Viewing cable 09VILNIUS55

09VILNIUS552009-01-28 06:30:00 2011-08-30 01:44:00 SECRET Embassy Vilnius
R 280630Z JAN 09
S E C R E T VILNIUS 000055 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 
REF: 08 STATE 135193 
Classified By: Ambassador Cloud for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
¶1.  (SBU) Begin summary.  Embassy Vilnius's responses below 
are keyed to questions in reftel.  Questions are repeated 
below for ease of reading.  POC is Economic Officer Daniel 
Gage,, for questions related to the 
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) and Pol/Mil Officer 
Michelle Hoyt,, for questions related 
to Second Line of Defense (SLD).  End summary. 
¶2.  (S)  What specific security measures are in place at 
nuclear facilities?  Are private guards, police officers, or 
military personnel used to guard facilities?  What type of 
cooperation agreements, if any, exist between facility guards 
and local authorities?  Are facility guards armed?  If so, 
what kind of weapons do guards typically carry? 
Post has visited the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP), a 
Soviet-era RBMK style plant on several occasions in the past 
two years.  At the entrance to the plant, security measures 
include metal detectors, id verification and guards with side 
arms controlling access.  Within the plant, there are nuclear 
material detectors.  During a 2007 tour as well as in a 
December 2008 conversation with Gytis Maksimovas, the head of 
the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI), we were 
told that there are anti-aircraft measures in place to 
protect the INPP from a plane entering its airspace without 
¶3.  (S)  Are there specific regulations governing the 
transport of nuclear materials? Do the responsible 
authorities typically follow these regulations in 
transporting nuclear materials? 
All waste generated by the INPP is stored on-site at the 
plant in a secured, monitored location with fences and 
surveillance cameras.  We visited the site in July 2007.  The 
waste site uses dry casks made of steel and concrete 
manufactured by Skoda.  A new fuel storage site is planned 
for the INPP as well. 
¶4.  (S)  What plans or procedures has the national level 
government prepared for responding to the theft of nuclear 
material?  What plans or procedures have been prepared for 
attacks on nuclear facilities? 
VATESI, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Security 
Agency (VSD) and internal INPP security oversee the physical 
security of the plant and the nuclear materials stored 
therein.  VATESI also conducts inspections of the internal 
security of the plant.  The Ministry of the Interior has a 
special unit dedicated to the security of the plant and 
Lithuanian Air Force personnel are stationed nearby equipped 
with anti-aircraft measures. 
Lithuania has been a member of the Second Line of Defense 
(SLD) Program since 2002.  Working with the Border Guard 
Service, SLD installed radiation detection equipment at the 
Vilnius airport in 2002 and then later at the newly built 
Vilnius airport terminal in 2007.  SLD also replaced gamma 
only equipment with dual channel (neutron and gamma 
detectors) at five border crossings with Russia and Belarus 
in 2007-08. 
¶5.  (S)  How has the addition of the EU-10 affected EURATOM's 
budget and number of inspectors?  How has it affected the 
EURATOM 's and IAEA's workload with respect to safeguards 
Maksimovas told us that there have been no changes in regards 
to IAEA safety inspections with the addition of the EU-10. 
IAEA and EURATOM do joint inspections.  Lithuania is a part 
of the integrated safeguards regime meaning the INPP does 
fewer inspections than before Lithuania joined the regime but 
its inspections can be unannounced except for annual 
inventory inspections.  Maksimovas said IAEA and EURATOM do 
conduct unannounced inspections and monitor transfers of 
materials to fuel storage. 
¶6.  (S)  Do EURATOM inspectors have the necessary resources 
to carry out inspections?  Have there been any changes in 
inspection procedures, or in the number of inspections 
carried out annually? 
Maksimovas said that he hadn't seen any radical changes in 
the quality of EURATOM inspections. 
¶7.  (S)  What has the reaction been among European Union 
member states to having inspections performed by both IAEA 
Maksimovas mentioned no concerns or objections.  When 
Lithuania's trilateral safeguard agreement (between the GOL, 
EURATOM and IAEA) entered into force on January 1, 2008 
reporting changed slightly, mostly affecting format, 
procedure and the order of reporting.  Final information is 
always sent to the IAEA and includes discussion of classical 
safeguards and additional reporting on the nuclear fuel cycle. 
¶8.  (S)  How has joining the European Union affected new 
member states' bilateral IAEA safeguards agreements? 
Maksimovas said joining the EU did not affect Lithuania's 
bilateral relations with the IAEA, and they still conduct 
national and regional level projects, more than a dozen in 
Maksimovas's estimation.