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) The 2008 OSCE Ministerial directed a review of the 
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), also 
handled within the FSC.  Germany is taking the lead in 
preparing a work plan for the review that would culminate in 
a two-day meeting late in 2009.  Many pS support closer 
alignment of OSCE programs on SALW and stockpiles of 
conventional ammunition with the UN Program of Action on SALW 
(UNPOA).  Germany has proposed completing the SALW review in 
time for the next biennial meeting of states to review 
implementation Qthe UNPOA, scheduled for summer 2010. 
 
Cyber Security: U.S. Ideas Welcome 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The FSC conducted a two-day workshop on cyber 
security in March 2009 that featured several U.S. presenters, 
including Michele Markoff, the Department's cyber policy 
lead, and representatives of DOD and DHS. The U.S. delegation 
proposed several possible next steps for the FSC: networking 
and training workshops; a self-survey of existing policies 
and practices; sharing best practices with other 
multinational organizations; a workshop to exchange lessons 
learned from exercises and identify opportunities for 
confidence-building exercises; publishing information 
requirements for an early warning network; and developing a 
framework using the Counter-Terrorism Network to facilitate 
law enforcement cooperation in tracing cyber criminals.  The 
U.S. proposals were well-received at the workshop and several 
delegations have informally approached the U.S. since to urge 
us to introduce specific proposals in the FSC. 
 
¶19. (C) COMMENT: A new CSBM introduced by the U.S. and close 
allies on cyber security would be in U.S. interest for three 
reasons.  First, it would advance the U.S. approach with the 
56 participating States of the OSCE, half of whom are not in 
NATO.  Second, it would offer a positive alternative to 
impractical Russian proposals that would treat cyber security 
as an arms control issue and thus prevent Russia from 
defining the debate.  Third, it would allow the U.Qto 
assert leadership in an area that matters to U.S. interests. 
 Such a CSBM could be centered, for instance, around the U.S. 
recommendations at the workshop (see preceding para) or the 
G-8's eleven agreed points on cyber security.  END COMMENT. 
 
Open Skies: Good Flying Weather 
but Sensors Cloud Future 
------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) The mood surrounding Open Skies in Vienna continues 
to be positive and collaborative.  The key challenge to this 
agreement is to drag it into the modern age of changing 
technology.  In February, there was a landmark Chairman's 
statement that allows procurement and testing of equipment. 
Even so, March sub-meetings of the Informal Working Group on 
Sensors (IWGS), chaired by the U.S. (Scott Simmons), sought 
 
USOSCE 00000085  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
without success to hammer out rules that would govern, in 
accordance with Treaty provisions, the use of digital cameras 
during Open Skies Observer missions.  Although Russian 
experts were engaged seriously, progress remains 
frustratingly slow due to the complexity of the discussions, 
which require in-depth knowledge of physics and mathematics. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The U.S. will be chair of the second Open Skies 
review conference required in 2010, and began consulting 
informally with interested States Qties on the agenda, 
modalities, theme, and timing.  So far, there have been no 
firm views other than vague recommendations that the first 
review conference in 2005 went well and can serve as an rough 
model for the second, so we have an opportunity to shape the 
agenda and work-plan in the coming months. 
 
¶22. (C) COMMENT:  The Mission has three areas of focus for 
the upcoming Open Skies session which convenes on April 27 
under Bosnian chairmanship.  First, to reach an OSCC decision 
by late June on a date and location for the second review 
conference in 2010.  Second, to continue informal 
consultations to build consensus with all interested States 
Parties on broader expectations and recommendations for next 
year's review conference.  Third, to  encourage the Russians 
toward progress on digital imaging decisions.  The first two 
areas are easy; the third, however, is far more elusive due 
to the technical challenges.  END COMMENT. 
 
Dayton Article IV: Don't Fix 
What Isn't Broken 
----------------- 
¶23. (SBU) The 42nd Dayton Article IV Sub-Regional 
Consultative Commission (SRCC), representing the Dayton 
Agreement Parties of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and 
Montenegro, met March 16-19 in Croatia (Ref D).  This 
sub-regional CSBM, a CFE-like regime, is another success 
story.  The meeting was cooperative and friendly, resulting 
in easy approval of several implementation documents that had 
been prepared by the Permanent Working Group. 
¶24. (C) The most contentious discussions were reserved for 
the issue of "ownership" of Article IV responsibilities, with 
the four Parties seeking to avoid rapid transfer to them of 
technical responsibilities from the OSCE Office of the 
Personal Representative for Dayton Article IV ("the PR"). 
Close observers believe that, given the problematic political 
situations in Bosnia and Kosovo, there is little desire by 
the Parties to see any decline in international support to 
the Dayton Article IV regime.  Last week the PR, Italian 
Brigadier General Costanzo Periotto, took on board the 
consensus view of the contact group that the ownership issue 
should be slow and steady.  Periotto said he had also 
concluded that to rush the process would be a mistake. 
¶25. (C) COMMENT: Given ongoing uncertainties about Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the apparent success of the present division of 
responsibilities between the Personal Representative and the 
Parties, and its low cost of under USD 300,000 annually, 
PeriottoQ right that it would be ill-advised to press a 
transfer of additional responsibilities onto the Parties at 
this time.  Let's not fix what isn't broken.  END COMMENT. 
SCOTT