S E C R E T VILNIUS 000055
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: KNNP PINR MNUC PARM LH
SUBJECT: C-WP8-01022, INFORMATION ON SECURITY OF LITHUANIAN
REF: 08 STATE 135193
Classified By: Ambassador Cloud for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Â¶1. (SBU) Begin summary. Embassy Vilnius's responses below
are keyed to questions in reftel. Questions are repeated
below for ease of reading. POC is Economic Officer Daniel
Gage, gagedlATstate.sgov.gov, for questions related to the
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) and Pol/Mil Officer
Michelle Hoyt, hoytmlATstate.sgov.gov, for questions related
to Second Line of Defense (SLD). End summary.
Â¶2. (S) What specific security measures are in place at
nuclear facilities? Are private guards, police officers, or
military personnel used to guard facilities? What type of
cooperation agreements, if any, exist between facility guards
and local authorities? Are facility guards armed? If so,
what kind of weapons do guards typically carry?
Post has visited the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP), a
Soviet-era RBMK style plant on several occasions in the past
two years. At the entrance to the plant, security measures
include metal detectors, id verification and guards with side
arms controlling access. Within the plant, there are nuclear
material detectors. During a 2007 tour as well as in a
December 2008 conversation with Gytis Maksimovas, the head of
the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI), we were
told that there are anti-aircraft measures in place to
protect the INPP from a plane entering its airspace without
Â¶3. (S) Are there specific regulations governing the
transport of nuclear materials? Do the responsible
authorities typically follow these regulations in
transporting nuclear materials?
All waste generated by the INPP is stored on-site at the
plant in a secured, monitored location with fences and
surveillance cameras. We visited the site in July 2007. The
waste site uses dry casks made of steel and concrete
manufactured by Skoda. A new fuel storage site is planned
for the INPP as well.
Â¶4. (S) What plans or procedures has the national level
government prepared for responding to the theft of nuclear
material? What plans or procedures have been prepared for
attacks on nuclear facilities?
VATESI, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Security
Agency (VSD) and internal INPP security oversee the physical
security of the plant and the nuclear materials stored
therein. VATESI also conducts inspections of the internal
security of the plant. The Ministry of the Interior has a
special unit dedicated to the security of the plant and
Lithuanian Air Force personnel are stationed nearby equipped
with anti-aircraft measures.
Lithuania has been a member of the Second Line of Defense
(SLD) Program since 2002. Working with the Border Guard
Service, SLD installed radiation detection equipment at the
Vilnius airport in 2002 and then later at the newly built
Vilnius airport terminal in 2007. SLD also replaced gamma
only equipment with dual channel (neutron and gamma
detectors) at five border crossings with Russia and Belarus
Â¶5. (S) How has the addition of the EU-10 affected EURATOM's
budget and number of inspectors? How has it affected the
EURATOM 's and IAEA's workload with respect to safeguards
Maksimovas told us that there have been no changes in regards
to IAEA safety inspections with the addition of the EU-10.
IAEA and EURATOM do joint inspections. Lithuania is a part
of the integrated safeguards regime meaning the INPP does
fewer inspections than before Lithuania joined the regime but
its inspections can be unannounced except for annual
inventory inspections. Maksimovas said IAEA and EURATOM do
conduct unannounced inspections and monitor transfers of
materials to fuel storage.
Â¶6. (S) Do EURATOM inspectors have the necessary resources
to carry out inspections? Have there been any changes in
inspection procedures, or in the number of inspections
carried out annually?
Maksimovas said that he hadn't seen any radical changes in
the quality of EURATOM inspections.
Â¶7. (S) What has the reaction been among European Union
member states to having inspections performed by both IAEA
Maksimovas mentioned no concerns or objections. When
Lithuania's trilateral safeguard agreement (between the GOL,
EURATOM and IAEA) entered into force on January 1, 2008
reporting changed slightly, mostly affecting format,
procedure and the order of reporting. Final information is
always sent to the IAEA and includes discussion of classical
safeguards and additional reporting on the nuclear fuel cycle.
Â¶8. (S) How has joining the European Union affected new
member states' bilateral IAEA safeguards agreements?
Maksimovas said joining the EU did not affect Lithuania's
bilateral relations with the IAEA, and they still conduct
national and regional level projects, more than a dozen in