S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000011
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS: PREL MCAP MARR NATO PL EN LH LG GM
SUBJECT: POLISH NON-PAPER ON BALTIC CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
Â¶1. (U) This is a request for guidance. See para 8.
Â¶2. (S) SUMMARY: On January 11, Polish Permanent
Representative Winid delivered a non-paper reflecting
Warsaw's views on the U.S./German proposal to revise the NATO
contingency plan for the defense/reinforcement of Poland to
also include the defense of the Baltic states. He said that
Warsaw had agreed to the proposal, but wanted U.S. support
for Polish ideas on how to implement the proposal in order to
avoid unnecessary delays in the Poland-specific portions of
the plan. Ambassador Daalder promised to raise the Polish
ideas with SACEUR and with Washington. The Polish deputy
assured us after the meeting that Poland would approve
expansion of the plan at the January 20th meeting of the NATO
Military Committee. END SUMMARY.
Â¶3. (S) On January 11, Polish Permanent Representative Winid
delivered a non-paper (see para 9 below) to Ambassador
Daalder reflecting Warsaw's views on the U.S./German proposal
to revise the NATO contingency plan for the
defense/reinforcement of Poland (EAGLE GUARDIAN) to also
include defense of the Baltic states. He said that the
non-paper was only being distributed to Daalder and to German
PermRep Brandenburg, although the missions of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania would also be briefed on its contents.
Â¶4. (S) Winid said that Poland--with his encouragement--had
agreed to the proposal to revise EAGLE GUARDIAN, but that it
had some views and questions about the technical
implementation of the revision. Winid explained that Warsaw
saw three "layers" of approval for the plan (initial
endorsement by SACEUR, formal approval by the NATO Military
Committee, and then promulgation by SACEUR) and wanted to
creatively use these layers to avoid any perception that the
Poland-specific part of the plan was being delayed. He said
that Poland was seeking U.S. support to have SACEUR "endorse"
the Polish portion of the plan as soon as it was ready, but
stressed that after this endorsement the plan could be put on
the shelf until the Baltic portion of the plan had been
concluded, at which point the entire document could go to the
Military Committee for formal approval.
Â¶5. (S) Similarly, Winid said that Poland was seeking U.S.
support for having SACEUR ask JFC Brunssum to informally
begin preparing the necessary supporting plan for the
Poland-specific portion of EAGLE Guardian.
Â¶6. (S) Ambassador Daalder promised to discuss the Polish
requests with SACEUR, as well as with Washington.
Â¶7. (S/NF) COMMENT: Winid was obviously taking great pains to
be as positive about the revision of EAGLE GUARDIAN as
possible. After raising the two issues noted above, he cut
off his own DCM when the DCM tried to interject to raise
additional points. At the same time, Warsaw clearly wants to
mitigate the extent to which "its" plan will be delayed by
the revision. While we intend to double-check the technical
feasibility of the Polish requests, the requests appear
reasonable and constructive. END COMMENT
Â¶8. (S/NF) RFG: Unless otherwise directed we intend to inform
Winid that we will support the Polish requests, assuming our
checks determine that they are technically feasible.
Â¶9. (S/REL POLAND) The full text of the Polish non-paper is
Art. 5: Contingency Planning ) Poland's position
Contingency planning for a reinforcement of relevant parts of
NATO territory during crisis remains (sic) indispensable
element of the Alliance's art. 5 preparedness. Poland
believes that contingency plans should reflect the changed
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geographic scope of the Washington Treaty area, should be
regularly updated, appropriately exercised and underpinned by
other measures, including adequate capability packages.
Poland has constantly supported the development of
contingency planning for the defence of the Baltic States.
Such planning would provide them with necessary strategic
reassurance, showing full Alliance solidarity for any
possible art. 5 situation emerging in this region. We
acknowledge arguments in favour of the assumption that
extending existing contingency plans to the Baltic States
would strengthen the Contingency Plan for the reinforcement
of Poland during crisis.
Poland believes that current update of Contingency Plan EAGLE
GUARDIAN provides an opportunity to address the defence
requirements of the Baltic States. However, a possible
expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN has to be conducted in a careful
manner in order to avoid derailing the whole process or
causing unnecessary delays.
Consequently, Poland wishes to propose the following course
- Current update of EAGLE GUARDIAN should be completed
according to envisaged time-frame. The plan will be endorsed
by SACEUR in February and passed to the Military Committee.
- After endorsement by SACEUR, JFC Brunssum should start
working on development of the supporting plan, CONSTANT
GUARDIAN, without any further delay. Simultaneously, SHAPE
will begin planning for exercising EAGLE GUARDIAN with the
aim of preparing first command post exercise as soon as
- In the Military Committee a consensus will be forged to
expand EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the Baltic States. This
might be done in a form of an additional branch plan or
extended option of EAGLE GUARDIAN. In any case, expanded
EAGLE GUARDIAN should include two distinct elements: the
current option (that does not need to be reopened) and the
- Additional planning for the Baltic States will be developed
by SHAPE as a matter of priority allowing prompt formal
approval of expanded EAGLE GUARDIAN. Poland stands ready to
actively support this process.
Poland believes that proposed steps do not require any
political debate. Consensus on them can be achieved through
informal consultations. We hope that the United States would
take a leading role in engaging NATO Military Authorities and
Allies to ensure support for expansion of EAGLE Guardian.
Contingency planning has to remain internal, strictly
classified NATO process and should not be a part of public